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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems, such as avionics and automobiles, are real-time distributed systems, where
many of the information processing functions require consistent views and actions across distributed
computing nodes. Guaranteeing consistency in these distributed computations is challenging. In
particular, distributed systems are physically asynchronous because system clocks at each node
cannot be perfectly synchronized. Such physical asynchrony, if not properly dealt with, can lead to
distributed race conditions and subsequently result in inconsistent actions and anomalous system
behaviors.
In this thesis, we address this problem and introduce a novel design methodology that guarantees
consistency in real-time distributed computations. At the core of this approach is a complexity-
reducing architectural pattern, called the Physically-Asynchronous Logically-Synchronous (PALS)
system. The PALS system is a formal architectural pattern that engineers can use to develop
distributed applications as if they would operate on a globally synchronous architecture with a
single global clock. The pattern maps the globally synchronous design as a logically synchronous
design executing on the physically asynchronous architecture. It provides significant benefit in
terms of the verification of safety and correctness. The formal verification cost is greatly reduced
since engineers only verify the simple globally synchronous model.
The thesis makes several contributions to the design and development of the PALS system:
C1 - Architectural model definitions: We propose architectural model definitions of the glob-
ally synchronous design and its equivalent logically synchronous design using SAE Architec-
ture Analysis and Design Language (AADL), an industry-standard modeling language.
C2 - Formal pattern specification and analysis: One of the biggest challenges in model-based
engineering is to preserve the verification properties as engineers refine and extend the models
during the development process. We therefore give a formal specification of this pattern and
perform static analysis to detect any error during the system design.
ii
C3 - Multi-rate PALS system: We extend the PALS system to support multi-rate distributed
computations. We provide an architectural analysis to support composition of multiple in-
stances of this pattern in a given system model.
C4 - Middleware design for PALS system: We have developed a middleware to implement
the PALS applications in C++. The middleware addresses several implementation challenges,
e.g. node failure, integration with underlying infrastructure components.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Next generation cyber-physical systems, such as avionics and automobiles, face formidable chal-
lenges in managing the software cost and complexity. With the advancement of hardware tech-
nologies, many of these systems are now capable of executing complex, software-based functions
such as unmanned and autonomous operations, integrating a variety of sensors and monitoring
components, adaptive operations in unknown environments. The size of the on-board software of
these systems has grown exponentially in recent years [1, 2]. The cost of software development has
also increased significantly in these systems. For example, recent studies show that the aircraft
software has doubled every four years since the mid-1990 and is estimated to have 27M SLOC by
2014 at a possible cost of over $10B [3]. This overwhelming cost has become a serious concern for
the growth of these systems.
In these systems, the cost is primarily involved in guaranteeing the system safety and satisfying
the rigorous requirements of the certification authorities. For example, the avionics certification
standard DO-178B [4] requires that testing of Level A software provide complete coverage of all
logical conditions and decisions in the code. Thus, the whole certification process requires more
effort and money to keep up with the growing complexity of these systems. In addition, the recent
avionics certification standard DO-178C (with its formal methods supplement DO-333) [5] provides
guidance using formal methods to satisfy certification activities. Unfortunately, many of the soft-
ware components suffer from the state-explosion problem. Their formal verification is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, in the past, the research and engineering communities
have developed numerous techniques for improving the system safety with fault-avoidance, run-
time monitoring, replication, and design diversity [6, 7, 8, 9]. These techniques are often reused
in new application domains. However, the lack of systematic reuse of the design leads to repeated
verification when applied in a new configuration or application environment.
We need a new breed of software engineering methodologies and theories of complexity control
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to afford the advanced capabilities and maintain progress in these technologies. In a recent collab-
oration with Rockwell Collins Inc. [10, 11], we addressed this problem and proposed a model-based
design methodology where complexity-reducing formal architectural patterns play a significant role.
This methodology extends the concept of classical software patterns [12]. It reduces the cost of
both development and verification of cyber-physical systems by systematically reusing formally
verified architectural patterns and components. In this approach, the system architecture is itera-
tively composed of pre-verified patterns and formally specified components. As long as the pattern
assumptions are satisfied, formal analysis of the system properties can reuse the pattern guarantees
without re-verifying them. This thesis contributes to this broader design objective of composing
cyber-physical systems with architectural patterns. In this thesis, we develop a new formal archi-
tectural pattern that can significantly reduce the design and verification complexities of real-time
distributed applications.
1.1 Problem Statement
Cyber-physical systems are commonly implemented as networked real-time systems consisting of a
network of distributed devices and their controllers. In these systems, many of these computations
are periodic in nature and are triggered by periodic timers based on the local system clock. These
clocks are not perfectly synchronized. Their relative skew can be bounded but cannot be entirely
eliminated.
Distributed computations in these systems are similar to the Globally-Asynchronous Locally-
Synchronous (GALS) system, originally proposed in the hardware community [13, 14]. Embedded
system designers model these computations using the GALS design philosophy. In this design, the
computations in a node execute synchronously by the local clock, but execute asynchronously with
respect to the computations of other nodes.
1.1.1 Design and Verification Complexities of the GALS System
In this thesis, we propose an alternative model of computation to address the design and verification
complexities of the real-time distributed systems. Designing distributed protocols to guarantee
coordination and consistency in a GALS system is extremely difficult. The main source of difficulties
is the asynchronous interactions between different nodes. Because of the clock skews, even a subtle
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timing difference in the execution and communication delay can lead to distributed race conditions.
These race conditions may lead to many serious bugs that are often very difficult to reproduce. In
these cases, a system may operate correctly for a long time, even for years, and suddenly fail after
a change in some logically unrelated hardware, software, or workloads.
To illustrate this problem, consider an example of a triplicated redundant control system that
receives a new reference position or setpoint command from a supervisory controller. Because of
the non-zero clock skews, one controller (say, Controller A) could be in period j + 1, while the
other two (Controller B and C) still be in period j at the time of receiving the setpoint. Since
they receive the setpoint at different periods, Controller A’s control command might diverge from
other two control commands and thus would be voted out. As a result, it leads to an invalid failure
detection of Controller A (even though it is not actually faulty) and results in an undesirable system
configuration where the system is no longer capable of handling a valid fault such as a controller
producing incorrect data.
There are other related technical challenges in the GALS system. First of all, tracking down the
root causes of these race conditions is nontrivial, even with the help of formal analysis tools, such
as model checking. To verify distributed protocols, a model checker has to explore all application
states under all possible event interleaving of messages and node executions. This easily leads
to the state-space explosion problem in a GALS system. For example, during the early stage
of this research, Miller et al. demonstrated this problem in case of an active-standby design of
a dual-redundant avionics application [15]. Even in this simple example, model checking of the
asynchronous model took over 35 hours in NuSMV [16] to discover a counter example.
Secondly, the problem becomes more challenging when an operation requires distributed compu-
tations that interact at different rates. For example, in a fly-by-wire aircraft, the control surfaces
are each locally controlled by higher-level supervisory controllers operating at different rates. These
controllers are deployed redundantly for fault-tolerance. Consistent views and actions are manda-
tory when a component interacts not only with its redundant components for replica management,
but also with other components of the hierarchical system to exchange discrete commands, such as
setpoint, mode change command. The race conditions within these multi-rate distributed compu-
tations significantly complicate the problem.
The complexity of the GALS system can also be contrasted with the simplicity of the globally
synchronous system. A globally synchronous system has a single global clock that drives the
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executions of instructions in each node in lockstep. As a result, a globally synchronous system is
conceptually easy to grasp. Designers are less likely to make errors in this system because of the
single global clock. Hence, system engineers often start the design phase with a globally synchronous
model. However, a perfect clock synchronization is not realistic for networked systems. The design
must be modified to make it work in the GALS system. Such modifications are usually non-trivial
and may introduce more errors when performed in an ad-hoc manner [17]. These changes also
limit the reusability of the design and verification without any formal specification and analysis.
For example, if the network topology or the processor mapping changes, one must be able to prove
that the behavioral characteristics can still be preserved. Furthermore, these solutions also add
complexity by requiring additional handshaking protocols to guarantee consistency [18, 19, 20].
1.2 Contributions of This Thesis
This thesis provides the design and development techniques to address these problems. These tech-
niques are based on a complexity-reducing architectural pattern for logical synchronization, called
the Physically-Asynchronous Logically-Synchronous (PALS) system [21, 22, 15]. This pattern is ap-
plicable to hard real-time systems that guarantee message delivery in bounded time and bounded
clock skews. In this pattern, the architecture is physically asynchronous since computations at
different nodes are still driven by asynchronous local clocks; but logically synchronous since the
computations have the same logical behavior as those in a globally synchronous architecture.
This pattern facilitates a new system engineering approach for the design and verification of real-
time distributed systems. In this approach, engineers design and verify distributed applications
as though the computations would execute on a globally synchronous architecture. Later, this
synchronous design can be systematically distributed over a physically asynchronous architecture
without any modification of application logic and properties. Thus, it gives a feasible verification for
large scale systems since the state space of the globally synchronous design is orders of magnitude
smaller than that of the GALS system.
In this thesis, we provide a comprehensive view of the recent works on the PALS system design
and development. In our earlier work [23], we have presented a model-based implementation of
the globally synchronous design as a logically synchronous design in the physically asynchronous
architecture. We have also developed an early prototype of a middleware for this pattern. The
basic features of this prototype are described in [15]. This thesis extends these concepts of model-
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based engineering and middleware development. In the following, we summarize these extensions
and overall contributions:
C1 - Architectural model definitions: Architectural models are more commonly used to man-
age the complexity of cyber-physical systems. In this thesis, we provide architectural model
definitions to incorporate the PALS pattern in model-based engineering. We use SAE Archi-
tecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [24] for the pattern modeling. AADL is an
architecture description language to model embedded applications and their execution plat-
forms1. We have chosen AADL because of its support for architectural analysis and growing
popularity in the cyber-physical system community. We propose an architectural model defi-
nition of the globally synchronous design in AADL (Section 3.2). Our colleagues, Kyungmin
Bae, Peter O¨lveczky, and Jose´ Meseguer provide formal semantics of this model to verify
the globally synchronous design in Real-Time Maude [25]. We also provide architectural
model definitions to model the logically synchronous design in the physically asynchronous
architecture (Section 4.1, 4.5).
C2 - Formal pattern specification and analysis: We give a formal specification of this pat-
tern. This pattern gives a generic architecture for a correctness-preserving mapping of the
globally synchronous AADL design to the logically synchronous AADL design (Section 4.3).
One of the biggest challenges in model-based engineering is to preserve the verification prop-
erties as engineers refine and extend the models during the development process. We therefore
support an analysis framework to validate the correctness of the implementation (Section 4.3).
Based on the specification, we also support a reverse transformation from the PALS model
to the globally synchronous model (Section 4.4).
C3 - Multi-rate PALS system: The original PALS pattern works for distributed tasks exe-
cuting at the same rate. While this is useful for some common fault-tolerant applications
(executing at the same rate), the pattern needs to be extended to support multi-rate compu-
tations. This thesis gives an extension, called multi-rate PALS system, to support multi-rate
computations (Section 5.2-5.3). For example. we can apply this pattern in a hierarchical
control system to coordinate the hierarchical computations executing at different rates. We
1In Appendix A, we give a brief introduction of AADL. Readers, who are not familiar with AADL, are encouraged
to read the chapter in the appendix first before reading Chapter 3-5.
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also provide an architectural analysis to support the composition of multiple instances of this
pattern (Section 5.4).
C4 - Middleware design for PALS system: With our colleague Dr. Cheolgi Kim, we have de-
veloped a new middleware, called PALSware, to support a robust implementation of the PALS
system. We present a layered design for this middleware that is both reusable in different
system architectures and extendable with architecture-specific solutions for fault manage-
ment (Section 6.1). The middleware guarantees consistency in distributed applications by
eliminating the asynchronous interactions resulting from the node failure (Section 6.3). It
also guarantees atomicity in logically synchronous interactions (Section 6.4). In this thesis,
we demonstrate the middleware in an academic control testbed and show the consistency in
a fault injection framework designed for this middleware (Chapter 7).
1.3 References
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CHAPTER 2
PALS SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this chapter, we give an overview of the PALS system. The objective is to provide an intuition
of how the PALS system can have logically equivalent behavior as the globally synchronous model.
In Section 2.1, we discuss the system characteristics that must be guaranteed prior to applying this
pattern. In Section 2.2, we discuss the main rules of this pattern. These rules are first described
by Sha et al. [21]. Meseguer and O¨lveczky give the formal proof of these rules in [22]. At the end
of this chapter, in Section 2.3, we give an overview of the model-based design of the PALS system.
2.1 PALS System Model
The PALS system is applicable to hard real-time systems that guarantee real-time, reliable message
transmission and bounded clock skews. It envisions a logically synchronous distributed real-time
architecture, in which a group of periodic distributed tasks (M1,M2, . . . ,MN ) collaborate for fault-
tolerant monitoring and control of physical systems and processes. In this pattern, these tasks
execute periodically with the same period T .1 The pattern is applied to guarantee consistent views
and actions during the coordination of these computations.
The pattern assumes following system parameters and their bounds:
1. Each node of the distributed architecture has a monotonically non-decreasing local clock,
c : Time → Time (Time = R≥0). Here, c(t) = x is the local clock time x at the “ideal”
global time t. Furthermore, we define tc : Time → Time such that tc(x) denotes the earliest
global time at which a local clock shows x, i.e. tc(x) = inf{t | c(t) ≥ x}.
2. Since the clocks are not perfect, they drift apart over the period of time. We assume that the
clock drift rate is bounded and the local clocks are synchronized to extent that corresponding
local clock times happen within a 2 interval in global time. If the maximum clock drift rate
1In Chapter 5, we consider the logical synchronization between multi-rate computations.
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is ρ, then
1− ρ ≤ c(t1)− c(t2)
t1 − t2 ≤ 1 + ρ
Let c(t1) = x, then t1 happens in the global time interval [x − , x + ]. Therefore, for any
two clocks, c1 and c2, if c1(t1) = c2(t2) = x, then |t1 − t2| ≤ 2.  is defined as the worst-case
clock skew with respect to the global time. In this thesis, we assume that when a clock is
ahead/behind, it should be corrected by decreasing/increasing its rate of progress. A clock
value that goes backwards or has large jumps generates serious errors in the computation of
velocity and acceleration in control systems.
3. Response time of a computation task, α is bounded, i.e. 0 < αmin ≤ α ≤ αmax. The response
time of a task is based on the scheduling policy and other tasks running in the same node.
4. Message transmission delay, µ is bounded, i.e., 0 < µmin ≤ µ ≤ µmax. µ includes the network
queuing and scheduling delays during the message transmission.
5. Nodes are fail-stop and may recover later. The output of a crashed node is assumed to be
‘null’. A failed node must not be able to send extra messages during a period. This could
result in tasks receiving messages inconsistently.2
Note 1: These assumptions are realizable in existing real-time systems, such as avionics. These
systems have bounds for clock skew, response time, and message transmission delay. For example,
the nodes in an avionic system communicate through a fault-tolerant, real-time network. The
communication architecture guarantees real-time, reliable delivery of messages. Furthermore, the
nodes synchronize the clocks to minimize the jitter of sampling and control operations.
Note 2: The PALS pattern is applicable in the coordination of distributed computations that
require consistent views and actions at different nodes. For example, the supervisory control logic of
a flight control system performs various discrete mode control, e.g. selecting the primary controller
in a dual-redundant flight control system. The supervisory control logic uses the PALS pattern to
guarantee consistency during the mode changes. On the other hand, there are local computations
in a node that only depend on the local state. For example, health monitoring of the internal
subsystems at a node is a local computation. These local computations can be implemented
without this pattern since they do not have to be synchronized with other nodes.
2We discuss the fault model of the PALS system in Chapter 6.
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2.2 PALS System Rules
(a) Globally Synhronous System
(b) PALS System
Time
Period j
Period j+1
PALS lok
period j
PALS lok period = T2ǫ
PALS lok
period j+1
msgs
msgs
msgs
msgs
msgs
msgs
msgs
msgs
M2
M3
M1
M2
M3
M1
Period = T
Figure 2.1: Logically equivalent globally synchronous system and PALS system.
The main concept of logical synchronization in the PALS system is simple and is illustrated in
Figure 2.1. In the globally synchronous system, the distributed tasks are triggered periodically by
the global clock with a period T . Thus, these tasks dispatch in lockstep at the same global time.
At each dispatch, a task reads messages from its input ports, processes the messages and sends its
output messages to other nodes. In this lockstep execution, messages generated during the period
j are always consumed by their destination tasks in the period j + 1.
The PALS system guarantees an equivalent lockstep (synchronous) execution in the physically
asynchronous architecture. In this architecture, the distributed tasks are now triggered periodically
by the local clocks with the same period T . Since the local clocks are asynchronous, these tasks do
not dispatch at the same global time. Despite these asynchronous dispatches, the PALS system will
guarantee that these tasks dispatch within well-defined periodic intervals and messages generated
during the period j are always consumed by their destination tasks in the period j + 1. As a result,
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the input views and operations of the tasks become identical to those in the synchronous model
running with the same period.
The PALS system must satisfy some timing and external input constraints to achieve the logical
synchronization. In the following subsections, we discuss these rules. (Later in Chapter 4, we will
present a checker that validate these rules on the AADL models of the physically asynchronous
system.)
2.2.1 R1 - PALS Clock Events
The PALS system defines a logical clock or timer, called PALS clock, to dispatch each distributed
task. This logical clock defines a sequence of periodic events, called PALS clock events. In the
PALS system, these PALS clock events happen at a regular interval when the local clock c equals
to jT,∀ j ∈ N . Here, T is the period of the distributed task. T is also referred to as the PALS
clock period interval. In this case, we assume that the PALS clock events start from a pre-defined
origin, called epoch3.
However, the PALS clock events do not happen at the same global time in different nodes. In
a physically asynchronous architecture with a bounded clock skew of , the jth PALS clock event
happens between the global time jT −  and jT + . We refer the interval between two consecutive
PALS clock events at tc(jT ) and tc((j + 1)T ) as the PALS clock period j.
2.2.2 R2 - PALS Causality or Output Hold Constraint
Since the PALS clock events are not perfectly synchronized, delivering a task’s outputs too early
may result in the violation of the lockstep synchronization. It is possible that a message sent at
the PALS clock period j could be consumed in the same PALS clock period j at a destination task.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.2. M1 is a sender and M2 is a receiver with local clocks c1
and c2, respectively. In this figure, the PALS clock period j starts at the global time t1 = tc1(jT )
in M1 and at the global time t2 = tc2(jT ) in M2. Suppose that the end-to-end delay from M1 to
M2 is smaller than 2. That is, α+µ < 2. In this condition, if the M2’s clock lags behind the M1’s
clock, M2 might receive the message before t2 = tc2(jT ). In a globally synchronous system, this
could not happen without violating the causality. For the clock skew condition shown in Figure 2.2,
3For example, the epoch for the UNIX system is January, 1, 1970 00:00.
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this potentially leads to inconsistent input views at different destination tasks, when other tasks
consume the same message during the PALS clock period j + 1.
2.ǫ
M1
M2
t1 t2 t3 t4
µα
c1(t1) = jT
c2(t2) = jT
c1(t3) = (j + 1)T
c2(t4) = (j + 1)T
Time
msg
Figure 2.2: Violation of causality.
In order to prevent this erroneous condition, a task executing during the PALS clock period j is
not allowed to send a message earlier than tc1(jT +H), where H = max(2− µmin, 0).
2.2.3 R3 - PALS Clock Period Constraint
The distributed computation of a node requires at least the delay of end-to-end computation and
message transmission to know the state of the computations in other nodes. Hence, the distributed
computations in a PALS system must run at a period longer than this delay. The PALS system
defines an optimal lower bound for the PALS clock period, which is given below:
T > 2+max(αmax, 2− µmin) + µmax. (2.1)
H
Time2ǫ
αmax µmax
msg
M2
M1
c1(t2) = jT
c2(t1) = jT
c1(t4) = (j + 1)T
c2(t3) = (j + 1)T
t2 =
jT + ǫ
t1 =
jT − ǫ
t3 =
(j + 1)T − ǫ
t4 =
(j + 1)T + ǫ
Figure 2.3: PALS clock period constraint.
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To explain this constraint, consider a worst-case clock synchronization illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Here, the clock c2 of M2 (the receiver) leads the clock c1 of M1 (the sender) by 2. In this figure,
the PALS clock period j starts at the global time t2 = tc1(jT ) = jT +  in M1. The PALS clock
period j + 1 starts at the global time t3 = tc2((j + 1)T ) = (j + 1)T −  in M2. We need to ensure
that a message sent by M1 from the PALS clock period j will reach M2 before the next PALS
clock period j + 1 at t3 = tc2((j + 1)T ). As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the latest time at which
M1 transmits its messages on the network is tc1(jT + max(H,α
max)), which can be as late as
(jT + max(H,αmax) + ). The maximum message transmission delay is µmax. It is easy to show
that M2 receives a message before the next PALS clock period j + 1, when PALS clock period,
T > 2+max(αmax, H) + µmax.
Based on this constraint, the PALS system achieves an optimal logical synchronization. In [21,
22], we prove the optimality of the PALS system. The argument for the optimality is simple. The
lower bound of the PALS clock period is equal to the worst-case end-to-end delay considering the
worst-case clock skew. In a distributed system, we need at least the worst-case end-to-end delay
time to achieve consistency at the distributed nodes.
Note: If a task transmits its message always after an interval H = max(2− µmin, 0), the PALS
causality constraint is trivially satisfied. Thus, αmax is always greater than max(2 − µmin, 0).
Hence, the PALS clock period constraint is T > 2+αmax+µmax. This is also true when 2 ≤ µmin.
2.2.4 R4 - Environment Input and Output Synchronizer
In the PALS system, it is mandatory that the participating computations have consistent inputs
in each PALS clock period. However, when an input source does not follow the above-mentioned
timing constraints, the input may be potentially received in different PALS clock periods at the
destinations tasks.
The PALS system therefore supports consistent delivery of external input messages. In a PALS
system, we define a special component called, environment input synchronizer. An environment
input synchronizer guarantees that the receiving tasks receive the external messages consistently
in the same PALS clock period. It receives external messages asynchronously but delivers them
synchronously to the intended receiving tasks. In the simplest form, an environment input synchro-
nizer is a periodic task satisfying both PALS clock period constraint and PALS causality constraint.
In this design, if an external input is received during the PALS clock period j, the environment in-
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put synchronizer re-transmits this input to the distributed computations at the PALS clock period
j + 1. Thus, the PALS tasks receive an external input consistently in the same period. In [15], we
give an implementation of a fault-tolerant, environment input synchronizer.
Similarly, one may use an environment output synchronizer to have a consistent view of the
PALS computations at the external observers. The environment output synchronizer also executes
in a similar way as other PALS computations and satisfies the above-mentioned timing constraints.
2.3 Overview of the PALS System Design
Based on the rules and system parameters of Section 2.1 and 2.2, one can design a PALS system
that is logically equivalent to a globally synchronous system [21, 22]. The pattern thus enables
a new design approach to apply the globally synchronous design systematically over a physically
asynchronous architecture and preserve its correctness. In this thesis, we demonstrate this process
for the architectural models in AADL. Figure 2.4 illustrates the steps of the design and verification
of the PALS system models in AADL.
Synchronous design specification
(Synchronous AADL)
PALS pattern specification
(AADL) 
Synchronous design specification
(Real-time Maude)
SynchAADL to 
Real-time Maude 
translation
PALS middleware specification
(AADL)
1. Instantiation
2. Middleware
implementation
PALS software
(C++/Java)
Mapping
Figure 2.4: PALS pattern based design flow.
The first step is the design and verification of the synchronous design. With our colleagues
at UIUC and University of Oslo, we have proposed a specification of the synchronous design in
AADL [25]. This synchronous AADL specification models the lockstep execution of the globally
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synchronous computations (Chapter 3). The synchronous AADL models are verified in Real-Time
Maude [28], a formal verification tool for model checking and simulation.
We then map the synchronous AADL model onto the logically synchronous AADL model in a
physically asynchronous platform according to our proposed pattern specification. In this thesis,
we obtain the final PALS models in two steps. In the first step, we obtain a logically synchronous
model by extending the globally synchronous model. We validate the timing requirements to
guarantee the logical synchronization in the physically asynchronous model. This model however
does not provide any modeling of the middleware or implementation components. It assumes that
the implementation of this model satisfies the model’s timing and scheduling parameters. In the
second step of the implementation, we extend the model to add middleware components to execute
the verified globally synchronous model. In Chapter 4, we provide a detailed discussion of the PALS
pattern specification and implementation. Eventually, the AADL specification must be translated
into the software. An automatic or semi-automatic code generation is out of scope of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
SYNCHRONOUS AADL SPECIFICATION
The first step of the PALS system implementation is the design and verification of the globally syn-
chronous design. With our colleagues, we have proposed a specification of the globally synchronous
design in AADL [25]. We later use the Synchronous AADL model as the input to the proposed
PALS pattern in Chapter 4. The contents of this chapter are based on our paper published at
ICFEM 2011 [25]. In the original work, we solve four problems:
• We specify a fragment of AADL, called Synchronous AADL, in which synchronous models
can be defined.
• We provide the formal semantics to map models in Synchronous AADL to rewrite theories
in Real-Time Maude, where such models can be simulated and verified by model checking.
• We develop an automatic verification tool, called SynchAADL2Maude, that automatically
translates the Synchronous AADL model to Real-Time Maude specification.
• We illustrate this formal verification process for a dual-redundant active-standby model.
We can formally verify this Synchronous AADL model in less than 10 second, whereas it
is impossible to verify the corresponding asynchronous model because of the state-space
explosion.
My contribution to this paper is limited to the specification and validation of a Synchronous
AADL design. Since this thesis focuses on the architectural description of the PALS system, we
only discuss the Synchronous AADL model definition and illustrate it with an example in this
chapter. We refer to the original paper for the formal verification of the AADL model. We also
present an architectural analysis that validates the Synchronous AADL model before verifying it
in Real-Time Maude.
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3.1 Synchronous Model
In the following, we provide a brief intuitive explanation of the synchronous model. This model is
formalized in [22]. We assume that there are N distributed tasks that participate in a distributed
interaction on a globally synchronous architecture. In the Synchronous AADL model, the behavior
of each distributed task is modeled as as a deterministic typed machine M . Each typed machine
is defined as an automaton M = (Di, S,Do, δM ), consisting of a set of states S, sets Di and Do of
outputs, and a next-state-and-output-function, δM : (Di×S)→ (S×Do). In this model, the input
and output sets can be given by the Cartesian products of the data sets of basic data types of the
task’s input and output ports.
For the external components that are not synchronized with the distributed tasks, this model con-
siders an environment component that generates nondeterministic input to the tasks. In this model,
the environment generates input messages based on user-defined constraints. In this synchronous
model, constraints on the values generated by the environment can be defined as a satisfiable pred-
icate ce : D
e
o → Bool so that ce(d1, . . . , dme) is true if and only if the environment can generate
output (d1, . . . , dme).
M1
M3
M2
Figure 3.1: A machine ensemble.
The Synchronous AADL forms a synchronous composition of a collection of deterministic typed
machines, a nondeterministic environment, and a wiring diagram that connects the machines.
Fig. 3.1 gives an example of this “wiring diagram”. An ensemble has a synchronous semantics that
all machines perform a transition simultaneously, and whenever a machine has a feedback wire
to itself and/or to any other machine, then the corresponding output becomes an input for any
such machine at the next step. Meseguer and O¨lveczky show a further improvement by composing
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these distributed state machines into a single state machine so that model checking becomes more
efficient [22].
3.2 AADL Model Definition
We define Synchronous AADL as an annotated sublanguage of AADL. In this specification, each
typed machine of the synchronous model is designed as an AADL thread that executes periodically.
In each period, the thread reads messages from the input ports, performs the state transitions and
produce output messages. The execution of each thread in each period is independent of the other
threads, and where output generated by a thread in a period is available as input at the receiving
thread exactly at the beginning of the next period.
Since Synchronous AADL is intended to model synchronous designs as opposed to asynchronous
implementations, it ignores the hardware and scheduling features of AADL. Synchronous AADL
therefore focuses on the behavioral and structural subset of AADL, namely, hierarchical system,
process, and thread components, ports, connections, and thread behaviors1.
We next discuss the definition of Synchronous AADL.
Property set. Synchronous AADL adds a property set SynchAADL to declare Synchronous AADL-
specific properties as explained below.
Dispatch. The dispatch protocol is used to trigger an execution of an AADL thread. A periodic
thread is dispatched at the beginning of each new period of the thread. In aperiodic, sporadic,
timed, and hybrid dispatch, a thread is dispatched when it receives an event. Such event-triggered
dispatch is not suitable to define a system in which all threads (with a possible exception for the
environment thread) should execute in lockstep, since the sending thread triggers the execution of
the receiving thread, which would read in its jth period the output generated by the sender in the
same period. Therefore, each thread must have periodic dispatch. Furthermore, since each thread
must execute in each period, the period of all the threads must be the same.
Communication. There are three kinds of ports in AADL: data, event, and event data ports.
Event and event data ports can be used to dispatch event-triggered threads. To have only AADL
1The thread behavior is modeled in the Behavior Annex standard [29]. An annex allows a user to extend the
AADL language with specialized notations and modeling capabilities. The Behavior Annex defines the states, the
variables, and the state transitions of a thread or a subprogram.
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constructs that define “synchronous behaviors”, the communication primitives must ensure that
all output generated in a period is available to the receiver at the beginning of the next period,
and not earlier.
The AADL standard defines three timing semantics for the data connections: sampled, imme-
diate, and delayed connection timing. According to the AADL standard [24, Section 9.2.5], a
periodic destination thread uses the sampled data port connection to sample a data stream. Since
the sampling at a destination thread is independent of the source thread, the sampling can result
in a non-deterministic message exchange depending on the availability of the output message. In
Synchronous AADL, we intend to support deterministic message communication. We therefore do
not use sampled data connections.
AADL supports deterministic message communication for immediate and delayed connections
between periodic threads. We however find the delayed data connections to be suitable for the
lockstep synchronous communication.
The immediate data connections impose a strict scheduling order between the source and the
destination threads. When both source and destination threads dispatch at the same time, the
scheduler delays the dispatch of the destination thread until the source thread has completed its
execution. In our setting, since the threads execute with the same period and the dispatch time
of the source and destination threads coincide, an immediate connection will cause the destination
thread to receive the output messages in the same period. As a result, the immediate connection
timing violates the intended “lock-step” semantics of the Synchronous AADL model.
On the other hand, for a delayed connection, the value from the sender is transmitted at its
deadline and is available to the receiver at its next dispatch. In our setting, where all threads
have periodic dispatch with the same period, the output generated in a period is, therefore, avail-
able at the start of the next period. Since only data ports have delayed connections, and since
event-triggered dispatches are excluded, only data ports are used in Synchronous AADL, and all
connections between non-environment threads must be delayed.
Execution times. In a real-time distributed system, the execution times of the threads are
bounded. Since the threads execute in lock-step and the destination threads receive the messages
only at the next period, for simplicity, we can assume that thread executions are instantaneous.
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Deterministic threads. In the systems targeted by PALS and Synchronous AADL, the nodes
that communicate with the environment are invariably deterministic. We therefore assume that
the the behavior of a non-environment thread is deterministic. Each such thread has the property
SynchAADL::Deterministic => true.
Environment thread. In Synchronous AADL, the environment thread generates output non-
deterministically in each period. The possible outputs can often be defined by an environment
constraint ce so that ce(~o) is true if and only if the environment can nondeterministically generate
output ~o in any iteration. The property SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => true denotes that the
thread is an environment thread, and SynchAADL::InputConstraints => ("Boolean formula")
defines an input constraint on a set of Boolean-valued outputs. We assume that a Synchronous
AADL system has at most one environment thread.
It seems natural to regard the system as responding to the current environment output. We,
therefore, support only immediate connections from the environment. According to the AADL
semantics, this forces the environment to execute before the other nodes in each period.
Note: In PALS, external inputs are propagated through the environment input synchronizer.
In Synchronous AADL, the environment input synchronizer must be modeled as a deterministic
typed machine. The environment input synchronizer acts as a relay between the environment
thread and other deterministic typed machine. The environment input synchronizer receives the
external inputs from the environment thread in each period by using immediate connections. On
the other hand, the environment input synchronizer uses delayed connections to propagate the data
to other deterministic typed machines.
Declaring synchronous systems. The top-level system component declares the entire system
to execute synchronously by declaring SynchAADL::Synchronous => true. The period of the
system can be declared by SynchAADL::SynchPeriod => p. A Synchronous AADL model defines
a synchronous machine ensemble in the obvious way, as mentioned above.
In summary, Table 3.1 lists the AADL properties of SynchAADL that we use to annotate the
components and the connections in Synchronous AADL. In Appendix B.1, we provide the AADL
definitions of these properties.
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Property name Type Explanation
Synchronous Boolean If the top-level encapsulating system contains synchronously
executing threads. The threads inherits this property, too.
SynchPeriod Time Period of the synchronously executing threads.
IsEnvironment Boolean If a thread is environment or not.
Deterministic Boolean If a thread is deterministic or not. A synchronously executing,
non-environment thread is assumed to be deterministic.
Table 3.1: Synchronous AADL property set, SynchAADL
3.3 Active-Standby System
We exemplify Synchronous AADL with fragments of a model of a dual-redundant system, called
the active-standby system. This example is originally presented in our previous paper [15].
3.3.1 Description
The active-standby system consists of two physically separated components: Side1 and Side2.
They are connected by a fault-tolerant real-time network. Only one side should operate in the
active mode, while the other stays in the standby mode.
In this illustration of Synchronous AADL, we focus on the logic for deciding which side is active.
Each side can fail independently, but both of them cannot fail at the same time. A failed side can
recover after failure. When one side fails, the non-failed side should be the active side. In addition,
the user can send commands to these components to toggle their active-standby status and switch
the active side. The full functionality of each side depends on the two sides’ perception of the
availability or accuracy of other subsystems. Each side can sense the status of the subsystems
and determine if the subsystems are fully available or not. There are five requirements that the
coordination logic must satisfy [15]:
1. Both sides should agree on which side is active (provided neither side has failed, the avail-
ability of a side has not changed, and the user has not issued a command for switching the
active side).
2. A side that is not fully available should not be the active side if the other side is fully available
(assuming that at least one side is fully functional and the partial failure is detectable).
3. The user can always change the active side when both sides are fully functional.
4. If a side is failed the other side should become active.
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5. The active side should not change unless the availability of a side changes, the failed status
of a side changes, or the user commands.
Figure 3.2: The architecture of the active-standby system.
The architecture of the system is shown in Figure 3.2. We model an environment component as
Environment. Each time Environment dispatches, it nondeterministically sends 5 Boolean values,
one through each ports. The environment data, side1Failed and side2Failed, are used to inject
failure to these sides. manualSelection is used to model a switch command from the user. If
manualSelection = true, then the user commands to switch the active side. side1FullyAvailable
and side2FullyAvailable are two boolean inputs to model the full availability of Side1 and Side2,
respectively. These two variables in our model capture the overall statuses of subsystems dedicated
for both Side1 and Side22. In this model, we assume that the statuses of different subsystems are
available to both sides.
In this model, both sides exchange their status through the outputs: side1ActiveSide and
side2ActiveSide. They capture the active, standby or failure status of these components. For
example,
• If Side1 is active, then Side1 outputs side1ActiveSide = 1.
• If Side2 is active, Side1 outputs side1ActiveSide = 2.
2In the physically asynchronous model, an environment input synchronizer distributes these data.
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• Otherwise, if Side1 is failed, the default output of side1ActiveSide is 0. Side2 then becomes
active observing this value.
Thus, both sides agree on which one is active when side1ActiveSide = side2ActiveSide (Require-
ment 1).
3.3.2 The Synchronous AADL Model
The following top-level system implementation declares the architecture of the system, with the
three subcomponents sideOne, sideTwo, and env, and with immediate data connections (denoted
with property Timing=>Immediate) from the environment to the two sides, and with delayed data
connections (Timing=>Delayed) between the two sides. The top-level system component also shows
the thread dispatch and the SyncAADL properties for the synchronous threads in the system. Parts
of the model are replaced by ‘...’. We provide the complete Synchronous AADL model of the
active-standby system in Appendix C.
system implementation ActiveStandbySystem.impl
subcomponents
sideOne: system Side1.impl;
sideTwo: system Side2.impl;
env: system Environment.impl;
connections
C1: port sideOne.side1ActiveSide -> sideTwo.side1ActiveSide;
C2: port sideTwo.side2ActiveSide -> sideOne.side2ActiveSide;
C3: port env.side1FullyAvail -> sideOne.side1FullyAvail;
C4: port env.side1FullyAvail -> sideOne.side1FullyAvail;
...
properties
SynchAADL::Synchronous => true;
SynchAADL::SynchPeriod => 2 ms;
Timing => Delayed applies to C1;
Timing => Delayed applies to C2;
Timing => Immediate applies to C3;
Timing => Immediate applies to C4;
SynchAADL::Deterministic => true applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => false applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
Period => 2 ms applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
...
end ActiveStandbySystem.impl;
Inside the sideOne and sideTwo systems, there is a thread that interacts in this configuration.
For example, Side1Thread is defined in Side1. We model the state transitions of these threads
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using the AADL Behavior Annex notations for states and transitions. Here, we show the thread
implementation inside Side1. Side1Thread defines the thread type and Side1Thread.impl is the
thread implementation.
thread Side1Thread
features
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side1Thread;
thread implementation Side1Thread.impl
annex behavior_specification {**
states
preInit: initial complete state;
side1ActiveState, side2ActiveState, ...: complete state;
side2ActiveState_tmp , ... : state;
state variables
prevSide2ActiveStatus: Base_Types::Integer; prevManSwitch: Base_Types::Boolean;
transitions
...
side2ActiveState -[ on dispatch ]-> side2ActiveState_tmp;
side2ActiveState_tmp -[side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 and
side1FullyAvail = true and ((prevManSwitch = false and
manualSelection = true) or
side2FullyAvail = false)]-> side1ActiveState
{side1ActiveSide := 1; prevSide2ActiveStatus := side2ActiveSide;
prevManSwitch := manualSelection};
...
**};
end Side1Thread.impl;
We show only one state transition in this thread, in which Side1 becomes active upon re-
ceiving the manualSelection input from the user. The transition takes the thread from state
side2ActiveState to state side1ActiveState if the input received in the side1Failed port is
false, the value received in the port side2ActiveSide is different from 0, etc. As a result of
applying the transition, the value 1 is sent through the output port side1ActiveSide, and the
local variables prevSide2ActiveStatus and prevManSwitch are assigned the values received in
the ports side2ActiveSide and manualSelection, respectively.3
3A state transition in a periodic thread typically happens in two steps in Behavior Annex. The first step is about
the dispatch of the thread. In the next step, we can use the input and state variables to define the actual transition.
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The following code shows the thread component implementing the environment. We do not show
the definition of the system env containing this thread component:
thread EnvironmentThread
features
side1FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
manualSelection: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
end EnvironmentThread;
thread implementation EnvironmentThread.impl
properties
SynchAADL::InputConstraints => ("not (s1F and s2F)"); SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => true;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
Period => 2 ms;
annex behavior_specification {**
states
s0 : initial complete final state;
state variables
s1FA: Base_Types::Boolean; s2FA: Base_Types::Boolean; mS: Base_Types::Boolean;
s1F: Base_Types::Boolean; s2F: Base_Types::Boolean;
transitions
s0 -[on dispatch]-> s0 { side1FullyAvail := s1FA; side2FullyAvail := s2FA;
manualSelection := mS; side1Failed := s1F; side2Failed := s2F};
**};
end EnvironmentThread.impl;
The environment has a single transition, that sends the values of the state variables s1FA, s2FA,
mS, s1F, and s2F to the corresponding output ports. In each periodic dispatch of this thread, we
execute this transition and assign any values that can satisfy the constraint not (s1F and s2F).
Hence, both sides do not fail at the same time.
3.4 Static Analysis
We have developed a static analysis tool to check the rules of Synchronous AADL. A model using
Synchronous AADL needs to satisfy these rules before it can be considered for the formal verifica-
tion. We have developed a plug-in for the Open Source AADL Tool Environment (OSATE), the
AADL development environment [30]. OSATE is the development environment for AADL-based
model development and analysis. It is built as a set of plug-ins in the open source Eclipse platform.
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We use the OSATE API to traverse the Synchronous AADL model and check if the required AADL
properties of threads and connections follow the Synchronous AADL specification.
Explanation of the symbols. For brevity, we use first-order logic to describe the rules. We
consider that Synchronous AADL configuration of a top-level system component S is given by
Gsync = (Threadssync, Connssync). It consists of the set of threads, Threadssync = {Mi} and
the set of thread connections, Connssync = ∪i,jConnssync(Mi,Mj), where Connssync(Mi,Mj) is
the set of all connections from a thread Mi to another thread Mj . The set of all connections to
a thread Mj is also given by Conn(∗,Mj). For each connection Cn, we assume that Cn.SrcPort
and Cn.DstPort provide information on the source and the destination port of the connection, re-
spectively. We also assume that Cn.Src and Cn.Dst give the corresponding source and destination
thread, respectively.
We use the notation T.PropertyName to give the values of an AADL property of T , where T
is an AADL construct, e.g. component, connection or port. For example, Mi.Dispatch Protocol
gives the Dispatch Protocol property value of a thread Mi. The return values may be Periodic,
Aperiodic, etc. Mi.P eriod gives the Period property value of a thread Mi. Similarly, we get the
values of the SynchPeriod, Deterministic, IsEnvironment, Synchronous, SynchPeriod prop-
erties defined in Synchronous AADL. We assume that if a property is not defined, the property
returns a default undefined value.
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Sync R1. The top-level system component S is synchronous.
S.Synchronous = true.
Sync R2. The threads of the Synchronous AADL model are periodic.
∀Mi∈Threadssync Mi.Dispatch Protocol = Periodic
Sync R3. Both SynchPeriod and Period must be defined for each thread. They must be equal.
∀Mi∈Threadssync Mi.SynchPeriod 6= undefined ∧ Mi.SynchPeriod = Mi.P eriod
Sync R4. All non-environment threads are deterministic.
∀Mi∈Threadssync Mi.IsEnvironment 6= false → Mi.Deterministic = true
Sync R5. All data connections in Synchronous AADL are data port connections.
∀Cn∈Connssync (Cn.SrcPort).type = (Cn.DstPort).type = ‘data port′
Sync R6. The connections to the non-environment threads use delayed timing.
∀Cn∈Connssync Cn.Dst.IsEnvironment = false→ Cn.T iming = delayed
Sync R7. The connections from the environment threads use immediate timing.
∀Cn∈Connssync Cn.Src.IsEnvironment = true→ Cn.T iming = immediate
Table 3.2: Synchronous AADL rules.
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CHAPTER 4
PALS PATTERN SPECIFICATION AND ANALYSIS
The PALS system executes the globally synchronous model onto a physically asynchronous architec-
ture. The proof of the logical equivalence between the PALS system and the globally synchronous
system is provided in [21, 22]. However, such logical equivalence does not immediately produce
correct asynchronous designs. Validation of the asynchronous implementation is still a developer’s
responsibility. In the absence of any generic analysis framework, each implementation must go
through a costly validation process to prove the logical synchronization.
We therefore propose a formal pattern specification and analysis framework for the PALS system
in this thesis. In our proposed approach, system engineers model the Synchronous AADL model of
an application and transform this model to work on a physically asynchronous architecture. In a
model-based design, this architectural transformation involves component inheritance, modification
of architectural features or properties, etc. In this thesis, we do not provide a tool to have an
automatic transformation of the Synchronous AADL model. Since the goal for the PALS design
philosophy is to provide a correct-by- construction architecture for logical synchronization, we
instead provide an analysis framework that works for different instantiations of this pattern. This
framework validates the assumptions and rules of Chapter 2 to show that the transformation is
correctly implemented and the resulting model is logically synchronous.
In following section, we present the AADL model definition of the logically synchronous design.
We illustrate this specification in an active-standby system in Section 4.2. We then present the
mapping of the Synchronous AADL model to the PALS model and the analysis rules in Section 4.3.
In Section 4.4, we discuss a reverse transformation process to generate the synchronous model auto-
matically from a PALS model. Finally in Section 4.5, we discuss the basic middleware components
of the PALS system in AADL.
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4.1 AADL Model Definition
In this section, we describe an architectural specification of the PALS system. We first proposed
this specification with Steven P. Miller and Darren D. Cofer in [11].
Property set. In this specification, we define a small set of AADL properties to map the globally
synchronous components and connections in the physically asynchronous model. We use these
properties to describe the scope of the logically synchronous interactions. The properties are
defined in a AADL property set, called PALS Properties.
Scope of logical synchronization. In a distributed application, each node participates in more
than one computation. Only a subset of the computations may depend on the global system states
and thus, need to be logically synchronized. The PALS system rules are applicable only to these
logically synchronous computations. In the asynchronous model, we annotate the components and
connections of these computations with two AADL properties, PALS Properties::PALS Id and
PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id. These properties accept a string literal as the value.
With these two properties, we define a logical synchronization group that consists of a set of
components and connections with the same value for these properties.
Thread execution. In the PALS system, the logically synchronous components execute period-
ically with the same period. In this model, these components are modeled as AADL threads. We
annotate these threads with a property, PALS Properties::PALS Period=>T, to define the PALS
clock period of T . Based on the PALS clock event rule (R1) of Section 2.2.1, these threads dispatch
at the local clock time jT during a period j, for all j ∈ N.
In this model, we also use other pre-defined AADL properties to declare the scheduling and
timing parameters. For example, we declare the Deadline of these threads to define the latest time
by which a thread must finish its computation. The deadline can also be viewed as a parameter
for the maximum response time, given as αmax in the PALS system model.
Output timing In the PALS system, we model the output times of a thread to satisfy the PALS
output hold constraint. There is a pre-defined property Output_Time that we use to declare output
times of the ports of a thread. The output time is specified with respect to a reference time, e.g.
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dispatch, completion, deadline, etc. of a thread. For example,
Output T ime => ([Time => Dispatch;Offset => 1ms..2ms; ],
[Time => Completion;Offset => 0ns..0ns; ]);
Here, Output_Time defines two output time ranges with respect to the dispatch and completion
of a thread.
In the PALS system, we only care about the earliest and the latest time at which a thread
transmits its output since the dispatch. In order to provide a simple output time representation
for the PALS pattern, we define a property, called PALS Properties::PALS Output Time for the
logically synchronous threads. We derive its value from the output time of the ports of a thread.
This property accepts a single time range. The minimum and maximum value of this time range
is equal the earliest and the latest output time of the ports of a logically synchronous thread.
Latency. In AADL, the connections between the two threads define the message transmission
delay by using an AADL property, called Latency. This property accepts a time range, specifying
the minimum and the maximum delay of a connection. In the PALS system, the message trans-
mission delay parameters (µmin, µmax) are computed from the Latency values of the connections
between the logically synchronous threads.
Clock skew. The clock skew of the system is defined as a pre-defined AADL property, called
Clock Jitter. The system and the processor components declare this property. Maximum clock
skew of a system is equal to the maximum of these Clock Jitter values.
Environment input and output synchronizer. In the PALS system, the logically syn-
chronous threads receive external inputs from an environment input synchronizer. An environment
input synchronizer is also implemented as an AADL thread. It executes periodically at the same
rate as the logically synchronous threads. In this model, an environment input synchronizer declares
a property, PALS Properties::PALS Synchronizer Type => Environment Input Synchronizer.
It also declares the above-mentioned properties: PALS Properties::PALS Id, Period, Deadline,
PALS Properties::PALS Output Time, Output Time, Latency, and Clock Jitter. The connections
between an environment input synchronizer and the logically synchronous threads also define
PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id with the same value as PALS Properties::PALS Id.
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Similarly, an environment output synchronizer declares the property, PALS Synchronizer Type
with the value of Environment Output Synchronizer. Since the external components do not
directly contribute to the logically synchronous interactions, we do not require any analysis on the
connections between the environment output synchronizer and the external components.
Optional environment inputs. During the system design and verification, developers often
consider optional inputs to model certain behaviors, e.g faults, environmental influences. For ex-
ample, in the verification of the fault-tolerant applications, abstract fault injection variables are
used to inject faults in a component. In the analysis tools, e.g. model checkers, the environment
component of the Synchronous AADL model generates these external inputs to control the execu-
tion of the applications. However, these input ports may not be connected to an input source in the
actual implementation. In order to support these optional environment input ports of the globally
synchronous model, we use an AADL property, Required Connection=>false. We use a default
value for the input ports when the connection is not defined. The default value is specified with a
pre-defined AADL property, Data Model::Initial Value. These two properties allow us to pre-
serve the component interface of the globally synchronous threads in the physically asynchronous
model.
4.2 Active-Standby System
In this section, we illustrate the specification of Section 4.1 with an example of a dual-redundant
control system. In this example, two redundant controllers execute an active-standby logical syn-
chronization. Only the active controller controls the physical system, while the other controller
acts as a standby. In Section 3.3, we describe the globally synchronous coordination of the active-
standby design. In that model, each side implements a globally synchronous thread to agree on
“who is active”. In this section, we map this globally synchronous model on a physically asyn-
chronous model of this control system.
Figure 4.1a gives a partial view of the top-level system. In addition to the two control sub-
systems, this model has other subsystems, e.g. sensor, actuator, user interface. In the physically
asynchronous model, we declare both software and hardware components. Each subsystem ex-
ecutes on a separate processor and communicates through bus components (not shown in the
figure). In this model, user input of manualSelection originates from a device (InputDevice) at
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Figure 4.1: Asynchronous active-standby system.
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the UserInterface subsystem. An environment input synchronizer (InputSynchronizerThread)
reads this maualSelection input from InputDevice. This environment input synchronizer then
propagates maualSelection to the control subsystems, Side1 and Side2. At each control side, we
implement two threads: one for active-standby coordination (e.g. Side1Thread) and another for the
feedback control logic (e.g. ControlThread). These two threads execute in the same address-space
of an AADL process and on the same processor. Similarly, the sensor and the actuator subsystems
execute on their own processor and define periodic computations for sensing and actuation.
In this physically asynchronous model, the control thread in each side uses the output of the
active-standby coordination logic to act as an active controller and control the actuator device.
Figure 4.1b shows the mapping of a globally synchronous thread at the subsystem Side1 to the
corresponding thread in the physically asynchronous model. In the globally synchronous design,
we model a periodic thread, Side1Thread in Side1 that performs the active-standby coordination
with Side2 and the environment threads. The same thread is used in the asynchronous model along
with the control thread, ControlThread. The control thread uses the output (side1ActiveSide)
of Side1Thread to know the active/standby status of Side1.
The following AADL code shows the instantiation of Side1Thread and its surrounding process
of the Synchronous AADL model in the physically asynchronous model. Side1Thread (shown in
Figure 4.1b) is directly used in the process, AsyncSide1Process.impl of the asynchronous active-
standby system. In this model, the transformation happens by extending the process element
(Side1Process) of the the Synchronous AADL model and adding the local control thread.
-- Side1Process in the Synchronous AADL Model.
process Side1Process
features
side1ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
side2ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
side1Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
...
end Side1Process;
process implementation Side1Process.impl
subcomponents
sideThread: thread Side1Thread.impl;
connections
port sideThread.side1ActiveSide -> side1ActiveSide;
port side2ActiveSide -> sideThread.side2ActiveSide;
port side1Failed -> sideThread.side1Failed;
...
end Side1Process.impl;
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-- Asynchronous process implementation with Side1Thread and the ControlThread.
process AsyncSide1Process extends Side1Process
features
sensor: in data port Base_Types::Float;
command: out data port Base_Types::Float;
end AsyncSide1Process;
process implementation AsyncSide1Process.impl extends Side1Process.impl
subcomponents
controlThread: thread PalsController::ControlThread.impl;
connections
port sensor -> controlThread.sensor;
port controlThread.command -> command;
port sideThread.side1ActiveSide -> controlThread.sideActiveSide;
properties
Required_Connection => false applies to sideThread.side1FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to sideThread.side1FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to sideThread.side2FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to sideThread.side2FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to sideThread.side1Failed;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("false") applies to sideThread.side1Failed;
end AsyncSide1Process.impl;
In the transformation, not all input connections of the Synchronous AADL model are used in
the asynchronous model. For example, side1Failed is used for fault injection into Side1 and is
only meaningful in the verification of the Synchronous AADL model. In the asynchronous model,
this port declares two properties, Required_Connection and Data_Model::Initial_Value.
Finally, we define the AADL properties of the threads and the connections according to the
specification of Section 4.1. In this example, we declare these properties at the top-level system
component.
system implementation ActiveStandbySystem.impl
subcomponents
sideOne: system PalsSide1::Side1.impl;
sideTwo: system PalsSide2::Side2.impl;
console: system PalsConsole::Console.impl;
sensor: system PalsSensor::Sensor.impl;
actuator: system PalsActuator::Actuator.impl;
connections
Side1toSide2AS: port sideOne.side1ActiveSide -> sideTwo.side1ActiveSide;
SensorToSide1: port sensor.output -> sideOne.sensor;
...
properties
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
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Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to sideOne.sideProcess.controlThread;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to console.synchProcess.synchThread;
...
Period => 40 Ms applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
Period => 40 Ms applies to console.synchProcess.synchThread;
...
Deadline => 20 Ms applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
Deadline => 20 Ms applies to console.synchProcess.synchThread;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Id => "active-standby" applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Id => "active-standby" applies to console.synchProcess.synchThread;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Synchronizer_Type => Environment_Input_Synchronizer
applies to console.synchProcess.synchThread;
...
PALS_Properties::PALS_Period => 40 Ms applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Output_Time => 10 Ms .. 15 Ms applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "active-standby" applies to Side1toSide2AS;
Latency => 1 ms..4 ms applies to Side1toSide2AS;
Clock_Jitter => 1 Ms applies to sideOne;
...
end ActiveStandbySystem.impl;
There are alternative modeling solutions for mapping the globally synchronous threads in the
physically asynchronous model. For example, it is not necessary to extend the process component
of the Synchronous AADL model in the asynchronous model. We could directly use a globally
synchronous thread in a process component of the asynchronous model. In either approaches, we
must ensure that the asynchronous architecture guarantees the logical synchronization. In the
following section, we therefore generalize this transformation process.
4.3 PALS Transformation and Analysis
In this section, we discuss the formal mapping between the Synchronous AADL model and the
logically synchronous model in an asynchronous platform. The pattern can be viewed as a model
transformation process, PALS(Gsync, AP ) to obtain the asynchronous model in a real-time dis-
tributed application, AP . Here, Gsync = (Threadssync, Connssync) is a Synchronous AADL model
discussed in Chapter 3. The Synchronous AADL model consists of the set of threads Threadssync
and the set of thread connections Connssync. We use the notations defined in Section 3.4.
In the pattern, we map the following set of components and connections of the Synchronous
AADL model on the physically asynchronous model:
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• Non-environment threads:
Threadsnesync = {M ∈ Threadssync |M.IsEnvironment = false}
• Delayed connections between non-environment threads:
Connsdelayedsync = {Cn ∈ Connssync |
Cn.Src.IsEnvironment = false ∧ Cn.Dst.IsEnvironment = false}
• External (environment) input connections from an environment thread:
Connsextsync = {Cn ∈ Connssync |Cn.Src.IsEnvironment = true ∧ Cn.Dst.IsEnvironment = false}
The physically asynchronous model consists of both hardware and software components. The
software components can have both logical synchronous computations and local asynchronous com-
putations. In this pattern transformation, we care about the threads, the connections, and the pro-
cessors of a physically asynchronous model given by Threadsasync, Connsasync, and Processorsasync,
respectively. The pattern considers following functions for the target application AP :
• A function mapping a synchronous non-environment thread to an asynchronous thread,
Tthread : Threadsnesync → Threadsasync.
• A function mapping a delayed connection of the synchronous model to a connection of the
asynchronous model,
Cdelayed : Connsdelayedsync → Connsasync.
• A function mapping an external input connection of the synchronous model to a connection
of the asynchronous model,
Cext : Connsextsync → Connsasync.
• A function mapping a synchronous non-environment thread to the processor on which the
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corresponding asynchronous thread executes,
Pproc : Threadsnesync → Processorsasync.
In addition, not all connections of the synchronous model may be mapped onto the asynchronous
model when the Required Connection property is set to false. In these cases, we assume that a
mapping function returns φ (null). Furthermore, in the PALS pattern, external inputs are received
through environment input synchronizer. We therefore define a function, Esync : Connsextsync →
Threadsasync, to obtain the environment input synchronizer for an external connection.
Once these functions are defined, we validate the PALS pattern rules to guarantee the logical
synchronization in this transformation.
4.3.1 Pattern Analysis
We have developed a static analysis framework for the correctness of the PALS transformation in
the asynchronous system. This framework validates the timing rules of Chapter 2 as well as the
interactions between the globally synchronous components and other environment components.
Furthermore, system design is an evolving process. Designers may extend the design after the
pattern transformation with additional features. This framework is also useful to preserve the
logical synchronization during the design evolutions.
For the analysis of the asynchronous model, we derive the performance bounds of the system.
For example,
• Maximum message transmission delay is equal to the maximum latency of all mapped con-
nections of the delayed connections of the Synchronous AADL model in the physically asyn-
chronous model.
µmax = max({Cn.Latency | Cn ∈ Cdelayed (Connsdelayedsync )})
• Minimum message transmission delay is equal to the minimum latency of all mapped con-
nections of the delayed connections of the Synchronous AADL model in the physically asyn-
chronous model.
µmin = min({Cn.Latency | Cn ∈ Cdelayed (Connsdelayedsync )})
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• Maximum clock skew: Maximum clock skew is based on the maximum clock jitter of the
processors in the physically asynchronous model.
 = max({Pr.Clock Jitter | Pr ∈ Processorsasync}))
Here, max(.) and min(.) functions return the maximum and the minimum value of a set.
PALS R1. The periods and PALS clock periods of the logically synchronous threads, including the
environment input synchronizers must be equal in the physically asynchronous model (PALS system
rule R1 of Section 2.2.1).
Let MS = (Tthread(Threadsnesync) ∪ Esync(Connsextsync)) \ {φ}.
∀Mi,Mj∈MS Mi.P eriod = Mj .P eriod = Mi.PALS Period = Mj .PALS Period
PALS R2. The earliest output time of a logically synchronous thread must satisfy the PALS causality
or output hold rule (PALS system rule R2 of Section 2.2.2).
∀Mi∈MS min(Mi.PALS Output T ime) > max(2− µmin, 0)
PALS R3. The periods of the logically synchronous threads, including the environment input syn-
chronizers must satisfy the PALS clock period requirement (PALS system rule R3 of Section 2.2.3).
∀Mi∈MS Mi.P eriod > 2+max(Mi.Deadline, 2− µmin) + µmax
PALS R4. All external connections must be received first at an environment input synchronizer,
unless the Required Connection is set to false (PALS system rule R4 of Section 2.2.4). If the required
connection is false, Cext(.) returns φ (‘null’).
∀Cn∈Connsextsync Cext(Cn) 6= φ→
Cext(Cn).Dst.PALS Synchronizer Type = Environment Input Synchronizer
PALS R5. The deadline must be greater than the latest output time.
∀Mi∈MS Mi.Deadline > max(Mi.PALS Output T ime)
PALS R6. The source and destination of a delayed connection must correspond in the asynchronous
model. That is, the source and destination of a delayed connection in the Synchronous AADL model
are same as the source and destination of the mapped connection in the physically asynchronous model.
∀Cn∈Connssync Tthread(Cn.Src) = Cdelayed(Cn).Src ∧ Tthread(Cn.Dst) = Cdelayed(Cn).Dst
Table 4.1: PALS specification rules.
Table 4.1 lists the rules of this analysis. The first 4 rules (PALS R1-PALS R2) correspond to
the PALS system rules (R1-R4) of Section 2.2. In this model, we also validate the derived value of
PALS Output Time property to ensure that it is correctly computed and is obviously less than the
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Deadline (PALS R5). Similarly, other transformation specific properties are validated for sanity
check. For example, a delayed connection of the Synchronous AADL model is correctly mapped
between the same source and destination in the asynchronous model (PALS R6).
We have developed this analysis framework in Open Source AADL Tool Environment (OS-
ATE) [30]. The tool traverses the AADL component hierarchy and selects the relevant PALS
components and connections for each logical synchronization group based the declared values of
the properties, PALS Properties::PALS Id, PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id. We then
apply the rules of Table 4.1 to validate the pattern requirements. Figure 4.2 gives a snapshot of
the GUI of this tool.
Figure 4.2: A snapshot of the PALS design tool. The GUI has three segments: (Segment 1) the
thread and connection configuration of the PALS system , (Segment 2) user buttons for analysis
and code generation of Section 4.4, and (Segment 3) results of analysis and code generation.
Discussion. A complete PALS system analysis may be divided into two procedures: 1) analysis
of the individual thread and connection properties, and 2) analysis of the PALS timing properties.
The proposed architectural modeling and analysis of this section is only relevant for the second
procedure. We assume pre-computed numerical values for the thread and connection properties,
such as period, latency, and output time. For the first procedure, we can compute these properties
by applying worst-case timing analysis on a system model with relevant hardware and software
components. For example, the connection property, Latency declares the message transmission
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delay between two AADL threads or devices. In practice, a single property as Latency abstracts
much of the implementation details of an architecture since the precise computation of the latency
requires us to model network topology, message flows, queuing delay, network devices, etc. One
can use an extended architectural model to define all these relevant components and apply the
theories of end-to-end delay analysis, e.g. network calculus [31] to compute the latency. There are
research tools that perform these timing analysis. For example, ASIIST [32] is a tool for performing
schedulability and bus analysis of AADL models. During our research, we have used ASIIST to
measure end-to-end delays, worst-case response and output time. Once the thread and connection
properties are measured, they can be used in our proposed analysis framework.
4.4 Auto-Generation of Synchronous Model from PALS Model
In this work, we also support a reverse transformation process that generates a Synchronous AADL
model from the PALS model. The objective is to support a reverse verification flow, especially in
legacy systems. In legacy systems, designers may apply the PALS pattern to simplify some critical
distributed interactions and verify the requirements. However, it may not be always possible to start
a design phase with the globally synchronous model due to the size and complexity of the legacy
system architecture. In particular, the hierarchical model structure of AADL requires significant
overhead to incorporate the globally synchronous model into the legacy system.
The alternative approach is to refactor the legacy components of the physically asynchronous
model in-place by directly using a logically synchronous design. The basic principle is based on
the same bisimulation property of the PALS pattern. As long as the PALS pattern constraints are
satisfied, we can refactor and verify a subset of the physically asynchronous model as the globally
synchronous model.
We have developed a tool in OSATE to generate the Synchronous AADL model from the PALS
model. We generate the Synchronous AADL model for each logical synchronization group of
threads and connections that define a common value for the PALS_Properties::PALS_Id and
PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id properties. Let these selected threads and connections
are Threads′async and Conns′async, respectively. The model generation works in the following way:
• We define a single process with these threads and connections and make this process a sub-
component in a top-level system component S.1
1Formal verification of the Synchronous AADL threads is not dependent on the process allocation of the threads.
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• For each thread in M ∈ Threads′async, we define the AADL properties relevant to the Syn-
chronous AADL specification. For example, we define two properties for these threads:
SynchAADL::IsDeterministic => true and SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => false. We
also define the period of these threads, Period => 1ms. The exact value of the period is also
not relevant, but they have to same.
• At the top-level system S surrounding the configuration, we define two properties, e.g.
SynchAADL::Synchronous => true and SynchAADL::SynchPeriod => 1ms.
• For the data connections between two threads in Threads′async, we define a property, Timing
=> delayed.
• For other incoming connections to a thread, M ∈ Threads′async, we define an environment
thread called Environment. We define the property, Timing => immediate for each connec-
tion from Environment to M .
There are however some manual modifications that must be done prior to the formal verification.
Designers have to specify the constraints on the environment inputs in Environment. They also
have to define the verification properties based on the auto-generated model.
4.5 PALS Middleware Specification
In Section 4.1, we use simple AADL constructs to map the globally synchronous model to the
logically synchronous model. In that specification, we abstract many of the implementation details.
Instead, we use high-level AADL properties, e.g. PALS Id, PALS Period, PALS Output Time,
PALS Synchronizer Type, etc. to declare the scope of the logically synchronous interactions and
have a generic analysis for different implementations. In some sense, one can view this architectural
model as a contract for subsequent model refinements and extensions. This specification must be
extended with implementation details and conform to the design contract to guarantee the logical
synchronization.
In this section, we discuss an extension of the architectural specification of Section 4.1 and imple-
ment the PALS pattern as a middleware service. This implementation has two parts: 1) globally
synchronous computations, and 2) PALS clock events and message communications. Since the
We can therefore define a single process with all threads.
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PALS clock events and message communication services are generic and do not depend on the
application logic, we implement them in the middleware. In addition to validating the timing con-
straints, we also validate some structural properties of the middleware components. The combined
analysis ensures the logical synchronization in this implementation.
The contributions of this implementation model first appeared in [23]. The original work was
done in AADLv1 [33]. We now support this model in AADLv2 [24]. We note that this implemen-
tation model does not handle any failure. We discuss our recent work on the PALS middleware in
Chapter 6, which handles task failure in the middleware.
Figure 4.3: Transformation for the PALS middleware specification.
4.5.1 AADL Model Definition
In this section, we describe the main components of this implementation model in the context
of the active-standby system. Since the middleware components are common for all logically
synchronous computations, we only show the implementation model of Side1 in Figure 4.3. In this
model, a logically synchronous thread (e.g. Side1Thread in Side1) is transformed into an AADL
thread group (e.g. PALSSide1ThreadGroup in Side1) encapsulating the middleware components for
Side1Thread. This newly formed thread group has the same interface as the original computation
thread.
PALS event generation. According to the PALS requirements, the logically synchronous com-
putations are performed at the PALS clock event. The outputs are also delivered after a certain
interval to avoid causality violation. In this middleware specification, the PALS timing constraints
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requirements are enforced by two events: PALS clock event (palsClockEvent) and PALS output
event (palsOutputEvent).
We use an AADL thread, called PalsEventGenerator to ouptut these events. This thread is
dispatched periodically at each PALS clock period. In the PALS system, it dispatches at local
clock times jT for all j ∈ N and the PALS clock period T . According to the pattern rules,
PalsEventGenerator outputs palsClockEvent immediately after its dispatch at the local clock
time jT . On the other hand, it outputs palsOutputEvent at tc(jT + H) where H = max(2 −
µmin, 0).
In order to guarantee that the PALS clock events are generated within a 2 interval across
all nodes, we assume that each node implements a clock synchronizer process to synchronize the
local clock. The clock synchronizer is required component for the PALS architecture. However,
it is not a part of the middleware specification. It can be instantiated from a fault-tolerant clock
synchronization algorithm [34, 35]. (See Section 6.5 for more details.)
Globally synchronous computation. In the logically synchronous model of Section 4.1, we
model each computation as a periodic thread such as Side1Thread for Side1 in Figure 4.3a. In
the PALS implementation model, we use the same computation. However, instead of having an
explicit property for the periodic dispatch, we model the thread as an aperiodic thread and trigger
its computations by using the PALS clock event palsClockEvent (Figure 4.3b). AADLv1 defines
a predeclared input event port, called Dispatch, for each thread. One can use this event port
to control the execution of an aperiodic thread. AADLv2 now has removed this option. It now
requires an explicit declaration of the input event port(s) that can dispatch an aperiodic thread.
In order to support the implementation model of [23] in AADLv2, we declare the Dispatch port
explicitly in a computation thread. This input port is not used in the verification of the Synchronous
AADL model. We define the property Required Connection => false for this new port in the
Synchronous AADL model.
PALS message communication. In order to enforce the PALS causality constraint, outputs
of the computation threads are delivered to an output delay thread. For example, SideThread
forwards its outputs to the output delay thread, Side1OutputDelayThread. This thread holds the
outputs until it is safe to send the output to the network. We model this thread as an AADL
aperiodic thread.
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The declaration for message communication through Side1OutputDelayThread is simple. In
AADL, each thread completion is signaled by an event on a predeclared event port, Complete. We
use the Complete event of the computation thread to notify the completion to the output delay
thread. The Complete event from the computation thread, such as Side1Thread, is received at
the palsComplete port of the output delay thread. The output delay thread also declares another
input event port, called palsOutputEvent. This port is connected with the palsOutputEvent port
of PalsEventGenerator.
In the output delay thread, the output is delivered only after both palsOutputEvent and
palsComplete have arrived. In the AADL Behavior Annex, we use a dispatch trigger condition on
these input event ports, given as (on dispatch palsOutputEvent and palsCompleteEvent). The
following AADL code snippet shows the AADL declaration for the output delay thread in Side1.
thread Side1OutputDelayThread
features
palsOutputEvent : in event port;
palsCompleteEvent : in event port;
side1ActiveSide_in : in data port Base_Types::Integer;
side1ActiveSide_out : out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side1OutputDelayThread;
thread implementation Side1OutputDelayThread.impl
properties
Dispatch_Protocol => Aperiodic;
annex behavior_specification {**
states
s1 : initial complete state;
transitions
s1-[on dispatch palsOutputEvent and palsCompleteEvent ]->s1 {
side1ActiveSide_out := side1ActiveSide_in
};
**};
end Side1OutputDelayThread.impl;
Event propagation. Figure 4.4 shows the event propagation in this implementation model. In
this case, once the Side1Thread completes its execution, its Complete event propagates to the
Side1OutputDelayThread, which then transmits the output messages to the network. The PALS
clock period T is sufficiently large so that the output messages reach Side2 before the next PALS
clock period or equivalently, the event palsClockEvent. In this way, we can have a logically
equivalent implementation as the globally synchronous model.
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Figure 4.4: Sequence of events in the PALS model.
4.5.2 Structural Constraints
In this section, we summarize the structural constraints that are necessary for a correct implemen-
tation of the PALS middleware. If any of the constraints are violated, counter examples will exist
to show that the implementation does not satisfy the synchronous model semantics.
The structural constraints of this middleware specification are as follows:
PALSMid R1. The logically synchronous threads must dispatch only at the PALS clock event,
palsClockEvent.
PALSMid R2. The middleware enforces the PALS causality constraint by using the output delay
thread, which is dispatched by the events palsOutputEvent and palsComplete.
PALSMid R3. Except for the environment input synchronizer, a logically synchronous thread
must interact with other components according to the PALS rules. This can be ensured
by checking whether inputs to a logically synchronous thread arrive from an output delay
thread.2
PALSMid R4. The outputs of a logically synchronous thread must go through the output delay
thread.
The first two constraints, although simple, are important since we must make sure that compo-
nents are asynchronously dispatched on the desired events. On the other hand, the last two con-
straints are dual constraints to require that all communication between two logically synchronous
2We exclude the environment input synchronizer since environment inputs arrive directly from external compo-
nents.
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Figure 4.5: Counter example if constraints PALSMid R3 and PALSMid R4 are violated.
threads go through an output delay thread. In Figure 4.5, we consider two logically synchronous
threads C1 and C2, and C1’s output delay thread C1out. If the message communication can occur
directly and the clock skew is larger than the end-to-end delay, the PALS causality constraint will
be violated. The message line labeled “without C1out” in Figure 4.5 shows how this error can occur
with direct communication. The output from C1 during period j will arrive early at C2. C2 will
receive the output message in the same period j. This violates the logically synchronous execution
semantics. The message line labeled “with C1out” happens in the correct implementation in which
the logically synchronous interactions goes through the output delay thread.
Note that there are other constraints that must also be satisfied. For example, palsClockEvent
in different nodes must be synchronized within  time of the ideal PALS clock event at the global
time jT . Such correctness can be ensured by verifying the correctness of the clock synchronizer.
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CHAPTER 5
MULTI-RATE PALS SYSTEM
The original PALS system has several limitations. It supports only a single rate for the distributed
computations. The communication pattern is also restrictive as it allows only one message to be
sent between 2 nodes in a PALS clock period. We have extended the PALS pattern to support
the logical synchronization of multi-rate distributed computations. The extended PALS system is
called multi-rate PALS system. In this pattern, application tasks execute at different rates and
more than one message transfer is possible per PALS clock period. Applications synchronize the
computations based on these messages.
In the multi-rate PALS pattern, a component can be logically synchronized with other compo-
nents in more than one instantiation of this pattern at different synchronization periods. This is
possible by forming separate logical synchronization groups. The composition of these instantia-
tions allows engineers to achieve certain system-level properties, such as distributed consistency and
distributed coordination, at the computations of the participating logical synchronization groups.
This chapter extends the static analysis framework of the original PALS pattern to validate the
integration of these synchronization groups. This chapter gives a detailed description of the pattern
and the static analysis in AADL.
The materials of this chapter are based on our paper published at ICCPS 2012 [26]. In this
thesis, we extend the multi-rate PALS pattern and unify with our specification of Section 4.1.
5.1 Main Concepts
In this section, we describe the main concepts of the logical synchronization of multi-rate distributed
computations using an example system.
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5.1.1 Case Study
For illustration purpose, let us consider an example of a hierarchical avionics control system.
Multiple devices of this system, such as aileron and rudder, must be coordinated to turn an aircraft
in real-time. Ailerons, attached to the left and right wings of an aircraft, coordinate with each
other to roll an aircraft about the longitudinal axis by changing the lift on two wings. Since
these ailerons move in different directions (upward or downward) to create a differential lift on the
wings, they also cause a difference in the drag on the wings. This unwanted side effect, commonly
known as adverse-yaw, produces a yawing motion in a direction opposite to the desired roll. One of
the commonly applied techniques to counteract this undesired yawing motion is to use the rudder
attached to the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft. Proper, synchronized coordination of both ailerons
and the rudder at the right speed is important for the safety of the aircraft. Otherwise, improper
turn of the rudder or the ailerons may result in undesired and dangerous sideways movement,
known as side-slip.
The coordination of these control surfaces is accomplished by a fault-tolerant, hierarchical control
system in which replicated supervisory controllers are responsible for coordinating the setpoints
of the position, velocity of ailerons and rudder at a desired speed based on the flight mode. The
local servo controllers of each control surface, which are also replicated, use the setpoint commands,
compute local tracking errors with respect to the setpoints, and generate actuator commands at the
acceptable rate for the devices. Here, we assume that the ailerons are controlled at 66.67Hz (15ms)
and the rudder is controlled at 50Hz (20ms)1. For simplicity, we only consider an active-standby
replication for the rudder control, where two servo controllers execute at the same rate. While both
controllers receive the sensor data and supervisory commands, only the active controller sends the
control command to the rudder.
Theoretically, the adjustment of these setpoints need not be synchronous since each of the ele-
ments under control is an analog device. However, asynchronous local actions increase coordination
errors and are undesirable to prevent inconsistency. The proposed pattern can be applied to guar-
antee a logically synchronous coordination of these devices and prevent any inconsistency. The
system would operate in the same way as it would do in a globally synchronous system (with zero
clock skew).
1In a commercial aircraft, the ailerons are controlled at 30-100 Hz, and the rudder is controlled at 30-50 Hz.
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5.1.2 Pattern Features
There are two main features of this pattern: the logical synchronization period and the synchro-
nization interface. These features differentiate the multi-rate PALS system from the single-rate
PALS system.
Logical synchronization period (i.e. PALS clock period):
In a globally synchronous system with multi-rate distributed computations, the discrete state up-
dates can happen synchronously only at the hyper-period boundaries, i.e. at an interval equal to
the LCM (least common multiple) of the periods. This is unavoidable in a synchronous design
since there is no simple scheduling solution to change the setpoints at the same time with a smaller
period. A smaller synchronization period may also potentially result in asynchronous actions and
potentially affect the system safety. To preserve the same synchronous semantics in a multi-rate
PALS system, the PALS clock period is also set to the hyper-period. In this example, the rudder
and aileron servo controllers receive the setpoint updates at a period of 60ms. The supervisory
controller itself may execute at a faster or slower rate. However, if it needs to receive synchronous
updates of the status of the device controllers, it can do so at 60ms.
Note: Harmonic rates have been traditionally favored for hierarchical control in industrial sys-
tems as they simplify the scheduling. However, the rates offered in such design may not be the
best from a control perspective (considering the difference in the physical dynamics of the devices).
On the other hand, picking locally optimal control periods may result in a very long LCM and
slow the supervisory control. Therefore, the trade-off between local optimized control computa-
tions and longer supervisory control period needs to be considered when designing this hierarchical
control system. A key benefit of using the proposed pattern is that it provides the simplicity of the
synchronous design and does not require the devices to operate in a strictly harmonic rate. The
devices can be controlled in a non-harmonic rate in a hierarchical control system since there are
no direct communications between them. Thus, engineers can address this trade-off and explore
an extended design space with this approach.
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Synchronization interface:
In order to ensure the logical synchronization at a slower rate than the actual task rate, the pattern
defines a synchronization interface, called multi-rate synchronizer for each input component2.
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Figure 5.1: Supervisory setpoint commands going downward the hierarchy.
The multi-rate synchronizer has two roles in this pattern. Firstly, it ensures that the mes-
sages generated from the PALS clock period (j − 1) are observed at the receivers only during the
PALS clock period j. For example, Figure 5.1 shows the logically synchronous execution of the
aileron servo controllers, the rudder servo controllers, and their supervisory controller. In this
figure, the synchronizers at the aileron servo controllers and the rudder servo controllers gather
synchronous updates of the setpoint commands only at the 60ms period boundary. Since there
are many executions of a servo controller in each PALS clock period, the same setpoint is used
during these executions. In this example, there are 4 executions of the rudder servo controllers
and 1 execution of the supervisory controller in each PALS clock period. Suppose that the set-
point generated by the supervisory controller in its execution period p for the rudder is given by
Supervisor.SetpointoutR (p) and the setpoint used by the rudder controller in its execution period q
is given by Rudderi.Setpoint
in
R (q), i = 1, 2. The logically synchronous supervisory control of the
rudder controllers can then be shown by
Rudder1.Setpoint
in
R (4j+k) = Rudder2.Setpoint
in
R (4j+k) = Supervisor.Setpoint
out
R (j−1), k = 0..3
2In this chapter, we liberally use the term ‘synchronizer’ to refer to the ‘multi-rate synchronizer’. We want to
note here that the multi-rate synchronizer is different from the environment input and output synchronizers. We will
shortly explain the role of environment input and output synchronizer in the context of the multi-rate PALS system.
Similar to the PALS system, environment input and output synchronizer are also used to manage external input and
output events.
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for each PALS clock period j. (It can be similarly shown for the aileron controllers.) In the
physically asynchronous system, the system clock of each node has a bounded clock skew of .
The pattern abstracts the impact of the clock synchronization error and produces an equivalent
execution, which happens within a 2 interval in global time.
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Figure 5.2: Device controller status going upward the hierarchy.
Secondly, the synchronizer can be configured to deliver a unique input to the application such
as the last received message, a function on the messages received in a PALS clock period. For
example, the aileron and the rudder controllers send their status to the supervisory controller.
These responses flow upward in the hierarchy as shown in Figure 5.2. It shows that the status at
each PALS clock period j is propagated to the supervisory controller in the same PALS clock period.
The supervisory controller will consume this status update in the next PALS clock period. Based
on these inputs, the supervisory controller may take necessary actions to coordinate these devices
properly. While there are many executions of each control application during a PALS clock period,
only the update from the last execution matters for the coordination. We show this communication
with a solid line in the figure. However, the status from previous executions (as shown by the dashed
lines) may be relevant depending on the application requirements such as debugging. If they are
transmitted, then the synchronization interface of the supervisory controller may be responsible
for delivering the correct input. In the current work, the multi-rate PALS pattern assumes that
outputs from other executions are also delivered, but the multi-rate synchronizer filters the outputs
to deliver only the last execution’s output.
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Composition of different instances:
The multi-rate PALS pattern also allows designers to form logical synchronization groups where a
component may participate in different groups. Thus, the components have the flexibility to receive
their messages logical synchronously at different rates. For example, in addition to the multi-rate
PALS synchronization for supervisory control, the replicated rudder servo controllers participate
in another logical synchronization group with the sensors and the actuator. In this instantiation,
these servo controllers receive the sensor data and perform discrete mode changes, such as chang-
ing the mode to standby upon the failure of the active controller, logically synchronously. This
instantiation for the rudder servo control is a special case of this pattern with each task operating
at a period of 20ms. Hence, the PALS clock period is also equal to 20ms. In this case, the logically
synchronous interaction is simple. For the rudder sensor data (RSD), the pattern guarantees that
Rudder1.RSD
in(j) = Rudder2.RSD
in(j) = Sensor.RSDout(j − 1) in PALS clock period j.
The pattern greatly simplifies the system verification in the pattern composition. In this example,
we can reuse the pattern guarantee of logical synchronization with respect to the input data such
as rudder sensor data (RSD) and supervisory setpoint command (SetpointR). Based on the logical
synchronization property, the servo controllers operate consistently by receiving identical inputs,
despite the differences in the rates. The only overhead for validating this system-level property of
consistency is that these instantiations indeed follow the pattern requirements. We discuss these
requirements in Section 5.4.
5.2 Pattern Assumptions and Guarantees
The pattern is applied to a group of periodic distributed tasks, {M1, ...,MN}. They execute at a
period of T1, ..., TN respectively. The hyper-period, denoted by Thp, is equal to the LCM of these
periods. In this section, we summarize the pattern’s assumptions for these tasks. We also prove the
logical synchronization guarantee based on these assumptions. Later in Section 5.3, we describe
how a developer can use this pattern in AADL.
5.2.1 Assumptions
The assumptions of the pattern are classified into three categories: system context, timing, and
external interface constraints.
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System context:
The multi-rate PALS pattern is applicable to hard real-time systems that satisfy the requirements
of monotonic lock clock, bounded clock skew, bounded response time, and bounded message trans-
mission delay. We however consider two adjustments to the original PALS system parameters for
the response time and the message transmission delay. In the PALS system as described in Chapter
2.1, we assume a system-wide maximum and minimum values for all response times and network
transmission delays, given as (αmin, αmax) and (µmin, µmax), respectively. In the single-rate PALS
system, we use these values to derive the bound on the task periods. Since the tasks in the multi-
rate PALS system execute at different rates, using system-wide bounds may be inefficient. We
therefore use task-specific bounds for the response time and the message transmission delay.
In summary, this pattern makes following assumptions on the system model:
• The maximum skew of each local clock ci with respect to the global time is .
• A task Mi completes its execution in bounded time. The minimum and maximum response
time are αmini and α
max
i , respectively.
• Messages from a task Mi are reliably delivered to their destinations with a latency of µi,
where µmini ≤ µi ≤ µmaxi .
Timing constraints:
The following constraints relating system parameters of each computation must be also satisfied.
We show in next section that these constraints are required to satisfy the requirement that messages
generated during the PALS clock period j−1 are consumed by their destination tasks in the PALS
clock period j.
• Task period constraint. The period of a task Mi gives the upper bound on the worst-case
end-to-end delay from Mi. A message must not be sent after (Ti − µmaxi − 2) such that the
destination tasks receive it before the next dispatch of the source task.
eoutmaxi < α
max
i < Ti − µmaxi − 2. (5.1)
eoutmaxi denotes latest time when the task Mi transmits a message. Equation 5.1 is similar
to Equation 2.1 except that we now consider task-specific parameters.
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• Causality constraint. In order to account for the clock skews, messages should not be delivered
before a specific interval given as
eoutmini > max(2− µmini , 0). (5.2)
Here, eoutmini is the earliest time when the task Mi transmits a message.
Environment input constraints:
The last set of assumptions is associated with environment or external inputs from any component
outside the logical synchronization group. The pattern assumes that the components consume
these environment inputs, such as a user input that changes the global system mode, in the same
PALS clock period.
5.2.2 Guarantees
As illustrated in Chapter 5.1, the pattern guarantees logical synchronization between multi-rate
asynchronous computations at a period of Thp. In the multi-rate PALS pattern, the PALS clock
period is equal to Thp.
Suppose that Ma is a periodic task of period Ta. Ma transmits its output messages to other
tasks, Mb and Mc of period Tb and Tc, respectively. There are na = Thp/Ta, nb = Thp/Tb and
nc = Thp/Tc executions of Ma, Mb and Mc during a PALS clock period. The pattern guarantees
that Mb and Mc receive all na = Thp/Ta messages from Ma generated during the PALS clock period
j − 1. The pattern filters these received messages and delivers the selected messages identically to
Mb and Mc during the PALS clock period j. If the last received message is selected, the pattern
ensures that
Mb.in(j.nb + kb) = Mc.in(j.nc + kc) = Ma.out(j.na − 1),
where kb = 0 . . . nb − 1, kc = 0 . . . nc − 1. Here Ma.out(i′), Mb.in(j′), and Mc.in(k′) correspond to
the input and output port data of the corresponding tasks in their execution period i′, j′, and k′
respectively.
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5.2.3 Verification of the Multi-Rate PALS Pattern
This section describes the timing model of this pattern. We use this model to prove the logical
synchronization guarantee based on the pattern’s assumptions.
Multi-rate PALS timing model:
Each node in the pattern has two components involved in the pattern instantiation: Mi (input
task) and Mi,syn (multi-rate synchronizer). Mi and Mi,syn are periodic computations with period
Ti and Thp = niTi, respectively.
We assume that the PALS clock period j at each node begins at the local clock time jThp. Let
this happens in the global time tij,0. Since the maximum clock skew is , t
i
j,0 is in between the
global time interval [jThp − , jThp + ].
Both Mi and Mi,syn execute on the same processor. Thus, their executions are synchronized
based on the local clock time. The jth execution of Mi,syn coincides with the jn
th
i execution of
Mi. The other ni − 1 executions of Mi happen at local clock time jThp + kTi or in global time at
tij,k ∈ [jThp + kTi − , jThp + kTi + ], k = 1 . . . ni − 1. In this design, Mi,syn has a higher priority
than Mi when their dispatch events coincide at local clock time jThp.
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Figure 5.3: Multi-rate PALS timeline for ni = 2
55
Figure 5.3 shows a timeline of the computation and communication in a multi-rate PALS pattern
instance. Let the task Mi transmits an output message after an interval of eout
i
j,k during its k
th
execution in the PALS clock period j. If the message transmission delay is µi, this message is
expected to arrive after an interval of eoutij,k + µi at the receiving side. Here, eout
min
i ≤ eoutij,k ≤
eoutmini and µ
min
i ≤ µi ≤ µmaxi .
Lemma 1: In a physically asynchronous system, when a task Mi sends its messages to the multi-
rate synchronizer Mr,syn of the receiving component Mr, the multi-rate synchronizer receives exactly
ni = Thp/Ti messages in each PALS clock period j if the timing constraints eout
max
i < α
max
i <
Ti − 2 − µmaxi (Equation 5.1) and eoutmini > max(2 − µmini , 0) (Equation 5.2) are satisfied. In
other words, messages generated during the PALS clock period j are received by the receiving node
in the same PALS clock period j if these timing constraints are satisfied.
Proof : There are exactly ni executions of Mi in each PALS clock period. We prove this lemma
by showing that the 1st and nthi messages generated during the PALS clock period j are indeed
received in the same PALS clock period at the receiving node.
The first execution of Mi during the PALS clock period j happens at the local clock time jThp.
If the task’s output time is eoutij,0 and the message transmission delay is µi, the message arrives at
the receiving node in the global time interval [jThp + eout
i
j,k +µi− , jThp + eoutij,k +µi + ]. Given
the minimum latency µmini , the earliest message arrival time is jThp + eout
i
j,k + µ
min
i − . At the
receiving node Mr, the multi-rate synchronizer Mr,syn dispatches during the global time interval
[jThp − , jThp + ]. Since eoutij,k ≥ eoutmini > max(2− µmini , 0),
jThp + eout
i
j,k + µ
min
i −  > jThp + .
It implies that this message is indeed received in PALS clock period j, which happens after the
dispatch of Mr,syn in this period.
The nthi execution in the PALS clock period j occurs at t
i
j,ni−1. In global time, this can happen
as late as at jThp + (ni − 1)Ti +  in global time. Since the maximum output time is eoutmaxi and
the maximum message transmission delay is µmaxi , the latest output arrival time is given by tarr,
where tarr ≤ jThp + (ni− 1)Ti + + eoutmaxi +µmaxi . The PALS clock period j + 1 in the receiving
component may begin as early as at (j + 1)Thp −  = jThp + niTi − . Given that eoutmaxi < αmaxi
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and Ti > 2+ α
max
i + µ
max
i , it is easy to show that
tarr < jThp + niTi −  = (j + 1)Thp.
This implies that the nthi message is also received in the PALS clock period j.
The proof immediately follows since outputs of the remaining (ni−2) executions are also received
in FIFO order between the 1st and nthi executions. 
Theorem 1: The proposed pattern specification satisfies the same message interaction guarantee
as the globally synchronous system.
Proof: The proof is simple. By generalizing Lemma 1 over all receiving nodes, the multi-rate
synchronizers receive the same set of messages at a PALS clock period. The logic of the multi-rate
synchronizers are same at the receiving nodes. Since the multi-rate synchronizer Mr,syn executes
always before the destination task Mr and they select the same message, such as the last received
message, the destination tasks Mr apply the same input during its executions in a PALS clock
period as it would do in a globally synchronous system. 
5.3 Pattern Specification in AADL
The multi-rate PALS pattern also transforms an input system model to a new system model with
guaranteed properties. In this section, we describe the AADL specification of the multi-rate PALS
pattern. This specification extends the AADL specification of Section 4.1 for the model definition of
multi-rate synchronizer and the composition of the multi-rate synchronizer and the corresponding
distributed computation.
5.3.1 Pattern Parameters
We model the input distributed tasks {M1, ...,MN} as AADL threads or thread groups3. Only a
subset of the connections between these components are used in the multi-rate logical synchroniza-
tion in an instance of this pattern. As input parameters of this transformation, these connections
define a property, PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id=>‘‘GROUP ID’’.4 Here, “GROUP ID”
3An AADL thread group gives the component abstraction for a logical organization of threads and other thread
groups within a process.
4PALS Properties is an AADL property set defined for the PALS system. We describe the property set in
Appendix B.
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is the identifier of this logical synchronization group. These components also define an AADL
property, PALS_Properties::Computation=>Multi_Rate_Base_Computation to define the input
components of this transformation.
These input components must define the properties to declare period, deadline, output time, la-
tency, and clock skew. In AADL, these parameters can be specified by using standard AADL prop-
erties: Period, Deadline, PALS Properties::PALS Output Time, Latency, and Clock Jitter.
The multi-rate PALS pattern extends these input components and defines a corresponding
output component M ′i for an input component Mi. The output component defines a property
PALS_Properties::PALS_Id=>‘‘GROUP_ID’’ after the instantiations. The PALS Id and PALS_
Connection_Id properties together show the scope of the logical synchronous interactions in a
group of components and connections.
5.3.2 Multi-Rate Synchronizer
In order to guarantee the logical synchronization, the pattern attaches a multi-rate synchronizer
Mi,syn at each component Mi that serves as a synchronization interface and manages only the input
data used in the multi-rate logical synchronization. It does not affect other inputs that are not
used in this instantiation.
We currently model the multi-rate synchronizer as an AADL thread component and bind it to
the same processor as Mi. We use a set of AADL properties to model the expected scheduling and
communication characteristics of the multi-rate synchronizer:
• PALS Properties::PALS Synchronizer Type: The multi-rate synchronizer declares this prop-
erty to distinguish itself as a multi-rate synchronizer thread. The value is Multi_Rate_
Synchronizer.
• It declares the dispatch protocol and the period as Dispatch Protocol=>Periodic and PALS_
Properties::PALS_Period=>Thp, respectively.
• Priority: As discussed in the example section, the thread priority of the multi-rate synchro-
nizer is set to a value higher than that of Mi.
• PALS_Properties::PALS_Output_Time: It is the interval during an execution when the
multi-rate synchronizer transmits its output messages. As discussed in Chapter 4, this PALS
property is a derived value from Output Time of the output ports.
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• PALS Properties::Multi Rate Synchronizer Operation: The pattern defines the message
selection criteria of the input data ports of the multi-rate synchronizer with this property.
Currently, its value is set to Last_Message_Only to indicate that the multi-rate synchronizer
only propagates the last message that it has received in an input port during a PALS clock
period. It can be changed to model other alternatives, such as delivering a vector or a function
of the received messages.
5.3.3 Composition of Mi and Mi,syn
In order to facilitate the use of this component in subsequent pattern instantiations, the pattern
forms a new AADL thread group M ′i with the input component Mi and the multi-rate synchronizer
Mi,syn as its subcomponents. This newly formed thread group has exactly the same input-output
interface as the input component, Mi. The pattern defines the internal connections of this thread
group. The input ports of M ′i are connected to the input ports of Mi,syn if they are relevant to the
current pattern instantiation (identified by the property PALS Properties::PALS Connection Id),
otherwise these input ports are connected with corresponding input ports of Mi. The outputs of
Mi are directly propagated to corresponding output ports of M
′
i .
The pattern also annotates M ′i with a number of AADL properties: Period, Deadline, PALS_
Properties::PALS_Output_Time, Priority, and PALS_Properties::PALS_Id. These properties
capture the timing characteristics of the combined execution of these two components. We derive
their values from the properties of Mi and Mi,syn. In this case, Period, Deadline, Priority of M
′
i
are set to the same values as Mi since the main input component inside this new thread group does
not change with this composition. However, the multi-rate synchronizer adds small computation
overhead during the first execution of Mi in a PALS clock period. We consider this overhead in
the computation and output time. In this pattern, we primarily update the PALS_Properties::
PALS_Output_Time. In this composition, M ′i .PALS Output T ime is a time range, in which the
minimum value of the range is equal to min(Mi.Output T ime + Mi,syn.Output T ime) and the
maximum value of the range is equal to max(Mi.Output T ime + Mi,syn.Output T ime). Here
min(x) and min(x) give the minimum and maximum value of a time range x, respectively.
In addition, M ′i assigns two properties, PALS Properties::PALS Id=>‘‘GROUP ID’’ and PALS_
Properties::PALS_Period=>Thp. Here, “GROUP ID” is the identifier of the logical synchroniza-
tion group and Thp is the PALS clock period of this group.
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5.3.4 Environment Input Synchronizer
The multi-rate PALS pattern extends the concept of environment input synchronizer of the single-
rate PALS system. The external component transmits its outputs asynchronously to an envi-
ronment input synchronizer Menv. The environment input synchronizer then relays the exter-
nal inputs to the input components of this pattern. Similar to the PALS pattern specifica-
tion of Chapter 4, the environment input synchronizers defines a property, PALS_Properties::
PALS_Synchronizer_Type=>Environment_Input_Synchronizer.
Unlike the single rate PALS system, the environment input synchronizer does not have to execute
at the PALS clock period. It can execute at a faster rate in a multi-rate PALS system provided that
the PALS clock period is perfectly divisible by its period. In this pattern, Menv follows the timing
constraints of Equation 5.1 and 5.2. With this solution, the external component can execute at
any rate asynchronously with respect to the components of a given logical synchronization group.
5.3.5 Alternative Implementation
Some of the suggested implementations may have alternative modeling solution with equivalent
results. For example, we have modeled the periodic processing of the multi-rate synchronizer as
a thread in AADL. We choose the AADL thread representation as it clearly shows the timing
relationship between the multi-rate synchronizer and the input component. Alternatively, we can
model the multi-rate synchronizer as a subprogram that periodically executes at one of the dis-
patches of the input component. However, the exact timing relationship between the multi-rate
synchronizer and the input component is not clearly expressed with a subprogram. We need to
assume the timing relationship through additional AADL properties. In this case, we also have to
consider the effect of the subprogram implementation in the pattern modeling and analysis.
5.3.6 Exemplar Model
Figure 5.4 gives simplified AADL diagrams of the pattern instantiations for rudder servo control
synchronization and supervisory control synchronization. In this figure, we only show the dis-
tributed process elements of different subsystems and the threads inside them. We do not show
the binding of these threads to the hardware components.
In the first synchronization in Figure 5.4a-c, two replicated rudder controller threads (RCT) receive
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the sensor data from the rudder sensor thread (RST) and propagate their control commands to the
actuator thread (RAT). They also exchange the heartbeat messages as part of the active-standby
replication protocol. After the pattern is applied, multi-rate synchronizers, denoted by Syn, are
added to the processes. These synchronizers affect only the input data that are relevant to this
pattern instantiation. In this instantiation, the setpoint commands from the supervisory controllers
are not directly involved. Therefore, the setpoint commands do not pass through the multi-rate
synchronizer. After this, we create an AADL thread group component, such as RCT Gr, at the servo
controllers composing both RCT and Syn.
In the second synchronization in Figure 5.4d-f, we use the output model of the first instanti-
ation as the input model for the supervisory control synchronization. In this case, two rudder
controllers and an actuator controller receive the setpoint commands from the supervisor. The
pattern instantiation follows the same rule as above without affecting the non-participating inputs
of a component.
We provide an AADL code snippet of this hierarchical control system in Appendix D.
5.4 Compositional Analysis
We provide an analysis framework in OSATE to validate the assumptions and the structural spec-
ification of the multi-rate PALS pattern. This analysis framework extends the analysis of the
single-rate PALS pattern. In the composition of many instantiations of the multi-rate PALS pat-
tern, this analysis guarantees that the design does not have any error when we extend the output
model of the prior instantiations as the input to next instantiation.
5.4.1 Analysis Procedure
Table 5.1 lists the main analysis rules that validates the structural specification, the timing and
external input assumptions for different multi-rate PALS instantiations.
Explanation of the symbols: We consider that the top-level configuration, G= (Comp,Conns)
consists of the set of all thread and thread group components, Comp = {Mi} and the set of all
port connections, Conns = ∪i,jConns(Mi,Mj), where Conns(Mi,Mj) is the set of all port connec-
tions from component Mi to Mj . The set of all port connections to a component Mj is also given
by Conns(∗,Mj). For each connection Cn, we assume that Cn.DstPort provides information on
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the destination port. We use some data enumerating functions. For example, PALS Id(G) gives
all synchronization group identifiers in G. PALS Period(id) is equal to the PALS clock period
of the logical synchronization of id. CompF (G, id) gives the set of components Mi that define
PALS_Id=>id. If id = ∗, CompF (G, ∗) returns the set of components that define the PALS_Id
property. We use the term Mi.P roperty to give the values of an AADL property ‘Property’ of a
component Mi. As shown earlier, a thread group Mi is formed from a computation component
and its multi-rate synchronizer. Here, we denote these subcomponents as Mi.Sync and Mi.Base,
respectively. In this system model, Mi, Mi.Sync and Mi.Base are members of the set Comp.
Pattern specification rules: The rules MPALS R1-MPALS R7 are related to the scheduling
and communication characteristics of the pattern instantiated multi-rate synchronizer and the
newly formed thread group. For example, MPALS R5-MPALS R6 guarantee the condition that all
messages related to a multi-rate PALS pattern instance flow through the multi-rate synchronizer.
We analyze the data flow between the components and detect if the multi-rate synchronizer is
bypassed. This is important since any violation of these constraints may potentially invalidate the
logical synchronization guarantee. On the other hand, the rule MPALS R7 shows that that if a
connection belongs to a different logical synchronization group, then corresponding base component
handles it. We eventually check if this connection is indeed managed by the appropriate multi-rate
synchronizer of the target synchronization group.
Timing assumptions: The rules MPALS R8 and MPALS R9 describe the timing assumptions
we have defined in Equation 5.1 and 5.2.
Environment input assumptions: The rules MPALS R10 and MPALS R11 validate the en-
vironment input assumptions. MPALS R10 validates that environments inputs are originated from
an environment input synchronizer and the environment input synchronizer follows the constraint
of MPALS R8 and MPALS R9. MPALS R11 shows that its outgoing connections contribute to a
given logical synchronization group.
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Sanity check of the multi-rate PALS specifications
MPALS R1. At each PALS component Mi, PALS_Period of Mi must equal to Period of Mi.Sync.
∀id∈PALS Ids(G)∀Mi∈CompF (G,id) PALS Period(id) = (Mi.Sync).P eriod.
MPALS R2. At each PALS component Mi, Deadline of Mi is set to Deadline of Mi.Base and
Deadline of Mi.Base must be greater than that of Mi.Sync.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗) Mi.Deadline = (Mi.Base).Deadline ∧ (Mi.Sync).Deadline < (Mi.Base).Deadline.
MPALS R3. At each PALS component Mi, the minimum value of PALS_Output_Time of Mi is set to
the sum of the minimum value of PALS_Output_Time ofMi.Base andMi.Sync. Similarly, the maximum
value of PALS_Output_Time of Mi is set to the sum of the maximum value of PALS_Output_Time of
Mi.Base and Mi.Sync. Furthermore, the maximum value of PALS_Output_Time of Mi must be smaller
than the Deadline of Mi.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)min(Mi.PALS Output T ime) = min((Mi.Base).PALS Output T ime+
(Mi.Syn).PALS Output T ime).
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)max(Mi.PALS Output T ime) = max((Mi.Base).PALS Output T ime+
(Mi.Syn).PALS Output T ime).
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)max(Mi.PALS Output T ime) < Mi.Deadline
MPALS R4. Mi.Sync and Mi.Base must be be collocated and execute on the same processor core.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)(Mi.Sync).P rocessor = (Mi.Base).P rocessor.
MPALS R5. At each PALS component Mi, the connections received at the Mi.Sync must be-
long to the corresponding logical synchronization group. We validate this property by checking the
PALS_Connection_Id property of the connections and the PALS_Id property of Mi.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)∀Cn∈Conns(∗,Mi.Sync) Cn.PALS Connection Id = Mi.PALS Id.
MPALS R6. At each PALS component Mi, the connections between the pair (Mi, Mi.Sync) must
correspond to the connections between the pair (Mi.Sync, Mi.Base). We liberally use DstPort to show
the equivalence between the ports of two components.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗) ∀Cn∈Conns(∗,Mi) Cn.PALS Connection Id = Mi.PALS Id→
(∃Cn′∈Conns(Mi.Sync,Mi.Base)Cn.DstPort = Cn′.DstPort ∧ ∃Cn′∈Conns(Mi,Mi.Sync)Cn.DstPort =
Cn′.DstPort).
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MPALS R7. At each PALS Component Mi, the connections to Mi that have a different
PALS_Connection_Id than its PALS_Id are directly passed to Mi.Base instead of passing through
the multi-rate synchronizer Mi.Sync.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗) ∀Cn∈Conns(∗,Mi) Cn.PALS Connection Id 6= Mi.PALS Id→
(∃Cn′∈Conns(Mi,Mi.Base)Cn.DstPort = Cn′.DstPort.
Timing assumptions
MPALS R8. The period of each PALS component Mi must satisfy its period constraint, i.e.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)Mi.P eriod > 2× G.Clock Skew +Max Latencyi +Mi.Deadline.
Here, Max Latencyi = max({Cn.Latency |Cn ∈ Conns(Mi.Base, ∗)}). G.Clock Skew is the maxi-
mum clock skew in the configuration.
MPALS R9. Each PALS component Mi must satisfy the causality constraint.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗)min(Mi.PALS Output T ime) > max(2×G.Clock Skew −Min Latencyi), 0).
Here, Min Latencyi = min({Cn.Latency |Cn ∈ Conns(Mi.Base, ∗)}).
Environment input assumptions
MPALS R10. An environment input synchronizer must satisfy the constraints of MPALS R8 and
MPALS R9 and PALS_period of an environment input synchronizer is divisible by its Period.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗) Mi.PALS Synch. Type = Env. Input Synch→Mi.PALS Period % Mi.P eriod = 0
∧ (Mi satisfies the predicates of MPALS R8, MPALS R9)).
MPALS R11. All outgoing connections of an environment input synchronizer must have the same
values for the PALS_Connection_Id property as its PALS_Id.
∀Mi∈CompF (G,∗) Mi.PALS Synchronizer Type = Environment Input Synchronizer →
∀Cn∈Conns(Mi,∗) Cn.PALS Connection Id = Mi.PALS Id.
Table 5.1: Multi-Rate PALS pattern rules.
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CHAPTER 6
MIDDLEWARE DESIGN FOR PALS SYSTEM
In previous chapters, we have applied the PALS pattern in architecture models of hard real-time
distributed systems. Users can use the PALS analysis framework to verify the correctness of
the implementation models. In this thesis, we have further extended this research. With Dr.
Cheolgi Kim, we have developed a distributed middleware, called PALSware, to enable robust
implementation of the PALS computations in C++.
In PALSware, we address several practical challenges for guaranteeing the logical synchronization.
First, the PALS pattern assumes that nodes are fail-stop. Existing safety-critical systems, such as
avionics, support the fail-stop executions with redundant processor pairs [9, 36]. The outcomes of
redundant processors are compared to detect a fault. However, the node-level fail-stop model does
not guarantee the fail-stop semantics in distributed computing. For example, a node may send
the same message sequentially to different nodes. If this node suddenly stops, only a subset of the
receiving nodes may receive this message, which subsequently leads to inconsistent states. In this
chapter, we discuss a fault-tolerant communication protocol to prevent this problem. We also use
this protocol to guarantee atomicity in logically synchronous computations.
Second, the PALS pattern assumes bounded clock skew and bounded message transmission
delay. Any violation of these timing assumptions may lead to inconsistent and unsafe operations.
PALSware therefore enables run-time monitoring of the system parameters to detect a violation of
the assumptions.. For example, the middleware detects timing faults, such as unusually large clock
skew, and converts them into the fail-stop model. Users can also extend the fault-management
capabilities of the middleware and add application or architecture-specific fault managers.
The rest of this chapter gives an overview of the middleware architecture and the design con-
siderations during its development. In Section 6.2, we discuss the basic PALS execution and
communication model in PALSware. This execution and communication model is similar to the
multi-rate PALS pattern of Chapter 5. In Section 6.3, we discuss a simple fault-tolerant commu-
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nication protocol to guarantee consistent message communication. In Section 6.3, we extend the
basic PALS communication model that guarantee atomicity in logically synchronous interactions.
In Section 6.4, we discuss PALSware’s solution to detect any violation of the timing assumptions.
Later in Chapter 7, we present the experimental studies of different aspects of this middleware.
Figure 6.1: PALS system architecture.
6.1 Middleware Architecture
Figure 6.1 shows the PALS system architecture with PALSware. It consists of three layers: in-
frastructure layer, middleware layer, and application layer. This layered architecture makes the
middleware portable and extendable in different platforms. The application logic does not change
as long as the pattern’s assumptions are satisfied.
At the infrastructure layer, PALSware assumes a fault-tolerant clock synchronizer that enables
high-precision synchronization of the distributed clocks [37, 38]. PALSware is not dependent on
a specific clock synchronizer. It can support an off-the-shelf clock synchronizer, such as Precision
Time Protocol (PTP) [39], as long as it satisfies the assumptions on the clocks. PALSware also
assumes a fault-tolerant real-time network architecture, such as AFDX [40], which has redundant
communication channels or sub-networks to ensure reliable transmission with bounded delay.
At the middleware layer, PALSware provides the services to execute the distributed tasks pe-
riodically based on the user-specified scheduling parameters such as period and priority. It also
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provides the required communication services for logically synchronous interactions. In particular,
task failures increase the system complexity. PALSware guarantees the logical synchronization
even when a task fails in the middle of the computation.
At the application layer, application developers implement the application logic for the dis-
tributed tasks. Users can plug-in fault managers to detect a fault that may affect the logical
synchronization and the application’s safety. For example, if the clock skew assumption is violated
for some reason, the distributed tasks will not be logically synchronized within the 2 interval in
global time. PALSware also supports fail-safe actions after the detection of a fault.
6.2 PALS Tasks and Communications in PALSware
PALSware assumes the task and communication model of the multi-rate PALS pattern. In this
section, we give an overview of the implementations in PALSware.
6.2.1 Task Execution
In PALSware, each task Mi executes periodically with a period of Ti. Following this model, a task
Mi dispatches at the local clock time kTi,∀ k ∈ N.
According to the multi-rate PALS pattern, the logically synchronous interactions happen at
every hyper-period interval. The PALS clock period Thp is equal to the hyper-period or the least-
common-multiple of the task periods.
PALSware has an abstract C++ class, called PALS task, for the execution of each task in this
model. PALS task defines a real-time periodic thread in the user-space. For each task Mi, an
application developer extends this class and defines the periodic logic of this task in the virtual
function, called each pals period. We use the scheduling parameter of the period and priority of
this task as input variables to construct an instance of the PALS task class. For each task Mi,
PALSware maintains a set of timestamps in this class:
• dispatch_time: This is equal to the local clock time of the most recent dispatch event of
Mi. If the current local clock time is in the interval [kTi, (k + 1)Ti), then dispatch_time =
kTi, for some k ∈ N.
• PALS_base_time: This is equal to the local clock time of the most recent PALS clock event.
If the current local clock time is in the interval [jThp, (j + 1)Thp), then PALS_base_time =
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jThp, for some j ∈ N and the PALS clock period Thp.
6.2.2 Task Startup
PALSware coordinates the start time of the logically synchronous tasks. In PALSware, a task
executes its first logically synchronous computation at the beginning of a PALS clock period. Let
the PALS clock period is Thp. In a multi-rate PALS pattern, Thp = niTi, where ni ≥ 1. If
the application binary is loaded at the local time interval (jThp, (j + 1)Thp], the task starts its
logically synchronous execution at the local clock time (j + 2)Thp. We wait for an extra Thp
interval, especially when the binary is loaded just before the local clock time (j+1)Thp. PALSware
guarantees consistency at the cost of this initial delay. Otherwise, the receiving tasks would not
always receive a fixed set of ni messages in each PALS clock period according to the multi-rate
PALS pattern.
6.2.3 Message Communication
Since there exists a non-zero clock skew in the actual system, we have to satisfy the causality
constraint and ensure that a message is received in the same PALS clock period and consumed
in the next PALS clock period. As shown in Section 2.2.2 and Section 5.2.1, each task must not
deliver its messages too early to violate the PALS causality constraint. In these approaches, a task
buffers its messages and uses an output timer to transmit the messages. The output timer has a
timeout after an interval of max(2− µmini , 0) so that the messages are delivered consistently even
with maximum clock skew and minimum message transmission delay.
However, there are some overheads in maintaining a timer in each task. A receiving task may
not also start exactly at the expected dispatch time due to the scheduling of other higher-priority
tasks in the same CPU. We need an explicit constraint on the input time that any message received
after a task’s dispatch_time are not processed in the current period.
PALSware uses a simpler solution to avoid the output timer. In this middleware, a source task
transmits its messages without any additional output hold delay. Instead of buffering the messages
at the source task, the middleware uses message timestamps and compares the timestamps to
detect if the messages have arrived early. PALSware buffers the messages at the receiving tasks
when they arrive early without requiring any timer.
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In this approach, PALSware attaches a timestamp, x1 in each message.
1 If the current PALS_
base_time of the source task Ms is jThp, x1 = (j + 1)Thp for a PALS clock period of Thp. This
indicates that the message is consumed in the PALS clock period j + 1 at the destination tasks.
The destination task then compares the timestamp x1 of the pending messages with its current
PALS_base_time, j′Thp in the PALS clock period j′. A message is accepted when x1 = j′Thp. It
is buffered when x1 = (j
′ + 1)Thp. Otherwise, it is rejected. In non-faulty scenarios, a message is
either accepted or buffered for at most 1 PALS clock period. The message is buffered in software
with very minimal overhead. The buffered message is delivered at the next PALS clock period.
The rejection of a message indicates that current clock skew at the source or the destination node
violates the clock skew requirement of the PALS system. We address this timing fault in Section 6.5.
PALSware implements this timestamp-based message transmission and reception in two C++
classes: TX PALS Port and RX PALS Port. We define one object of TX PALS Port to send a
message to an output port.2 Similarly, we use one object of RX PALS Port to read a message from
an input port. These classes internally use system-dependent objects for unicast/multicast message
communication. For example, we have developed a prototype of the middleware with POSIX
libraries in Linux. We define two classes, TX POSIX unicast port and RX POSIX unicast port,
for transmitting and receiving unicast UDP messages in this environment. In PALSware, these
classes for message communications extend two abstract classes, called TX port and RX port, and
implement the virtual functions, send and recv, respectively.
In Figure 6.2, we show the pseudocode of the send and recv functions of TX PALS Port and
RX PALS Port. These objects also have a reference to the corresponding PALS task object
to access the timing and scheduling parameters of a task such as period, PALS clock period,
PALS_base_time, and dispatch_time. The functions, sysdep send and sysdep recv, refer to the
system-dependent services of message transmission and reception.
Note 1: TX PALS Port::send and RX PALS Port::recv only guarantee that messages are pro-
cessed at the next PALS clock period. The underlying network services must guarantee reliability.
Later in Section 6.3, we show how to achieve consistent message communications in a real-time
network architecture.
1PALSware internally manages the timestamp information. Its use is transparent to the application logic.
2The definition of the port is identical to the event data port in AADL. We only assume one-to-one or one-to-many
port connections between the application tasks. In case of a many-to-one port connection, the application must define
the order of messages that are received in the same port from multiple source tasks.
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TX PALS Port::send(payload) {
Let timestamp, x1 = PALS_base_time + PALS_clock_period;
Append x1 and payload to form a message, msg;
sysdep_send(msg);
}
RX PALS Port::recv(payload) {
// Step 1: Process any previously received messages.
// Let packet_container is a class variable to save packets, especially when they arrive early.
// Each element of packet_container is a pair containing the timestamp and the payload.
for (int i = 0; i < packet_container.size();) {
Read the i-th element (saved_x1, saved_payload) from packet_container;
if (saved_x1 < PALS_base_time) {
Remove the i-th element from packet_containter as it is too old for the current period;
}
else if (saved_x1 == PALS_base_time) {
Copy saved_payload to payload;
Remove the i-th element from packet_containter;
return;
}
else {
break;
}
}
// Step 2: No more messages are queued. Read the messages from the network.
while (true) {
sysdep_recv(msg);
if (msg is received) {
Extract the timestamp (recv_x1) and the payload (recv_payload) from msg;
if (recv_x1 == PALS_base_time) {
Copy recv_payload to payload;
return;
}
else if (recv_x1 == (PALS_base_time + PALS_clock_period)) {
// That is, the message has arrived too early.
Append (recv_x1, recv_payload) to packet_container;
}
}
else {
Copy NULL to payload;
Return by throwing an exception that ‘‘nothing is received’’;
}
}
}
Figure 6.2: Pseudocode of TX PALS Port::send and RX PALS Port::recv.
Timing constraint. The use of the timestamps simplifies the constraints specified in Section 5.2.1.
In PALSware, we do not need the causality constraint explicitly. As long as the tasks are dispatched
in the pre-defined global time interval according to the maximum clock skew of , we only need the
constraint on the task period. Similar to what we have in Equation 5.1, Ti > 2+α
max
i +µ
max
i for
71
each task Mi.
The middleware uses the timestamp of the messages to deliver them in the next PALS clock
period similar to what we achieve with a multi-rate synchronizer. We still have to define a wrapper
of RX PALS Port to filter messages based on the user-specified criteria such as last received message
or a vector of all received messages.
6.2.4 Logical Synchronization Groups
In PALSware, a task may participate in more than one pattern instances to have logically syn-
chronous interactions with different sets of components. We implement the concept of logical
synchronization group in PALSware. To support the composition of these pattern instances, the
middleware maintains a data structure for each logical synchronization group Gi containing
• group’s identifier: GROUP IDi,
• tasks of this group: {Mi,1, . . . ,Mi,ni},
• connections of this group,
• PALS clock period: T ihp = lcm(Ti,1, . . . , Ti,ni),
• current PALS_base_time of the group.
PALSware synchronizes a task’s start time with the PALS clock events of the groups in which it is
a member. Thus, a task starts its logically synchronous computations at the local clock time jThp,
where Thp is the least-common-multiple of the PALS clock period of these groups. Furthermore,
for the message communication in a group, PALSware uses the corresponding PALS_base_time as
the timestamp x1.
In PALSware, application developers declare these pattern instances in a simple configuration
file, currently described in the JSON format. Figure 6.3 illustrates a part of the configuration
declaration. The configuration file declares the information of the logical synchronization groups
(in the “pals groups” block), the tasks (in the “components” block), and the connections (in the
“connections” block). PALSware uses this configuration file to instantiate C++ objects for the
tasks and the communication ports. In the future, this configuration file can be generated from
the AADL models.
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"pals groups" : [
{"name": String, "pals_period": {"second": Number, "nanosecond": Number}}+
],
"components":[
{"name": String, "period": {"second": Number, "nanosecond": Number},
"pals_groups": [String]+, "priority": Number, ... }+
]
"connections":[
{"name": String, "pals_group": String, "size": Number,
"sender": String, "receivers": [String+], ... }+
]
Figure 6.3: Parts of the PALSware configuration.
6.3 PALS Fault-Tolerant Communication Protocol
In this section, we specify the fault model of the PALS system. We discuss a possible distributed
inconsistency when a task fails in the middle of its computation. We develop a fault-tolerant
communication protocol to address this problem. We also use UPPAAL [41] for the model checking
of this protocol. We discuss the UPPAAL model and the verification result in Section 7.3.
6.3.1 PALS Fault Model
Assumption 1. (Fail-stop nodes) The nodes in a PALS system are fail-stop. In this model, a
faulty node fails by stopping its execution to minimize the fault propagation. A failed node does
not send any extra message in the network.
Assumption 2. (Real-time reliable message communication) The PALS system uses a redun-
dant real-time network architecture for reliable message communications. The default is the dual-
redundant network architecture such as AFDX [40]. At most one of the two sub-networks may
fail during operation. Both sub-networks have self-checking capability such as checksums to detect
transmission errors. For increased reliability, a message may also be re-transmitted k times, where
k is a known parameter for a given network. Since the probability of simultaneous errors in these
sub-networks is very low, we assume that at least one of the two sub-networks deliver a unicast
message to the receiver in bounded time.
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Figure 6.4: An example illustrating different failure conditions.
6.3.2 Problem Description
Even with these assumptions, a node failure can cause inconsistency in a system. For example,
a node may fail while a task is in the middle of its computation or message transmissions. As a
result, different receivers may have partial and inconsistent views of the failed node. Consider an
example configuration in Figure 6.4a. Here, outputs of the task M1 are used as inputs in the tasks
M2 and M3. In a normal condition, M1 sends two messages msg1 and msg2 sequentially in period
j. In this example, the failure of M1 may manifest following conditions:
1. Benign failure condition: Figure 6.4b illustrates this condition. In this condition, M1 fails
after it has finished its execution and message transmission of period j. However, this failure
does not cause any problem since the executions of M2 and M3 are consistent and both
destination tasks receive all messages of M1 before the next period j + 1. In this situation,
they detect M1’s failure at the period j + 2.
2. Incomplete but consistent messages: Figure 6.4c illustrates this condition. M1 fails after
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sending msg1 to both M2 and M3, but before sending msg2. In this case, even though M2
and M3 receive the messages consistently, they have partial view of M1’s outputs.
3. Inconsistent messages: In Figure 6.4d, M1 sends msg1 to both M2 and M3 successfully.
However, it fails after sending msg2 to M3 but before sending to M2. As a result, M2 and
M3 have inconsistent views of M1’s outputs.
In addition to the computation nodes, network devices can also fail. Based on the Assumption 2
of the PALS fault model, only one sub-network can be unavailable during the message transmission.
The network can transmit individual unicast messages reliably in bounded time. However, a reliable
unicast message communication is insufficient to prevent inconsistency. For example, the condition
illustrated in Figure 6.4d happens when the network does not support reliable multicast message
transmission.
6.3.3 A Simple Real-Time Reliable Multicast Service
In the PALS system, we use a simple communication protocol for real-time reliable multicast
message transmission. The protocol satisfies the following property:
Agreement. Let a source task Ms transmits a message msg to a set of destination tasks M
D
s =
{Md1, . . . ,Mdk}. In the PALS fault model, if a non-faulty destination task receives msg, then the
other non-faulty tasks in MDs will also receive the message in the same period.
Based on this property, there are two acceptable failure scenarios in the PALS system: 1) the
non-faulty destination tasks MDs receive all messages from the source task Ms if Ms does not fail
in its period j, or 2) they receive an identical subset of messages from Ms if Ms fails. Figure 6.4b
and 6.4c illustrate these acceptable scenarios. In the following, we discuss the related work and the
implementation of this protocol.
Related work. Reliable multicast is a well-studied concept in the networking and distributed
systems [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. These protocols are however applicable for general-
purpose computing systems. The assumption is that the network architecture provides a best-effort
service for eventual message delivery. Thus, these protocols have to handle complex interaction
scenarios, such as message omission and network partitions, to guarantee consistency within a
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bounded time. On the other hand, in the real-time network architecture, at least one of the sub-
networks deliver the messages in bounded time. Hence, we can implement a lightweight real-time
multicast protocol with reduced complexity.
Furthermore, one of the main objectives of the existing protocols is to guarantee ordered delivery
of the messages from multiple source tasks. For example, ISIS2 [51] is a group communication
service that delivers messages in different order: FIFO order using integer counter, causal order
using Lamport’s vector clock, and total order using a form of lock. In addition, Kaashoek et
al. [45] use a special node, called sequencer, to define the message order. Christian et al. [52] and
Kopetz [53] use the synchronized local clocks as the timestamp to determine the message order
and the delivery time. Abdelzaher et al. [54] use the token of a logical ring to define the order of
events. In contrast, there is no need for additional ordering of the messages in a PALS system.
The logically synchronous execution of the tasks, by default, provides the necessary order of the
messages. The only requirement is to guarantee that the multicast of a message from a task Mi
happens within a maximum delay of (Ti − αmaxi − 2).
There are two approaches to implement real-time reliable multicast protocols: network layer
vs. middleware layer. A network layer multicast relies on either a linear bus or the multicast-
aware network routers [53, 55, 56]. These protocols guarantee reliability based on the redundant
transmission over duplicated sub-networks. On the other hand, middleware layer protocols are
used when the network does not support the multicast. In this case, the middleware multicasts a
message based on unicast transmissions.
Ideally, the PALS system can support both approaches for reliable multicast. In both approaches,
one has to extend the abstract communication classes (TX port, RX port) of PALSware for the
multicast service. The PALS communication model of Section 6.2.3 will then internally use these
system-dependent multicast service.
Implementation. In this section, we discuss a simple implementation of a middleware protocol
for real-time reliable multicast. The main idea of this implementation is based on the protocols
proposed in [42, 43, 52]. In these protocols, the tasks are organized in a multicast group. During
each multicast operation, a sender sequentially transmits a message to the receivers. Upon receiving
a message, each receiver re-transmits to other receivers if it had not already received the same
message. A task may crash any time during the multicast of a message. As long as at least one
non-faulty receiver receives the message, other non-faulty receivers will also receive that message.
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Figure 6.5: Use of n fault-tolerant relay nodes for reliable multicast. In this figure, n = 2.
However, a naive approach requires O(n2) message delivery for each multicast message, where n
is the size of the multicast group. We use a simple extension. In this extension, we form a small
multicast group of n relay nodes, {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}. A source PALS task transmits its message
to these relay nodes. These relay nodes then apply the original multicast protocol to exchange
the message within themselves. Once a non-faulty relay node has received a message, it first re-
transmits it to other relay nodes and then transmits to the destination PALS tasks. A destination
task can receive at most 2n message from n relays over two sub-networks. It selects only one
message from the received messages. Figure 6.7 shows an example topology with two relay nodes.
In this implementation, total number of unicast message transmissions is reduced when the number
of relays is relatively smaller than the number of destination tasks.
We extend the PALS fault model with following assumptions about the relay nodes.
• Assumption 1-1. The relay nodes are also fail-stop.
• Assumption 1-2. At least one relay must be non-faulty or working during the operation of
a real-time multicast operation. Thus, if this non-faulty relay receives a message from either
another relay node or the source PALS task, it will propagate the message to the destination
tasks in bounded time.
• Assumption 2-1. Each relay node is connected to both sub-networks. Based on the As-
sumption 2 of the PALS fault model, at least one of the sub-networks will deliver the messages
to and from a relay within bounded time. We assume that maximum transmission delay to
a relay node or from a relay node takes at most δmax time.
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We also assume that the processing of a message takes at most βmax time at a relay. Both δmax
and βmax are computed based on the real-time schedulability analysis of the relay nodes and the
message communications.
multicast_send(destinations, msg) {
Send msg by using reliable unicast to the tasks in the set, destinations;
}
multicast_relay() {
Wait for a msg from either a PALS task or other relays;
if (msg has not been received before) {
Update the message history of the output message port;
multicast_send(relays, msg);
multicast_send(destination_tasks, msg);
}
}
TX_port_application_to_relays::send(msg) {
multicast_send(relays, msg);
}
RX_port_relay_to_application::recv(msg) {
Receive messages from the relays;
Select one received message and copy into msg;
Reject the remaining messages.
}
Figure 6.6: Pseudocode of multicast send and received operations.
Figure 6.6 gives the pseudocode of this multicast protocol. For example, a basic multicast
operation with sequential transmission to a group of destinations is given in the function, multi-
cast send. The main logic of this relay node is multicast relay. A PALS task uses the functions
TX port application to relays::send and RX port relay to application::recv to send and receive the
multicast message.
In this service, each relay maintains a data structure to detect if a message has been previously
observed. In this implementation, a message from a connection, equivalently an output port of a
source task, is uniquely identified by the connection identifier and a timestamp. Each relay node
keeps a history of the timestamp of the last message received from a connection.
There are two approaches to define the timestamp in this protocol. Firstly, one can use a counter
as the timestamp that increments from 0-to-N, where N is the maximum value of this counter. The
counter value wraps around after N. Each multicast message in a connection from a source task
has a counter value. The source task increments the counter at every multicast operation in a
connection. A message is considered new at the relay node when its counter is one greater than the
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saved value at the relay node. When a source task restarts, it sends a special start message with −1
as the counter value to reset the saved value at the relay.3 A restarted relay initializes the counter
value as −1. The restarted relay accepts any message as long as the message counter is positive.
We discuss the UPPAAL model of this design in Section 7.3. Alternatively, the timestamp can
also be based on the local clock time of the source node. Since we assume that the local clocks are
monotonically increasing, the relay nodes can easily detect whether a message is new by comparing
the timestamps.
Lemma 1. This protocol guarantees that the worst-case end-to-end delay of the successful multi-
cast message transmission is δmax + n(βmax + δmax) for n > 1 relay nodes. The time is measured
from the time when the source task finishes its computation of the function “multicast send” to
when the message arrives at the final non-faulty destination node.
Proof. The end-to-end delay in a successful multicast message transmission has three segments:
1) the message transmission delay from the source to the relays, 2) the delay within the multicast
group of relays to reach the first non-faulty relay node, and 3) the delay from a non-faulty relay to
a non-faulty destination task. The worst-case delays at the first and the third segments are simple.
Since the network architecture guarantees a reliable message transmission to and from the relay
node (Assumption 2-1), these segments are given as δmax and βmax + δmax, respectively.
Christian el al. [52] discuss the scenario at which the worst-case delay occurs in a multicast
group. In this group of relay nodes, the worst-case delay occurs when only one relay node remains
non-faulty, and the remaining source and relay nodes fail during the same multicast operation.
Let the messages are sequentially transmitted to relays R1 to Rn. In this worst-case scenario, the
nodes fail immediately after sending the message to the next relay in the list. Thus, the source task
fails after it transmits the message to R1. Similarly, the relay Rk fails after receiving the message
and transmitting the message to the relay Rk+1, for k = 1 . . . n − 1. As a result, it takes at most
(n− 1)(βmax + δmax) time to deliver the message to the final non-faulty relay node from the first
relay. We illustrate this worst-case scenario in Figure 6.7 for three relay nodes. In this case, the
source task and the relay nodes fail in a sequence until the message reaches the final non-faulty
relay node.
It therefore follows that the worst-case end-to-end delay of a successful multicast message tran-
3The start message may be piggybacked in the first message from the restarted node.
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mission is δmax + n(βmax + δmax) in this protocol. 
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Figure 6.7: Worst-case message flow in the reliable multicast protocol for n = 3 relays. Gray
ellipses represent faulty nodes that fail after one message transmission.
Lemma 2. When a source task Ms delivers a message msg to a set of destination tasks M
D
s =
{Md1, . . . ,Mdk}, if a non-faulty destination task receives msg, then the other non-faulty tasks in
MDs will also receive it.
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we assume that there are two non-faulty destination tasks
Md1 and Md2, and n relay nodes {R1, ..., Rn}. We prove this lemma by contradiction. We assume
that Md1 receives a message msg from a source task Ms, but Md2 does not receive msg.
Let Md1 receives msg from a relay node Rk, for some k (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Thus, Rk must be non-
faulty at the time of sending msg to Md1. Since the relay nodes are fail-stop, Rk must have failed
before transmitting the message to Md2 on both sub-networks (Assumption 1-1). Otherwise, Md2
would have received the message based on the assumption of the real-time network architecture
(Assumption 2-1).
In the proposed logic of the relay node in multicast relay, a relay node propagates the message
to other relays prior to sending to the destination tasks. Since there are at least one non-faulty
relay nodes during the multicast operation (Assumption 1-2), they must receive this message msg
during the current multicast operation from Rk. Subsequently, at least one non-faulty relay nodes
will propagate the message to both destination tasks Md1 and Md2. However, this contradicts our
initial hypothesis. Thus, the lemma holds. 
Proof of agreement. The proof of the above-mentioned agreement property follows from Lemma
1 and Lemma 2. Let the source task Ms transmits the message msg in its period j. If the message
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arrives at a non-faulty relay node during the multicast operation, then the non-faulty destination
tasks receive msg in a bounded time of δmax + n(βmax + δmax). Thus, by defining the maximum
message transmission delay µmaxs of the source task Ms as δ
max+n(βmax+δmax) and using µmaxs to
derive the bound on the source task’s period Ts, we guarantee that either all non-faulty destination
tasks receive msg in the same period j before the next dispatch of the source task or none of them
receive it. 
6.4 Atomicity of Logically Synchronous Computations
The multicast protocol of Section 6.3.3 ensures consistency but does not guarantee atomicity.
Destination tasks may receive only a subset of the output messages because of the failure of a
source node. In the section, we extend the PALS communication model to guarantee atomicity of
the task execution during a period. This extension provides consistent information about the failed
state of a source task to the destination tasks. The destination tasks may use this information to
discard any of the partially received messages so that either all or no messages from a source task
is received during a period. Thus, a task failure can only be benign as shown in Figure 6.4b.
6.4.1 Protocol Implementation
End-marker message. In this protocol, PALSware propagates a special end-marker message to
the destination tasks of Ms at the end of Ms’s computation in each period.
4 The end-marker mes-
sage has a timestamp, xend = kTs, denoting the completion of the period k at Ms. PALSware uses
the real-time reliable multicast service to send this message.
Processing of application messages. Let the destination tasks of a source task Ms is given as
a set MDs . In this extension, the middleware appends another timestamp x2 to each message from
a PALS task. The timestamp x2 is equal to the current dispatch_time of the source task. Let the
task Ms transmits the message in its period k
′ = nsj + k i.e. the kth execution in the PALS clock
period j. Thus, x2 = k
′Ts.
4End-markers are also commonly used when a large message is packetized. Either the last packet has an explicit
end-marker bit or the payload length is used as the end-marker. This proposed solution is different from end-marker
of the packets. Our solution is applied when a source task transmits separate messages in a period. In this approach,
we do not form a large packet by bundling all messages as the messages may be transmitted to different sets of
targets.
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In this protocol, a destination task Md ∈ MDs compares the timestamp x2 of an application
message with the timestamp of the last received end-marker message. Md processes a message
from Ms sent at its period k
′ only if an end-marker message with a timestamp, xend ≥ k′Ts has
been received.5 A message is delivered to the application when the conditions on both timestamps
(x1, x2) are satisfied. (x1 is defined in Section 6.2.3.)
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Figure 6.8: Operation sequences in non-faulty conditions.
Operation sequence. Figure 6.8 illustrates the operation sequences of a task Ms in non-faulty
conditions. During each periodic execution, Ms reads the end-markers of other tasks from the
reliable multicast service in the system. It decides on the failed state of other tasks based on
the received end-marker messages. PALSware then executes the fault detection logic of the user-
specified fault manager (Section 6.5). If Ms has no internal fault, PALSware executes the task
logic defined in the function each pals period of the class PALS task. At the end of the task logic,
PALSware propagates the end-marker message of current period to the multicast service, which
then multicasts to the destination tasks of Mi.
In PALSware, we use a wrapper class, called PALS comm client, to manage the PALS commu-
nication objects, TX PALS Port and RX PALS Port. It also transmits the end-marker message
through the real-time multicast service. Application tasks use two functions, pals send (connec-
5A simple optimization is possible for the end-marker messages in a task participating in a multi-rate PALS
pattern. Given the above mentioned logic, only the final end-marker message from the last execution in a PALS clock
period is required to be transmitted in this fail-stop model.
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tion name, payload) and pals recv(connection name, payload), to send and receive application mes-
sages. In the function pals recv, the parameters payload is used as a call-by-reference parameter
to return the received message from this function. We also have a variant of pals recv to receive
messages only when the corresponding source task has an atomic execution in the period of the
message transmission. This function is given as pals atomic recv(connection name, payload). In
these functions, we use connection name as the input identifier for a connection from a source task
to a group of destination tasks. We provide the pseudocode of pals send and pals atomic recv in
Figure 6.9. The only difference between pals recv and pals atomic recv is that pals recv does not
compare the timestamps to detect the atomic execution of the source task.
PALS comm client::pals send(connection name, payload) {
x_2 = dispatch_time;
Create a message, msg by appending x_2 and payload;
tx_port = pointer to a TX_PALS_port object for a given connection, named connection_name;
tx_port->send(msg);
}
PALS comm client::pals atomic recv(connection name, payload) {
x2_end = timestamp of the last received end-marker message;
rx_port = pointer to a RX_PALS_port object for a given connection, named connection_name;
rx_port->recv(msg);
Extract the timestamp, x_2 of the received message, msg;
if (x2_end >= x_2) {
// That is, the source did not fail in the period of transmission.
Copy the rest of the message to payload;
return the length of the payload;
}
else {
// Inform users of the non-atomic execution of the source task.
return -1;
}
}
Figure 6.9: Pseudocode of the communication wrapper class, PALS comm client.
6.4.2 Protocol Property
We now discuss the atomicity property of this protocol. The atomicity of this protocol is obvious
when we use the real-time reliable multicast service for all messages, including the end-marker
message. Based on the agreement property of Section 6.3.3, the non-faulty destination tasks receive
either all messages from the source task Ms if Ms does not fail in its period j, or an identical subset
of messages from Ms if Ms fails. If an end-marker is received, the destination tasks treat Ms as non-
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faulty or working and subsequently deliver the received application messages from Ms. Otherwise,
the destination tasks reject any of the partially received messages from Ms.
We can however achieve a simpler approach to achieve atomicity. In this section, we prove a
sufficient condition based on only the real-time reliable multicast of the end-marker message. The
remaining application messages can be transmitted sequentially to the destination tasks by using
the available unicast message transmission of the real-time network architecture.
Atomicity. A real-time reliable multicast of the end-marker message is sufficient to guarantee
atomicity in the proposed protocol under the assumptions of the PALS fault model.
Proof. The proof is divided into two steps. In the first step, we show that if a destination task
Md receives an end-marker message of period j from Ms, then it must have received all of Ms’s
application messages of period j. In the second step, we show that the destination tasks agree on
the received end-marker message.
The first step of this proof is based on the assumptions of the PALS fault model, and the
ordered transmission of the application messages and the end-marker message. Let Ms outputs a
set of application messages {msg1, . . . ,msgk} and the end-marker message ends in period j. In
the proposed protocol, the middleware transmits ends after transmitting the application messages.
By the assumption of the real-time network architecture, even if Ms transmits a message msgj
sequentially to the destination tasks, all non-faulty destination tasks receive it as long as Ms does
not fail in the middle of this transmission. We assume that the nodes are fail-stop. Hence, if
Ms does not fail prior to transmitting ends, the non-faulty destination tasks must receive the
previous application messages. Furthermore, the period of the source task Ms is sufficiently large
to guarantee that a message arrives in the same period at the destination tasks. In the multi-rate
PALS system, the worst-case multicast message delay of these messages, including the end-marker
message, from the source task Ms is less than (Ts − αmaxs − 2). Thus, it is obvious that if a non-
faulty destination task Md receives ends, it must have received other messages {msg1, . . . ,msgk}
from Ms in the same period.
The second step of this proof directly follows from the agreement property of the real-time reliable
multicast protocol such as the protocol of Section 6.3.3. In case of a real-time reliable multicast
of an end-marker message, if a non-faulty destination task receives the end-marker message from
the source task Ms, the other non-faulty destination tasks also receive it in the same period. This
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implies that the non-faulty destination tasks agree on the failed state of Ms based on the availability
of the end-marker message.
Based on these steps, when the end-marker message from the source task Ms is available at the
non-faulty destination tasks, these tasks consume all application messages from Ms sent in the
same period as the end-marker message. Otherwise, these tasks decide consistently that Ms has
failed to transmit the end-marker message successfully and reject any received messages from Ms.

6.5 Fault Managers in PALSware
PALSware supports integration of fault managers to detect any software fault that can adversely
affect the PALS system requirements. In PALSware, we define a generic interface for the fault man-
agers, called Abstract fault manager. It has a virtual function, called check pals faults. PALS task in-
vokes this function to check the assumptions in each period. Users can extend this interface to
define application-specific fault managers and plug into PALSware. If the fault manager detects a
fault, PALS task does not execute the task logic. It rather invokes a user-defined function, called
fail safe, to have an application-specific graceful termination of the task.
While many of the faults are generic and have system-wide detectors, a small class of timing
faults is critical to the correctness of the logical synchronization. For example, PALSware can
integrate with existing clock synchronizers [57, 58, 34] to synchronize the local clocks. These clock
synchronizers nowadays achieve a clock skew in the order of microseconds in a local area network.
Such precision is sufficient for many real-time control applications. However, there are certain
operational conditions, such as system initializations or faulty kernels, in which the clock skew
requirement may be violated. In this section, we demonstrate some of these fault scenarios and
discuss a fault manager that detects the clock synchronization error locally.
6.5.1 Clock Synchronization Error
Clock synchronization is a well-studied concept in distributed systems community [34, 35, 59, 60,
61]. Since the hardware clock oscillators do not progress precisely at the same rate, the clocks
of the distributed nodes eventually drift apart. The distributed nodes must therefore synchronize
their local clocks to satisfy the PALS timing requirements. In a PALS system, each node executes
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a clock synchronizer process to synchronize the local clocks with respect to a reference clock server.
The clock synchronizer periodically computes the clock offset or clock skew with respect to the
reference clock server and adjusts the local clock time to minimize the timing error.6
We identify two integration problems when the clock synchronizer and the PALS application
execute as independent processes in the operating system. We discuss these problems in the
context of two clock synchronizers. The first clock synchronizer is our prototype implementation
of the Christian’s algorithm [34]. We refer it as ClockSyncProto in this section. In this clock
synchronizer, nodes interact in a master-slave mode. Each node runs a clock synchronizer process
that periodically communicates with reference (master) clock servers to synchronize the local clock.
The second clock synchronizer is an open-source implementation of IEEE-1588 Precision Time
Protocol (PTP) [57, 62]. PTP synchronizes the distributed clocks in a broadcast mode. In this
mode, a reference clock server periodically broadcasts its clock information to other nodes. Each
node runs a PTP daemon. This daemon then synchronizes the local clock based on the reference
clock information.
Problem 1: A PALS application has a startup dependency on the clock synchronizer. During
the node startup, the local clocks usually have a large clock offset or clock skew. In this condition,
a clock synchronizer typically resets the clock to match with the reference clock. Despite the
initial reset, it may still take several minutes to reduce the clock synchronization error below an
acceptable range. As a result, the execution of a PALS task may be delayed after the node restarts.
Figure 6.10 demonstrates this phenomenon for both ClockSyncProto and PTP. For example, in our
experiments, it takes 3-6 minutes to reduce the clock offset from 0.19 seconds (approximately) to
a value in the order of hundreds of microseconds.
Problem 2: Both clock synchronizer and PALS application have some shared dependency. Both
of them depend on the local clock time maintained at the operating system. A clock synchronizer
uses the local clock time to attach the timestamps to its messages and measure the delay to the
reference clock server. On the other hand, PALSware uses the local clock time for the PALS clock
events and task executions. Thus, any fault affecting the local clock time, such as in the form of
time loss or faster clock, also affects these processes.
6The clock offset is an equivalent measurement of the clock synchronization error as the clock skew defined in
Section 2.1. For a local clock time c(t) at the global clock time t, the true clock offset is given as c(t) - t. With
respect to the reference clock server’s clock time cref (t), the clock offset is c(t)− cref (t). We discuss the relationship
between the clock offset and the clock skew in Appendix F.
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Figure 6.10: Startup delay in clock synchronizers.
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Figure 6.11: Effect of time loss in clock synchronizers.
For illustration purpose, we use a simple kernel module to emulate the effect of time loss in an
operating system. When we load this module, it disables the timer interrupt and implements a
busy loop before re-enabling the interrupt. Since the operating system does not update the clock
time during this interval, it loses some time from its measurement.7 This results in a spike of about
4-5ms in the clock offset. As a result, the tasks in the node may no longer be logically synchronized
with the tasks in other nodes. Figure 6.11 demonstrates this experimental result for both clock
synchronizers.
Note: In this section, we do not address the faults of the reference clock servers. Appendix F
7Note that the timer interrupt should not be disabled for a long period of time in actual systems. It is not often
allowed to disable the timer interrupt at all. Yet, a faulty device driver, a buggy kernel or even a simple memory
bit-flip can affect the local clock time to result in similar behavior.
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gives a generic concept of the arbitrary faults in these servers. We believe that existing research
results may be applied in these problems [63, 38, 37].
6.5.2 Experiments with a Timing Fault Manager
We have developed a fault manager to monitor the clock synchronization state and detect the
above mentioned timing errors in PALSware. The fault manager uses two fault detection logic.
The first solution is supported on any architecture but requires a simple extension of existing clock
synchronizers. On the other hand, the second solution is architecture-specific and requires processor
counters for fine-grained timing information.
In the first solution, the clock synchronizer updates the current clock offset or clock skew estimate
periodically in a pre-defined shared memory. The fault manager in PALSware reads this published
value at every period. If the current clock skew is greater than the expected maximum clock skew,
then it is not safe to start or execute the PALS tasks. We currently use this solution to detect the
clock synchronization error during the task startup. PALSware does not start the tasks until the
clock skew stabilizes below the expected bound.
In this technique, suppose that the clock synchronizer process notifies its clock skew estimate at
a maximum interval of R and PALSware reads this value at a minimum interval of T. Let ts be
the most recent local clock time when the clock skew estimate is updated and tp be the most recent
local clock time after ts, i.e. tp ≥ ts, when PALSware reads this value. We define two conditions
for this monitoring:
1. (tp − ts) ≤ R: It means that there is a recent update of the clock skew from the clock
synchronizer process.
2. (tp−ts) > R: It means that the clock skew estimate is stale. Either the clock synchronizer has
crashed or is making no progress. In this condition, PALSware, by default, stops the execution
of the task. Note that it may be possible to continue the task execution for an additional
interval. However, this needs to consider the maximum clock drift rate and last clock skew
estimate. If the last clock skew estimate is ∆ and the maximum clock drift rate is ρ, then the
computation can safely progress until a future time t as long as |∆|+ (t− ts)ρ < . Beyond
the time t, we cannot guarantee the PALS clock skew requirement without reinitializing the
clock synchronizer.
88
However, the clock synchronizers typically compute the new clock skew value at the time of
resynchronization. Traditionally, the clock resynchronization happens in a very slow rate, often in
the order of seconds or minutes. As a result, even if the clock is bad, or there are bugs in the under-
lying operating system, the fault manager cannot detect the fault until the next resynchronization
time.
We address this problem in the second fault detection technique in which we use high-resolution
timers available in the processor. For example, x86 processors currently support a 64-bit counter,
called Time Stamp Counter (TSC) in each CPU. Its value is incremented at every pulse of the
hardware clock oscillator. Since TSC is not subject to the interrupt, it is less prone to any time
loss. System-specific fault detectors in PALSware can read these counters and measure the time
between two consecutive PALS clock events or two successive periodic dispatches. If the current
measurement deviates significantly from the regular execution, the fault manager notifies the mid-
dleware of a possible timing fault. In this approach, the exact accuracy of the processor counter,
such as TSC, is not necessary to detect any timing error. We can afford some inaccuracies as long
as we know a reasonable bound on the TSC measurement of the intervals.
Experimental results. In this study, we compare the effectiveness of these two fault detection
techniques based on the time-loss error. We inject the fault by loading the above-mentioned kernel
module multiple times in the target node. In order to evaluate for multiple fault injections, we let
the PALS task continue even after the fault manager detects the timing error. Figure 6.12 gives
the experimental results of this fault injection experiment for both ClockSyncProto and PTP.
In our experiment, these clock synchronizers notify the clock offset or clock skew value at every 2s
interval. For the purpose of demonstration, we test with a PALS task with a period of 100ms. We
observe that there are sudden changes in the measurements of clock offsets and TSC measurements
after we load the kernel module. The fault manager can easily notice the anomalous behavior based
on the prior knowledge of the maximum clock skew and the bounds on the TSC measurements of
the task period.
As shown in Figure 6.12, the fault manager based on the high-resolution processor counter,
such as TSC, performs better in this experiment. Figure 6.12c gives the exact period number at
which the fault manager detects the error in this experiment. Since the clock synchronizer updates
the current clock synchronization error at a slower rate than the task period, there can be many
intermediate executions that are unaware of the timing fault in the system. In this configuration,
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we may decide to reduce the update interval or the clock resynchronization interval. However, this
approach increases the network and processing overhead.
Experiments with ClockSyncProto to detect timing error
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Experiments with PTP daemon to detect timing error
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(b) Precision Time Protocol (PTP) daemon
Clock synchronizer Fault # Offset TSC
ClockSyncProto
1 542 538
2 2025 2006
PTP daemon
1 753 752
2 2893 2893
(c) The task periods at which the fault manager detects the error.
Figure 6.12: Monitoring of clock offset (or skew) update and TSC to detect timing error.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
This chapter discusses a number of experimental studies on various aspects of the PALS middleware,
PALSware. In Section 7.1, we present an experimental study of the middleware in a distributed
control system of an inverted pendulum. In this section, we also discuss a scenario of how we use
PALSware’s guarantee of logical synchronization to solve a performance problem, in addition to
the distributed consensus. In Section 7.2, we discuss a fault-injection framework that we use to test
the PALS applications. In Section 7.3, we describe a UPPAAL model of the PALS fault-tolerant
communication protocol.
7.1 Case Study: A Dual-Redundant Control System
7.1.1 Description
The inverted pendulum is a linear-motion servo-plant consisting of a movable cart and a free turning
rod attached to the cart [64]. The servo control of the inverted pendulum is based on a feedback
controller that reads the measurements of the cart position and the rod angle. The controller then
controls the cart movement on a steel shaft to maintain the rod in its upright position. The failure
in this control system happens when the rod falls over.
Figure 7.1 shows the setup of our experiment on 4 distributed machines. We have two redundant
servo controllers: Side1 and Side2. The pendulum is connected with the I/O machine that exe-
cutes both sensing and actuation logic. Both servo controllers execute the same feedback control
logic. They also collaborate in an active-standby configuration. The coordination of these two
controllers is similar to our model of Section 4.2 except that we do not use the input variables:
side1FullyAvailable, side2FullyAvailable, side1Failed, and side2Failed. We implicitly
assume that the subsystems are always available and the controller tasks are crashes in case of a
fault. The user can issue a command from the user interface machine to flip the active-standby
91
Figure 7.1: Control system.
status of a controller similar to manualSelection of Section 4.2.
In the experiment, there are two logical synchronization groups. The servo control synchroniza-
tion happens between the tasks of the I/O, Side1 and Side2 machines at a PALS clock period of
20ms. On the other hand, the user command synchronization happens between the tasks of the
Side1, Side2 and user interface machines at a PALS clock period of 40ms. In our implementa-
tion, there is one task per machine in this implementation. Both Side1 and Side2 execute a single
task for both servo control and active-standby coordination that execute a period of 20ms. The
user interface runs an environment input synchronizer to propagate the user command logically
synchronously at a period of 40ms.
We use PALSware to guarantee consistent inputs at the servo controllers. Such consistency
is crucial for the inverted pendulum. For example, when there is no active controller, we do not
normally execute a control command. As a result, we can visually observe the jittery movement
or the failure of the inverted pendulum, when the controllers are inconsistent and do not agree on
who is active.
7.1.2 C++ Implementation
Figure 7.2 and 7.3 give the code snippet of the periodic tasks in Side1 and Side2. We particularly
show the active-standby configuration logic in these two figures. Here, Side1 task and Side2 task
are two child classes of the PALS task class that implement the logically synchronous computations
in these servo controllers. We define the periodic computations in the each pals period function.
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bool Side1_task::eah_pals_period() {
...
// 1. Dene task-spei default values for messages.
int8_t side1 = NO_MSG;
int8_t side2 = NO_MSG;
bool user_md = false;
// 2. Reeive previous period's data, given that the soure has not rashed.
omm_lient→pals_rev(side1_status,&side1,1);
omm_lient→pals_rev(side2_status,&side2,1);
omm_lient→pals_rev(user_md, &user_md,1);
// 3. Deide on whih side is ative, based reeived information from
// Side1, Side2, and the user.
next_side1_state = ative_standby_logi(side1, side2, user_seletion);
// 4. Send urrent period's state.
omm_lient→pals_send(side1_status,&next_side1_state,1);
...
return true;
}
(a) The each pals period function.
int8_t Side1_task::ative_standby_logi(int8_t side1, int8_t side2, bool user_md){
// If both sides have same status, side1 beomes ACTIVE
if(side1 == side2) {
return ACTIVE;
}
// If side2 is alive, but side1 has just woken up. Therefore, side1 starts as STANDBY.
else if (side1 == NO_MSG && side2 != NO_MSG) {
return STANDBY;
}
// If side2 is down, but side1 is running. Thus, side1 beomes ACTIVE.
else if (side1 != NO_MSG && side2 == NO_MSG ) {
return ACTIVE;
}
// When both are alive, a new user ommand ips the ative/standby status.
if (user_md) {
if (side1 == ACTIVE) return STANDBY;
else return ACTIVE;
}
return side1;
}
}
(b) The active standby logic function.
Figure 7.2: Code snippet of Side1’s each pals period.
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bool Side2_task::eah_pals_period() {
...
// 1. Dene task-spei default values for messages.
int8_t side1 = NO_MSG;
int8_t side2 = NO_MSG;
bool user_md = false;
// 2. Reeive previous period's data, given that the soure has not rashed.
omm_lient→pals_rev(side1_status,&side1,1);
omm_lient→pals_rev(side2_status,&side2,1);
omm_lient→pals_rev(user_md, &user_md,1);
// 3. Deide on whih side is ative, based reeived information from
// Side1, Side2, and the user.
next_side2_state = ative_standby_logi(side1, side2, user_seletion);
// 4. Send urrent period's state.
omm_lient→pals_send(side2_status,&next_side2_state,1);
...
return true;
}
(a) The each pals period function.
int8_t Side2_task::ative_standby_logi(int8_t side1, int8_t side2, bool user_md){
// If both sides have same status, side2 beomes STANDBY
if(side1 == side2) {
return STANDBY;
}
// If side1 is alive, but side2 has just woken up. Therefore, side2 starts as STANDBY.
else if (side2 == NO_MSG && side1 != NO_MSG) {
return STANDBY;
}
// If side1 is down, but side2 is running. Thus, side2 beomes ACTIVE.
else if (side2 != NO_MSG && side1 == NO_MSG ) {
return ACTIVE;
}
// When both are alive, a new user ommand ips the ative/standby status.
if (user_md) {
if (side2 == ACTIVE) return STANDBY;
else return ACTIVE;
}
return side2;
}
}
(b) The active standby logic function.
Figure 7.3: Code snippet of Side2’s each pals period.
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For the simplicity of presentation, we define separate classes for these servo controllers. Both classes
use the same feedback control logic. The only difference between these classes is in the initialization
of the active-standby configuration. For example, when both Side1 and Side2 start at the same
period, we break the tie in favor of Side1. In such case, Side1 starts as the active controller, where
as Side2 starts as the standby controller.
In PALSware, we use a PALS comm client object, called comm client, for the message commu-
nication in each PALS task. If the source task fails or the input is not available, we use a default
value for the input data port. Note that even though the connections may belong to separate PALS
patterns, the interfaces remain same in PALS comm client. PALSware hides the pattern manage-
ments using the system configuration discussed in Section 6.2.4. PALSware guarantees identical
input views of the previous period’s state and the user command at the servo controllers. Based
on this guarantee, these controllers remain consistent and perform identical state transitions. For
example, in the active standby logic function, the controllers can flip their active/standby status in
the same period when they are both alive and there is a corresponding user command. Without the
PALS pattern guarantee in PALSware, it would not have been possible without acknowledgment
messages or a complex interaction protocol.
7.1.3 Experimental Setup and Result
Machine Description
Side1 OS: Linux 2.6.28-11-generic
Side2 Dual core processor. Intel(R) CPU T2300 1.66GHz
User interface Total memory: 500160 kB
Cache size: 2048 KB
I/O
OS: Linux 2.6.31-14-generic
Single core processor. Pentium II 349.123 MHz
Total memory: 250716 kB
Cache size: 512 KB
Table 7.1: System configuration.
In this experiment, the four machines are connected via Ethernet switches. Table 7.1 gives
the configuration of these machines. We can assume this system as a pseudo real-time system
since the network is small and other tasks or communications have not significantly interfered our
experiments. In this case study, we use ClockSyncProto to synchronize the clocks of these machines.
The clock skew is less than 0.5ms in normal configuration. We discuss the clock synchronizer’s
operation in Section 6.5 and Appendix F.
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Later in Figure 7.7a, we give a boxplot of the response times of the application tasks. The
I/O machine’s task has the largest response time because of its processor speed with respect to
other machines. Furthermore, the I/O machine has a single core. Thus, the response time is also
increased since we have to run both clock synchronizer and the I/O task in the same core. On the
other hand, we run these tasks in different core in other machines.1
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Figure 7.4: Inverted pendulum response. Fault injections are marked as blue circles.
We ran this experiment for maximum 5hrs. The pendulum remained stable and balanced during
this time. Figure 7.4 gives a sample plot of the cart’s position and the rod’s angle. Here, we
manually killed the active controller (Side1) at period 11076. Side2 became active at period 11077.
We then restarted Side1 at period 11985, and finally killed the active controller (Side2) at period
12037. There was however a slight perturbation after the failure of the active controller (shown
by the blue circles). This is expected in the synchronous design. When the active controller fails,
there is no active control command for a period. Even though the standby becomes active in the
next period, missing a control command for a period affects the pendulum’s response for a brief
interval. We therefore amend the design based on PALSware’s guarantee that the active controller
may be unavailable for a limited number of periods (in this case, one period). We now use the
last active controller’s command when no one is active. This solution improves the pendulum’s
response during the failure of the active controller. Figure 7.5 shows the pendulum’s response after
this fix. In the amended solution, we do not observe any jittery movement in the control of this
1The I/O board of the inverted pendulum uses an ISA card. We an old I/O machine that supports ISA.
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inverted pendulum.
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Figure 7.5: Inverted pendulum response after our fix to handle the failure of the active controller.
Fault injections are marked as blue circles.
Note: In the worst-case, it may take upto 2 periods before this active-standby design can have
a new active controller after the failure of the current active controller. The worst-case scenario
happens when the active controller fails in the same period as the other controller has restarted.
In our design, the restarted controller may take upto 2 periods before becoming active, in case
the other controller is failed. Two periods for a restarted controller is required to overcome any
confusion when both controllers start at the same time.
7.2 Validation of Agreement and Atomicity
Distributed testing is simple with PALSware. Since PALSware delivers an application’s messages
in the order of the PALS clock events, we can easily validate the global state properties. To test a
distributed algorithm in PALSware, we only need a validator task that receives the messages from
the target PALS tasks and execute a validation logic on the global state in each PALS clock period.
In this work, we extend this concept to test the agreement and atomicity properties mentioned in
Section 6.3 and 6.4. We implement a testing framework to inject faults in the code of a PALS task
and validate these properties even when the task fails in the middle of its computation. Figure 7.6
illustrates this framework. There are 4 components in this framework: a fault injection driver, a
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Figure 7.6: Fault injection test setup.
target PALS task Ms interacting with other distributed tasks Md, a set of replicated fault monitors
and a validator task.
The fault injection driver and the target PALS task Ms execute in the same machine. The fault
injection driver injects a fault in Ms. Currently, we kill the task randomly during its computation.
In this framework, the fault monitors act as dummy destination tasks to monitor Ms’s state. A
fault monitor therefore executes identically at the same rate as a destination task of Ms. For
example, in case of the servo controller, we emulate the I/O task to be a fault monitor. Since the
fault monitors are assumed to be non-faulty during the testing, we only need two redundant copies
of a fault monitor to detect any inconsistency. These fault monitors receive the end-marker and
application messages from the target task. In each period, the fault monitors notify the state of
the received end-marker and application messages to the validator. The validator then compares
these messages to detect any inconsistency due to a bug or an implementation error.
This framework is currently developed in Linux. In order to control the fault injection point, the
fault injection driver uses the ptrace system call of Linux to monitor the system call invocations
from Ms.
2 The fault injection driver then randomly kills the target task after a number of system
calls based on a given MTTF (mean time to failure) parameter. In this context, MTTF is the
statistical mean on the number of system calls after which Ms fails in a fail-stop manner.
2We thank Daniel Chen, Kuan-Yu Tseng, and Cuong Pham of CSL, UIUC for their help with the fault injection
driver. We use some part of their tool, called pfi, to build our own fault injection driver.
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Performance overhead. The fault injection experiments increase the task response time due
to the overhead of ptrace and interruption of the system calls. Figure 7.7 compares the response
times of the application tasks of Section 7.1 with and without fault injection experiments. The
boxplot shows that the upper bound of the response time of the I/O task increases about 80%. We
also notice some outliers during the fault-injection experiments. These outliers result in some false
positives if we do not adjust the task periods. For testing purposes, we increase the task periods by
a constant factor to reduce the number of false positives. In these cases, the code for the I/O tasks
also have to be replaced with a dummy code since the adjusted control periods are not appropriate
for the physical control of a device. Furthermore, this framework only validates the consistency of
the middleware, not the application semantics.
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Figure 7.7: Comparison of response time with and without fault injections in the inverted
pendulum control system of Section 7.1.
7.3 Verification of PALS Fault-Tolerant Communication Protocol
In this section, we describe the UPPAAL model of the fault-tolerant communication protocol of
Section 6.3.3. In the UPPAAL model, we currently model the reliable multicast from a single source
task. The source task multicasts its messages to a group of distributed relays. These relays then
exchanges the source message within themselves. Once a relay receives a new message either from
the source task or remaining relays, it multicasts the message to other relays and the destination
tasks. In this protocol, each message has a counter. During each multicast operation, the counter
increments by one. Thus, the relays can know whether an incoming message is new based on its
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counter value and the counter of the last received message.
In this model, the source and the relays can fail non-deterministically any time during the
multicast operation. We only add a constraint on the number of non-faulty relays. In each multicast
operation, there must be at least one non-faulty relay to deliver the message to the destination
tasks.
The rest of this section gives a brief overview of the components of this model and verification
of the agreement property. We compare the model checking results for different size of the relay
group. In this model, we do not explicitly model the destination tasks. Instead, we use an output
variable for each relay. We compare these output variables to evaluate the agreement property.
7.3.1 Brief Overview of UPPAAL
UPPAAL [41] is model checker for real-time embedded systems. It models a system as a network of
timed automata. A timed automaton is a finite-state machine with clock variables. One can define
the automaton with a finite number of locations and transitions between the locations. UPPAAL
models the state of the modeled system as the current locations of the timed automata, their clock
conditions and other user-defined variables. Each automaton instance in UPPAAL is referred to as
a process. Users use a process template to declare the locations and transitions of an automaton.
The process templates are parameterized. One can instantiate a process by defining the values of
the parameter.
In UPPAAL, each transition (edge) between two locations of an automaton defines 4 optional
labels: select, guard, sync, update. The select label allows to select a value non-deterministically
from a range such as an integer range and apply the value in other labels of the transition. The guard
defines an expression that must be true to execute the transition. Two processes in UPPAAL can
have synchronized transitions based on a synchronization label defined in sync. UPPAAL uses the
notion of channel to synchronize the processes. The sync label of a transition uses the expression of
type c? or c! for a given channel c. A process with the sync label of c! synchronizes with another
process with the sync label of c? as long as the receiving process’s guard expression is true. The
automaton can also update its variables based on the expression of the update label. UPPAAL also
defines the notion of committed and urgent locations. In the model, these locations are marked
with C and U, respectively. These locations are used to have restrictive executions. For example,
time does not progress in a system when a process is in these locations. In case of the committed
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locations, the next transition in the system must be from a committed location.
7.3.2 Description of the Model
There are 4 process templates in our model of this protocol:
• Driver: We have a process template, called Driver, to coordinate the interactions during
a multicast operation. We instantiate this process template and define a process, called
MainDriver. In our model, the driver also plays a partial role for the source task. During
each multicast operation, it increments the message’s counter value prior to the message
transmission to the relays.
• MulticastSrcMsg: We model a process template, called MulticastSrcMsg, to transmit a
source task’s message to the relays. This process sequentially transmits this message to the
relays. It also models the failure of the source task during the multicast operation. The
source task can fail before, after or in the middle of the computations of this process.
• Relay: The operations of the relays are divided into two process templates in our model:
Relay and MulticastRelayMsg. In the Relay process, we synchronize the relay’s message
receipt from the source task through the process MulticastSrcMsg and from other relays
through the process template MulticastRelayMsg. Once a relay receives a new message, it
propagates the message to other relays. In UPPAAL, we instantiate the process template
Relay for all relays in the system.
• MulticastRelayMsg: We model the message transmission from a relay to its neighboring
relays through this process template. We also model the non-deterministic failure of a relay
node during the sequential message transmissions in this process. We instantiate this process
template for all relays in the system.
We now provide a detailed description of these process templates.
Driver process. Figure 7.8 gives the UPPAAL representation of this process template. We use
a single clock clk in this process. The multicast operation in this model spans across one clock step
of this process. At each clock step, this process increments the message counter and transmits a
message on behalf of the source task. According to the proposed protocol, the counter increments
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L4 L3
L2L1
clk <= 1
L0
clk = 0
src_msg!
relay_reset!
clk == 1
set_new_val(src_val)
clk = 0,
src_val = -2
Figure 7.8: Driver process template.
from 0 to MAX_VAL-1. (MAX_VAL = 18 in the model.) When the source task fails, we set the
counter value to FAILED_VAL(=-2). When the source task recovers, we also reset this counter to
RESET_VAL(=-1). This counter is set in the function, set_new_val during the transition L1->L2.
The driver then generates an event on the channel relay_reset. This event non-deterministically
resets or restarts any of the previously failed relay nodes. In this way, we can control the execution
of the relays across different clock steps. In the transition L3->L4, the driver triggers an event on
the channel src_msg to initiate the process of multicasting the source task’s message to the relays.
This process waits at the location L4 until the operation of the multicast operation completes. Note
that L4 is not a committed location in our model. Thus, UPPAAL will handle the transitions from
committed locations in other processes prior to executing a transition at this process.3
MULTICAST_LOC
i <= MAX_RELAYS
INIT
i = 0,
set_failed_val(src_val)
i == MAX_RELAYS
i = 0
i < MAX_RELAYS
src_msgs[i]!
i = i + 1
src_val != FAILED_VAL
src_msg?
i = 0
Figure 7.9: MulticastSrcMsg process template.
MulticastSrcMsg process. Figure 7.9 gives the UPPAAL representation of this process tem-
plate. After the synchronization on the src_msg channel, this process sequentially sends an event
to each relay node by using the channel src_msgs[i] , ∀ i ∈ MAX RELAY S. We use the variable
MAX_RELAYS to give the total number of relays in the system. We also model the failure of the source
3In actual implementation, this wait is implicit when the period interval is sufficiently large.
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task. The process may move from the location MULTICAST_LOC to INIT non-deterministically and
set the message counter to FAILED_VAL to simulate the failure of the source task.
L3
L2
L1
tmp == RESET_VAL
update_val(tmp)
mult_relay_msg!
update_val(tmp) j : id_t
j != id && accept_relay_val(relay_vals[j])
relay_msgs[j]?
tmp = relay_vals[j]
tmp != RESET_VAL
mult_relay_msg!
update_val(tmp)
accept_src_val(src_val)
src_msgs[id]?
tmp = src_val
Figure 7.10: Relay process template.
Relay process. Figure 7.10 gives the UPPAAL representation of this process template. We
synchronize the processes Relay and MulticastSrcMsg using the channel src_msgs[i], where i
is the index of the relay node. In this synchronization, each relay checks if the input message’s
counter (given by src_val) is acceptable or not. Each relay saves the previously observed counter
value in a variable relay_vals[i]. As mentioned above, a relay accepts a new message if the new
message counter is equal to RESET_VAL or (relay vals[i]+1) % MAX VAL. In the model checking, we
find that there is a third condition to accept a message. When the failed relay restarts, it updates
its internal variable for the previously observed counter value to RESET_VAL. In this condition, an
input message with a positive counter is also accepted. We give the function accept_src_val that
checks a message from the source task.
bool accept_src_val(val_t val) {
if (val == FAILED_VAL || relay_vals[id] == FAILED_VAL) return false;
if (relay_vals[id] == RESET_VAL && val != FAILED_VAL) return true;
return (val == RESET_VAL || val == (relay_vals[id] + 1) % MAX_VAL);
}
In case of a reset message, the relay does not propagate the message to other relays. Otherwise,
a relay triggers an event on the channel mult_relay_msg to initiate a multicast operation to other
relays (shown by the transition L2->L1).
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Similarly, when a relay receives a forwarded message from other relays, it first checks if the mes-
sage is new. In case of a new message, the relay forwards the message to other relays (shown by the
transition L3->L1). In the following, we give the code snippet of the function accept_relay_val,
which checks an incoming message from another relay.
bool accept_relay_val(val_t val) {
if (val < 0 || relay_vals[id] == FAILED_VAL) return false;
if (relay_vals[id] == RESET_VAL && val != FAILED_VAL) return true;
return (val == (relay_vals[id] + 1) % MAX_VAL);
In both transitions, we update relay_vals[i] with the new incoming message’s counter in the
function update_val.
FAULT_LOC
MULTICAST_LOC
i <= MAX_RELAYS
INIT
relay_reset?relay_reset?
set_reset_val()
inject_fault(relay_vals)
i = 0,
set_failed_val()
i < MAX_RELAYS
relay_msgs[i][id]!
i = i + 1
i == MAX_RELAYS
i = 0,
set_recv_val()
first_msg?
i = 0
Figure 7.11: MulticastRelayMsg process template .
MulticastRelayMsg process. Figure 7.11 gives the UPPAAL representation of this process
template. We manage a 2-dimensional array of channels to transmit an event to other relays.
We also model the non-deterministic failure of the relay node during the multicast operation. We
only take a transition to inject a fault (denoted by the transition MULTICAST_LOC->FAULT_LOC)
when there are other non-faulty relays. At this transition, we set relay_msgs[i] to FAILED_VAL.
The fault persists until the driver process generates an event relay_reset. At this event, we non-
deterministically restart the relay node by resetting its saved counter relay_msgs[i] to RESET_VAL.
Note that as long as the value is set to FAILED_VAL, the relay does not accept any new value.
In order to propagate the relay’s content to the receivers, we use an array, called recv_vals. Each
relay of index i updates recv_vals[i] with relay_vals[i] after if it has successfully transmitted
the message to other relays.
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7.3.3 Verification Results
In order to store the input message’s counter during the multicast operation, we use a UPPAAL
meta variable, called meta_src_val.4 meta_src_val is set to src_val during the transition L1->L2
at Driver so that the failure of the source task does not affect this meta variable.
Based on the recv_vals array, we can easily verify the agreement property when a multicast
operation completes. In our model, we define this completion at the location L1 of the Driver
process. In this model, we use the following safety property to verify the agreement among the
relay nodes as well as the destination tasks that use the message from the relay nodes.
Property 1. If one of the relay nodes accepts the source task’s message during the multicast
operation, other relay nodes also accept the same message unless they have failed.
A[] (MainDriver.L1 && exists(i:int[0,MAX_RELAYS-1]) recv_vals[i] == MainDriver.meta_src_val) imply
(forall(i:int[0,MAX_RELAYS-1]) (recv_vals[i] == MainDriver.meta_src_val ||
recv_vals[i] == FAILED_VAL))
In this experiment, UPPAAL (version 4.0.13) explores a total of 18284 states to verify this prop-
erty for two relays with default settings such as breadth-first search exploration and conservative
space optimization. UPPAAL explores a total of 422902 states in case of three relays. It explores
a total of 12062277 states for four relays.
4In UPPAAL, meta variables are not part of the system state. They may be used to perform special calculations
without increasing the state space.
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CHAPTER 8
RELATED WORK
8.1 Formal Software Engineering
Since the famous book on design patterns, called “Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-
Oriented Software” [12], many design patterns have been proposed for different domains. There also
exist many patterns on fault-tolerance, real-time computing and networking of the cyber-physical
systems [65, 66, 67]. A pattern can be viewed as a design template of the solution to a generic
problem. Although useful in enabling the software reuse, the standard practice of the design
patterns is not sufficient for cyber-physical systems. These patterns are usually documented in
informal languages. Thus, correct instantiations often depend on users’ expertise and interpretation
of the application’s context. There have also been many efforts on formal modeling of design
patterns [68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74]. Similar to the PALS pattern, these works also intend to avoid
implementation ambiguities by using domain-specific languages and structural analyses. However,
these works do not address the formal verification of the target applications. In contrast, we
apply the PALS system to reduce both design and verification complexities of real-time distributed
applications.
In this work, we use AADL to model and analyze the PALS systems. Synchronous design lan-
guages and tools, such as Simulink [75], SCADE [76], and Lustre [77], are also widely used in
the cyber-physical system development. However, these languages are only applied in the model-
ing, simulation and analysis of the software components. Furthermore, the software components
in a synchronous design language are originally intended to be only centralized and driven by a
global clock. As a result, these techniques, by default, lack the support for architectural-level
analysis of distributed software components. Several works have proposed solutions to simulate
the asynchronous behavior of the distributed software in a synchronous design language [78, 79].
These works simulate the nondeterministic asynchronous behavior by having sporadic execution
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of processes and controlled delivery of the messages. While these techniques are useful in model-
ing asynchronous software components, we still need complexity-reducing techniques to deal with
combinatorial event interleaving and complex interactions in a distributed application. In this
respect, the PALS system complements these languages and tools. One can model and verify
the logically synchronous behavior of a PALS system in a synchronous design language as we
have done in Synchronous AADL and AADL Behavior Annex. In a similar fashion, we then need a
correctness-preserving transformation of the synchronous models to execute them on the physically
asynchronous architecture.
There are other architectural modeling languages such as SysML [80] and MARTE [81]. These
languages and AADL have similar capabilities for system modeling but at different levels of flex-
ibility and expressiveness. The PALS pattern may also be defined in these languages. We note
that there are active collaborations between these language communities to develop transformation
tools for these languages. Thus, in the future, it may also be possible to translate the PALS system
in AADL to other modeling languages.
8.2 Distributed Consensus Algorithms
Distributed consensus is a fundamental concept in distributed systems and theory. Virtual syn-
chronization is one of the early solutions for distributed consensus. Birman and Joseph [82] first
introduced the process group abstraction to achieve virtual synchronization for event-triggered com-
putations. This virtual synchrony model guarantees that the behavior of the replicated processes
is indistinguishable from the behavior of a single reference process on a non-faulty node. ISIS [83]
and its new version ISIS2 [51] are two middleware that achieve the virtual synchrony with a group
communication service. The group communication service maintains a list of active processes and
notifies the process join or crash events, known as view change events. These middleware synchro-
nize the view change events and the application messages in such a way that distributed processes
remain consistent.
Horus is another system supporting virtual synchrony [84]. Guo et al. [85] give a lightweight
version of this implementation. Pereira et al. [86] use application-level semantics to relax some
strong consistency requirements of virtual synchrony. However, these techniques do not provide
hard real-time guarantees or timing bound of when a synchronization is completed. Real-time
versions of these communication services have been proposed in [87, 88]. For example, Abdelzaher
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et al. [88] provide a multicast and membership service for real-time process groups organized in a
logical ring. When an application needs to send real-time messages, it presents the message with
timing constraints to an admission controller to perform online schedulability analysis. Real-time
messages that can be scheduled are admitted. Otherwise, they are rejected.
There are several key differences between the PALS system and the virtual synchronization model
implemented in these group communication services. Firstly, these services provide a different level
of abstraction to the application developers than the PALS system. These services are primarily
used as the network-layer services for reliable and consistent message communications in a group
of computations. One can synchronize the computations at individual events such as application
messages, membership or view change events with these services. Thus, from an application’s per-
spective, it makes more sense to use these services with event-triggered or aperiodic computations.
Otherwise, the application has to provide the necessary mechanisms for the timed processing of
the events. On the other hand, the PALS system achieves a time-triggered, logical synchronization
of real-time computations. It coordinates both computations and message communications in an
application such that the messages generated during two consecutive PALS clock events are pro-
cessed consistently at the receiving tasks. Thus, the computations are synchronized at the PALS
clock events. Based on the clock synchronization algorithms, these synchronization events happen
periodically within a fixed global time interval across the nodes.
Secondly, the group communication services, by default, guarantee reliable multicast of individual
application messages. As discussed in Section 6.3.3, even though we can use these services for
consistent message communications, the PALS system requires only a minimal protocol for real-
time reliable multicast communication. These existing works have more complexity than what we
need. For example, the PALS system does not require the ordered delivery of individual messages
in a period as long as they are received in separate application ports. The tasks in the PALS system
only care whether the messages are delivered reliably or not.
Thirdly, the group communication services bundle various fault-tolerance mechanisms such as
group membership, state transfer upon initialization. These are useful for many applications.
In this thesis, we do not address these mechanisms in the PALS system. We separate our logical
synchronization mechanism from these fault-tolerance mechanisms so that designers can implement
the right fault-tolerance mechanisms to meet different reliability requirements of the applications.
Implementation of these mechanisms should not be difficult in the PALS system. For example, we
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can easily determine the non-faulty computations in a group based on the end-marker events.
There are other well-known consensus algorithms, such as Lamport’s Paxos algorithm [89] and
Chandra-Toueg’s algorithm [43]. These consensus algorithms are widely used in distributed trans-
actions, distributed locking protocols, and leader election [90, 91]. These consensus algorithms
however do not provide hard real-time guarantees. They assume a globally asynchronous system,
which does not provide any bound on message transmission delay, clock drift rate, and execution
speed. We note that there is a famous theory on the impossibility of distributed consensus by Fis-
cher et al. [92]. This theory suggests that no algorithm can always reach consensus in a bounded
time in this model of asynchronous system, even with a single process crash failure. The main
reasoning is that processes cannot correctly differentiate a slow process from a crashed one with-
out a bound on the end-to-end delay. These consensus algorithms circumvents this impossibility of
consensus based on concepts such as failure detectors and quorum consistency [93]. Since the PALS
pattern assumes a bound on message transmission delay, clock drift rate, clock skew and response
time, this theory does not apply in the work of this thesis. In contrast to these algorithms, the
PALS pattern can achieve consistency in real-time with significant reduction in complexity.
8.3 Synchronous Lockstep Execution
Our work is also related to the works done by other researchers to implement synchronous model
onto different asynchronous architectures such as Loosely Time-Triggered Architecture [19, 94] and
Asynchronous Bounded Delay (ABD) network [95, 96]. Tripakis et al. [19] deals as ours with
the problem of mapping a synchronous computation on an asynchronous architecture. In their
approach, they consider a loosely timed-triggered architecture (LTTA). The mapping is achieved
through an intermediate finite FIFO platform (FFP) layer. Although correctness is achieved in
spite of unpredictable network delays and clock skews, these approaches do not provide the hard
real-time guarantee required for synchronization and consistent views in cyber-physical systems.
Furthermore, this work does not handle any failure and multi-rate computations.
The architectural assumptions of the PALS system is also related to those of the ABD network.
An ABD network primarily assumes that the message transmission delay is bounded. Chou et
al. [95] and Tel et al. [97] give similar protocols to simulate a globally synchronous design on
an ABD network with bounded clock drift rate. These works define the logical synchronization
period in terms of the round intervals for different network topologies, where each round interval
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gives an upper bound on the message transmission delay. However, these works do not assume
that a fault-tolerant clock synchronizer synchronizes the local clocks. As a result, these protocols
require complex reinitialization procedure to correct the clock drift errors. For example, after a
certain number of rounds, these protocols reset the clocks based on the multicast of special “start”
messages. In these approaches, the real-time periodic computations of a cyber-physical system may
be discontinuous during this reinitialization procedure. Furthermore, none of these works discuss
node failure, reliable message communication, and multi-rate computations.
Awerbuch [18] gives three protocols for achieving logical synchronization: α synchronizer, β syn-
chronizer, γ synchronizer. These synchronizers generate local tick events to execute the synchronous
logic, similar to our approach. However, these synchronizers either depend on the acknowledgment
messages or a leader node to prevent the arrival of past messages after a tick event. As a re-
sult, these solutions require longer synchronization periods and have high overhead to maintain a
verifiable leader election logic with respect to failure and other asynchronous events.
Rushby [98] also gives a round-based synchronous execution in a time-triggered architecture. In
this synchronous model, each synchronous round or period has two phases: communication and
computation. The computation phase begins only after the communication phase has finished. Only
the PALS system pattern (with single-rate) is closely related to this model. This work, however,
does not support multi-rate executions. There is also a difference with respect to our approach.
The PALS pattern does not require the computation phases to complete prior to sending messages.
A task can send its messages while it is in the computation phase, which can reduce the required
PALS clock period.
8.4 Time-Triggered Architecture
Time-Triggered Architecture (TTA) is one of the earliest system architectures that introduced
distributed real-time clock sources for maintaining consistency [99]. The core functions of TTA
are implemented in custom network architecture, such as TTP/C [53] and TTEthernet [100],
for reliable message communications. In both TTP/C and TTEthernet, the nodes communicate
according to a pre-specified Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) schedule. Hence, every node
knows exact message transmission time and has a time window for receiving each incoming message.
The hardware in these architectures, such as network guardian and network switch, also maintains
the message schedule and detects a faulty node when a message is not received in the allowable time
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window [101]. Correctness of these solutions requires a tight clock synchronization of all nodes,
including the network switches. Thus, these network architectures also implement a fault-tolerant
clock synchronization algorithm in the hardware [102, 103].
The existing capabilities of these network architectures are sufficient to satisfy the PALS architec-
tural assumptions of bounded end-to-end delay and clock skew. Hence, it is possible to implement
the PALS pattern in a system architecture with these time-triggered network architectures.
However, TTA has its own distinctive characteristics that make the implementation of distributed
consistency and logical synchronization different from the proposed approach in this thesis. In
TTA, the distributed consistency is based on the concept of sparse timebase [104]. In the sparse
timebase, TTA controls the send instants of the message transmissions. Messages are transmitted
with sufficient time difference so that other nodes can agree on the order of the messages based on
the local timestamps of message transmissions. In order to define the timestamps, TTA defines a
logical clock whose granularity (i.e. the tick duration) is a function of the maximum clock skew.
Based on this clock, TTA can ensure that “the temporal order of events can be recovered from their
timestamps, if the difference between their timestamps is equal to or greater than 2 ticks.” [105,
p. 62].
While this model provides a simple approach to define the temporal order of messages in TTA,
we need more efforts to coordinate the distributed interactions. In particular, TTA does not
consider the task response time and the message transmission delay in its logical clock. Therefore,
despite the control on message transmissions, variations of these system parameters can increase
the verification complexity of the distributed algorithms in TTA.
Steiner and Rushby have recently proposed an extension of the sparse timebase to implement
the globally synchronous model in TTA [106]. This approach requires an additional timing layer
on top of the original logical clock of TTA so that the synchronization period is sufficiently long to
allow for the task response time and the message transmission delay. A PALS clock period in TTA
then becomes equivalent to a fixed integer-multiple of the logical clock of TTA. A small caveat:
Since the granularity of the logical clock of TTA depends on the maximum clock skew, the PALS
clock period may be slightly larger than the expected one.
We also note that the PALS pattern does not have to know the global message schedule of the
time-triggered network architectures for the logical synchronization. The pattern only uses the
system’s performance parameters to abstract away the underlying network architecture. Thus,
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the use of the PALS pattern is similar in any real-time network architecture, whether it is time-
triggered or event-triggered. Applications can be reused with minimal overhead when the network
architecture is upgraded or modified.
8.5 Other Related Work
8.5.1 Real-time Networking Middleware
Distributed middleware, such as real-time CORBA [107], web-services, publish-subscribe middle-
ware [108], and PALSware provide a virtualized platform for distributed tasks to collaborate.
However, the level of abstractions provided by these middlewares are quite different. Real-time
CORBA, web services, and publish-subscribe middleware require the developers to be explicitly
aware of the asynchronous nature of the distributed nodes. Therefore, the applications on top of
these middleware layers should be carefully designed and verified to provide consistency under such
asynchronous environments. In contrast, PALSware is a middleware for logically synchronous com-
putations that hides the physically asynchronous clocks and simplifies the distributed algorithms.
8.5.2 Fault-Tolerant System Design
Fault-tolerance is a major design criteria for safety-critical systems [109]. Various techniques have
been proposed in different application domains. Triple modular redundancy and pair-pair redun-
dancy are widely used to mask single point failure [110]. Sha et al. proposed a simplex architecture
to separate the concerns of effectiveness and reliability for command and control systems [111].
Applications in a process group also use membership algorithms to have a consistent picture of
the members’ state in the presence of various faults such as crash failure, message omission, and
Byzantine faults [53, 52]. This thesis does not provide a specific fault-tolerance mechanism. How-
ever, we have demonstrated that the fault-tolerant solutions can be much simpler with the PALS
pattern.
Fault injection is a widely studied mechanism to test fault-tolerance functionalities for both
hardware and software [112, 113, 114]. These fault injection tools are capable of injecting a wide
range processor, memory, and communication faults and collecting performance and dependability
measurements. In this work, we consider a simple fault-injection driver to test the basic fail-stop
model using SIGKILL. Future extension may integrate with low-level fault injectors in the future.
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8.5.3 Formal Verification of Distributed Algorithms
Formal verifications of distributed consensus algorithms have been investigated in the past [115,
116]. These works show some feasibility of the model checking of distributed consensus algorithms
in physically asynchronous architecture that only guarantee bounded message transmission delay.
Such architecture is commonly known as partially synchronous distributed systems. These works
however do not provide any generic solution for achieving a scalable verification in distributed sys-
tems. Researchers have also verified other distributed algorithms, such as distributed convergence,
in this architecture. For example, Chandy et al. [117] transform a shared memory architecture to
verify the distributed convergence problem in a partially synchronous distributed system. However,
the architectural assumptions of the shared memory architecture and the partially synchronous ar-
chitecture are different from the PALS system. In contrast to these architectures, the PALS system
assumes real-time bounds on the various system parameters. Thus, not only that the PALS sys-
tem reduces the possible non-deterministic interaction scenarios, but also it enables the use of the
equivalent globally synchronous design.
In recent years, researchers have also explored the model checking of distributed software [118,
119, 120, 121]. These works consider various heuristics for efficient state-space explorations such as
random walk, bounded search, and dynamic partial-order reduction. Despite these optimizations,
model checking of distributed algorithms is still extremely difficult beyond a certain model size and
complexity.
8.5.4 Other Works on PALS System
In [122], Bae et al. extend the multi-rate PALS pattern. The authors give a mathematical defi-
nition of the pattern and proves the bisimulation between a synchronous system and a multi-rate
distributed system. This work is complementary to our approach. We emphasize on the engineering
aspect of the pattern and apply model-based techniques to analyze the system specification.
In [106], Steiner and Rushby also discuss a correction of the PALS timing constraints by us-
ing local clock time measurements and clock drift rate. They normalize the global time based
measurements with respect to the maximum clock drift rate ρ. For example, they use local clock
time measurements of (µmin(1− ρ), µmax(1 + ρ)) for message transmission delays instead of (µmin,
µmax). In our proposal, we do not have to explicitly handle the clock drift rate. When defining the
timing constraints of the PALS system, we always analyze with respect to the global time interval
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that defines the earliest and the latest global time of an event based on the maximum clock skew.
Therefore, their corrections are not necessary unless one considers the PALS timing constraints
purely in terms of the local clock time. In case of the local clock time, one can normalize the
system parameters with respect to clock drift rate as suggested by Steiner and Rushby [106].
Rockwell Collins META toolset [123] is closely related to the AADL framework proposed in
this thesis. The META toolset was developed during a DARPA-funded program [11] in which we
also collaborated. This toolset supports design transformations, compositional verification, and
static analysis for various architectural patterns. With respect to the PALS pattern, designers can
instantiate the PALS design specification and validate the assumptions in this toolset. Both our
framework and the META toolset perform similar architectural analysis for the PALS pattern. In
contrast to the META toolset, we also support architectural analyses for the Synchronous AADL
model and the multi-rate PALS model. Our framework also generates the synchronous model from
the PALS model.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
Components in cyber-physical systems require consistent views and actions in real-time to guarantee
safety and correctness. In this thesis, we propose a complexity-reducing architectural pattern
and its middleware implementation for achieving consistency in these systems. Our proposed
solutions guarantee a logically synchronous abstraction for the real-time distributed computations.
In this approach, we can reduce the amount of efforts spent for the distributed system design and
verification. Engineers need to design and verify only the simple globally synchronous model as
long as the system architecture satisfies the pattern’s assumptions.
Beyond the scope of this thesis, there are several open challenges in the research of the PALS
system:
• We currently validate the middleware with a simple fault injection framework. We still
have to test the middleware more rigorously to meet the certification requirements of the
safety-critical systems. Our group is currently collaborating with the researchers of Software
Engineering Institute (SEI), Carnegie Mellon University. We plan to use a software model
checker, such as CBMC [124], to verify the PALS applications and this middleware.
• We also have to support the formal verification of the multi-rate PALS applications. We have
to extend the Synchronous AADL specification for the multi-rate computations and translate
the AADL model to a model checking language for formal verification.
• In many information processing applications, the distributed computations operate in the
pipeline over multiple nodes. In these applications, we need to synchronize the components
that execute at different phases of the pipeline. We have developed a simple extension of the
PALS pattern, in which a component executes in one of the pipeline phases and interact with
the neighboring tasks of the following phases [27]. We have to analyze the integration of this
extension and the proposed patterns of this thesis.
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Based on our experience with the PALS pattern, we believe that formal design patterns can
be effective in reducing the complexities of a complex system. For a scalable formal analysis, a
system can be designed by composing these design patterns. In this composition, each pattern will
provide the necessary abstractions to simplify the design of the subsequent steps. This design style
is also suitable for the assume-guarantee compositional reasoning [125, 126]. One can formalize
the assumptions to define valid pattern instances so that the pattern guarantees can be preserved
in the subsequent design steps. We believe that more research still needs to be done to integrate
these patterns in existing formal verification frameworks.
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APPENDIX A
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF AADL
AADL is a modeling language for the cyber-physical system architecture. There are several benefits
of using AADL in the system engineering. It helps engineers maintain a logical mapping between
the design and the final implementation throughout the development process. During the system
integration, engineers can also perform various architectural analyses on the AADL models to
validate the design requirements and avoid many integration problems.
In this chapter, we give a brief introduction of AADL. Readers who are familiar with AADL can
skip this chapter. For a better understanding of AADL, we recommend the technical reports by
Feiler et al. [127] and the AADL standard released by Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) [24].
A.1 AADL Components and Connections
Engineers can specify both hardware and software components of a system architecture in AADL.
In the following, we briefly describe the constructs used to model these components:
1. The software components are specified by the AADL constructs: thread, thread group, process,
subprogram, data, etc. A thread represents an executable software component. A thread
executes inside a protected address-space modeled by the process construct. A thread can be
either periodic or aperiodic. A thread group provides a logical collection of threads, data and
other thread groups in a process. A subprogram models a source code function. In AADL, a
data construct represents a data type used in the source code.
2. The hardware components are specified by the AADL constructs: processor, memory, device,
bus, etc. A processor construct models the processing hardware that executes the threads. A
memory construct models the storage for code and data. A device construct is used to model
any hardware device such as sensors and actuators. The processor, memory, and devices can
be interconnected by a bus construct.
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AADL also defines a composite construct, called system to have a hierarchical organization of
the hardware and the software components of a subsystem.
In addition to the structural specification, one can specify the behavior of threads and subpro-
grams using an AADL annex1, called Behavior Annex [29]. AADL Behavior Annex defines states,
variables, and state transitions of a thread or a subprogram.
AADL defines different connection semantics for software interactions: data port connection,
event data port connection, and event port connection. These connections connect two ports. A
port defines a message interface of a software component. These connections have different queuing
behavior. For example, when two threads communicate messages using an event data port connec-
tion, the messages can be queued at the destination thread. On the other hand, when the threads
use a data port connection, the port has a single buffer at the destination thread. The messages
are allowed to be overwritten in this buffer. AADL uses an event port connection to send events
or notifications to other threads. An aperiodic thread may be dispatched at the arrival of an event
at an event port. An event data port connection can also be used to send an event along with a
data.
The AADL models have both textual and graphical representations. Figure A.1 gives the graph-
ical representation of the above-mentioned AADL constructs.
Process
Thread
Device
Memory
Processor
Bus
Thread
Group
System
Data Subprogram
Data port Event port Event data 
port
Figure A.1: AADL modeling constructs.
1An annex allows a user to extend the AADL language with specialized notations and modeling capabilities.
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A.1.1 Component type and implementation:
In AADL, a component is defined by its type and implementation specification.
Component type. The type declares a component’s visible characteristics including its name,
features (e.g. ports), properties, and an (optional) extend clause with the parent component’s type.
We give an example of a process’s type declaration in Figure A.2. In this figure, the process
type, called ComputationA, has two features given by two ports. The internal components of this
process communicate with the process’s external components through these ports. The declaration
of a port includes its name, connection type, direction, and data type. For example, msgOut is an
output event data port of ComputationA. ComputationA transmits an Integer message through
this port to other components.
In AADL, one can additionally declare the characteristics or parameters of a component in the
AADL property annotations. For example, in this example, we define the period of the compu-
tations inside ComputationA by using a pre-defined AADL property, called Period, which has a
value of 20ms. Any periodic thread that executes inside this process has this default rate unless
the thread defines its own period property.
process ComputationA
features
  msgIn: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
  msgOut: out event data port Base_Types::Integer;
properties
  Period=>20ms;
end ComputationA;
msgIn msgOut
ComputationA
Figure A.2: The type declaration of an example process, ComputationA.
Component implementation. An implementation, on the other hand, declares the internal
structure of a component, which include its identity, subcomponents, and interactions between the
subcomponents. Other declarations include the implementation properties, any refinement of the
inherited features and subcomponents, etc.
We give an example process implementation, called ComputationA.impl, in Figure A.3. The im-
plementation is identified as {component type name}.{implementation name}. Thus, ComputationA.
impl is an implementation of the type ComputationA. The internal structure of this example imple-
mentation contains two thread subcomponents: thread1 (thread implementation ThreadX.impl)
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msgIn msgOut
ComputationA.impl
thread1:
ThreadX.impl
thread2:
ThreadY.implmsgIn1
msgOut2msgIn2msgOut1
(a) AADL diagram.
process implementation ComputationA.impl
subcomponents
  thread1: thread ThreadX.impl;
  thread2: thread ThreadY.impl;
connections
  port msgIn -> thread1.msgIn1;
  port thread1.msgOut1 -> thread2.msgIn2;
  port thread2.msgOut2 -> msgOut;
properties
  Priority => 10 applies to thread1;
  Priority => 12 applies to thread2;
end ComputationA.impl;
thread ThreadX
features
  msgIn1: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
  msgOut1: out event data port Base_Types::Integer;
properties
  Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
end ThreadX;
thread implementation ThreadX.impl
end ThreadX.impl;
thread ThreadY
features
  msgIn2: in event data port Base_Types::Integer;
  msgOut2: out event data port Base_Types::Integer;
properties
  Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
end ThreadY;
thread implementation ThreadY.impl
end ThreadY.impl;
(b) AADL text.
Figure A.3: The implementation declaration of an example process, ComputationA.impl.
and thread2 (thread implementation ThreadY.impl). ComputationA.impl describes the inter-
connections between these threads and connections with its ports. For example, any incoming
data to this process is directly delivered to thread1. Then, the output of thread1 is passed to
thread2, which eventually generates the final output of this process. The process implementation
abstracts these internal details from the external components. Similar to the type declaration, an
implementation may define additional properties or override the property values declared in the
component type declaration. In this example, we define the priorities of the thread subcomponents
in ComputationA.impl by using the AADL property, called Priority.
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APPENDIX B
AADL PROPERTY SETS FOR PALS SYSTEM
B.1 Synchronous AADL Property Set
property set SynchAADL is
Synchronous: inherit aadlboolean applies to (system, process, thread group, thread);
SyncPeriod: inherit Time applies to (system, process, thread group, thread);
Deterministic: aadlboolean applies to (thread);
IsEnvironment: aadlboolean applies to (thread);
InputConstraints: list of aadlstring applies to (thread);
end SynchAADL;
B.2 PALS System AADL Property Set
property set PALS_Properties is
PALS_Id : aadlstring applies to (system, process, thread group, thread);
PALS_Period : Time applies to (system, process, thread group, thread);
PALS_Connection_Id : aadlstring applies to (connection, port);
PALS_Output_Time: Time_Range => 0 ns .. 0 ns applies to (system, process, thread group, thread);
PALS_Synchronizer_Type: enumeration (Multi_Rate_Synchronizer, Environment_Input_Synchronizer,
Environment_Output_Synchronizer, NOT_SYNCHRONIZER) => NOT_SYNCHRONIZER
applies to (system, process, thread);
PALS_Base_Component: aadlboolean => false applies to (thread, thread group);
PALS_Implementation_Component: aadlboolean => false applies to (thread group);
Computation: PALS_Properties::Supported_Computation applies to (thread, thread group, process);
Supported_Computation: type enumeration (Multi_Rate_Base_Computation, Synchronous_Computation,
Output_Delay_Computation, Pals_Event_Generator);
Multi_Rate_Synchronizer_Operation : PALS_Properties::Supported_Synchronizer_Operation =>
Last_Message_Only applies to (port, thread);
Supported_Synchronizer_Operation: type enumeration (Last_Message_Only);
end PALS_Properties;
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APPENDIX C
ACTIVE-STANDBY SYSTEM
This chapter provides the complete Synchronous AADL model of the active-standby system, men-
tioned in Section 3.3.2. There are 4 AADL packages in this system: MainModule, Side1, Side2,
and Environment. MainModule describes the top-level (main) system. The other packages describe
the system-process-thread hierarchy of the two sides and the environemnet. We use AADLv2 to
model this system.
C.1 Package: Main Module
package MainModule
public
with Side1;
with Side2;
with Environment;
with SynchAADL;
system ActiveStandbySystem
end ActiveStandbySystem;
system implementation ActiveStandbySystem.impl
subcomponents
sideOne: system Side1::Side1.impl;
sideTwo: system Side2::Side2.impl;
env: system Environment::Environment.impl;
connections
C1: port sideOne.side1ActiveSide -> sideTwo.side1ActiveSide;
C2: port sideTwo.side2ActiveSide -> sideOne.side2ActiveSide;
C3: port env.side1FullyAvail -> sideOne.side1FullyAvail;
C4: port env.side1FullyAvail -> sideTwo.side1FullyAvail;
C5: port env.side2FullyAvail -> sideOne.side2FullyAvail;
C6: port env.side2FullyAvail -> sideTwo.side2FullyAvail;
C7: port env.manualSelection -> sideOne.manualSelection;
C8: port env.manualSelection -> sideTwo.manualSelection;
C9: port env.side1Failed -> sideOne.side1Failed;
C10: port env.side2Failed -> sideTwo.side2Failed;
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properties
SynchAADL::Synchronous => true;
SynchAADL::syncPeriod => 2 Ms;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic applies to sideTwo.sideProcess.sideThread;
SynchAADL::Deterministic => true applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => false applies to sideOne.sideProcess.sideThread;
SynchAADL::Deterministic => true applies to sideTwo.sideProcess.sideThread;
SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => false applies to sideTwo.sideProcess.sideThread;
Period => 2 ms;
Timing => Delayed applies to C1;
Timing => Delayed applies to C2;
Timing => Immediate applies to C3;
Timing => Immediate applies to C4;
Timing => Immediate applies to C5;
Timing => Immediate applies to C6;
Timing => Immediate applies to C7;
Timing => Immediate applies to C8;
Timing => Immediate applies to C9;
Timing => Immediate applies to C10;
end ActiveStandbySystem.impl;
end MainModule;
C.2 Package: Side1
package Side1
public
with Base_Types;
with Data_Model;
with SynchAADL;
system Side1
features
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side1;
system implementation Side1.impl
subcomponents
sideProcess: process Side1Process.impl;
connections
port side1FullyAvail -> sideProcess.side1FullyAvail;
port side2FullyAvail -> sideProcess.side2FullyAvail;
123
port side2ActiveSide -> sideProcess.side2ActiveSide;
port manualSelection -> sideProcess.manualSelection;
port side1Failed -> sideProcess.side1Failed;
port sideProcess.side1ActiveSide -> side1ActiveSide;
end Side1.impl;
process Side1Process
features
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side1Process;
process implementation Side1Process.impl
subcomponents
sideThread: thread Side1Thread.impl;
connections
port side1FullyAvail -> sideThread.side1FullyAvail;
port side2FullyAvail -> sideThread.side2FullyAvail;
port side2ActiveSide -> sideThread.side2ActiveSide;
port manualSelection -> sideThread.manualSelection;
port sideThread.side1ActiveSide -> side1ActiveSide;
port side1Failed -> sideThread.side1Failed;
end Side1Process.impl;
thread Side1Thread
features
Dispatch: in event port;
Complete: out event port;
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
properties
Required_Connection => false applies to Dispatch;
Required_Connection => false applies to Complete;
Required_Connection => false applies to side1FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to side1FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to side2FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to side2FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to side1Failed;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("false") applies to side1Failed;
end Side1Thread;
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-- final state needs to be handled in Maude.
-- data types.
thread implementation Side1Thread.impl
annex behavior_specification {**
variables
prevSide2ActiveSide : Base_Types::Integer;
prevmanualSelection : Base_Types::Boolean;
states
preInit : initial complete final state;
initState, side1FailedState, side2FailedState, side1WaitState, side1ActiveState,
side2ActiveState : complete state;
initState_tmp, side1FailedState_tmp, side2FailedState_tmp, side1WaitState_tmp,
side1ActiveState_tmp, side2ActiveState_tmp : state;
transitions
preInit -[ on dispatch ]-> initState {
prevSide2ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false };
initState -[ on dispatch ]-> initState_tmp;
initState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide2ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false};
initState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false};
side1FailedState-[ on dispatch ]->side1FailedState_tmp;
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side1WaitState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2FailedState-[ on dispatch ]->side2FailedState_tmp;
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side1WaitState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
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prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1WaitState -[ on dispatch ]-> side1WaitState_tmp;
side1WaitState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side1ActiveState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1WaitState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1WaitState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState -[ on dispatch ]-> side1ActiveState_tmp;
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and prevSide2ActiveSide != 2 and side2ActiveSide = 2 ]
-> side2ActiveState {
side1ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and (prevSide2ActiveSide = 2 or
side2ActiveSide != 2) and side2ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side1ActiveState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState -[ on dispatch ]-> side2ActiveState_tmp;
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 and
side1FullyAvail = true and (prevmanualSelection = false and manualSelection = true
or side2FullyAvail = false) ]-> side1ActiveState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = true ]-> side1FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 0;
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prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side2FailedState {
side1ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side1Failed = false and side2ActiveSide != 0 and
(side1FullyAvail = false or side2FullyAvail = true and (prevmanualSelection = true or
manualSelection = false)) ]-> side2ActiveState {
side1ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide2ActiveSide := side2ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
**};
end Side1Thread.impl;
end Side1;
C.3 Package: Side2
package Side2
public
with Base_Types;
with Data_Model;
with SynchAADL;
system Side2
features
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side2;
system implementation Side2.impl
subcomponents
sideProcess: process Side2Process.impl;
connections
port side1FullyAvail -> sideProcess.side1FullyAvail;
port side2FullyAvail -> sideProcess.side2FullyAvail;
port side1ActiveSide -> sideProcess.side1ActiveSide;
port manualSelection -> sideProcess.manualSelection;
port side2Failed -> sideProcess.side2Failed;
port sideProcess.side2ActiveSide -> side2ActiveSide;
end Side2.impl;
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process Side2Process
features
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
end Side2Process;
process implementation Side2Process.impl
subcomponents
sideThread: thread Side2Thread.impl;
connections
port side1FullyAvail -> sideThread.side1FullyAvail;
port side2FullyAvail -> sideThread.side2FullyAvail;
port side1ActiveSide -> sideThread.side1ActiveSide;
port manualSelection -> sideThread.manualSelection;
port side2Failed -> sideThread.side2Failed;
port sideThread.side2ActiveSide -> side2ActiveSide;
end Side2Process.impl;
thread Side2Thread
features
Dispatch: in event port;
Complete: out event port;
side1FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1ActiveSide: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
side2Failed: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2ActiveSide: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
manualSelection: in data port Base_Types::Boolean;
properties
Required_Connection => false applies to Dispatch;
Required_Connection => false applies to Complete;
Required_Connection => false applies to side1FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to side1FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to side2FullyAvail;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("true") applies to side2FullyAvail;
Required_Connection => false applies to side2Failed;
Data_Model::Initial_Value => ("false") applies to side2Failed;
end Side2Thread;
thread implementation Side2Thread.impl
annex behavior_specification {**
variables
prevSide1ActiveSide: Base_Types::Integer;
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prevmanualSelection: Base_Types::Boolean;
states
preInit : initial complete final state;
initState, side1FailedState, side2FailedState,
side2WaitState, side1ActiveState,
side2ActiveState : complete state;
initState_tmp, side1FailedState_tmp, side2FailedState_tmp,
side2WaitState_tmp, side1ActiveState_tmp,
side2ActiveState_tmp : state;
transitions
preInit -[ on dispatch ]-> initState {
prevSide1ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false};
initState -[ on dispatch ]-> initState_tmp;
initState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false};
initState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := 0;
prevmanualSelection := false};
side2FailedState -[ on dispatch ]-> side2FailedState_tmp;
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side2WaitState {
side2ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1FailedState -[ on dispatch ]-> side1FailedState_tmp;
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side2WaitState {
side2ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1FailedState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
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side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2WaitState -[ on dispatch ]-> side2WaitState_tmp;
side2WaitState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side1ActiveState {
side2ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2WaitState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2WaitState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState -[ on dispatch ]-> side1ActiveState_tmp;
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide != 0 and
side2FullyAvail = true and (prevmanualSelection = false and manualSelection = true or
side1FullyAvail = false) ]-> side2ActiveState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side1ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide != 0 and
(side2FullyAvail = false or side1FullyAvail = true and (prevmanualSelection = true or
manualSelection = false)) ]-> side1ActiveState {
side2ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState -[ on dispatch ]-> side2ActiveState_tmp;
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = true ]-> side2FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 0;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and side1ActiveSide = 0 ]-> side1FailedState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
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prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and prevSide1ActiveSide != 1 and
side1ActiveSide = 1 ]-> side1ActiveState {
side2ActiveSide := 1;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
side2ActiveState_tmp -[ side2Failed = false and (prevSide1ActiveSide = 1 or side1ActiveSide != 1) and
side1ActiveSide != 0 ]-> side2ActiveState {
side2ActiveSide := 2;
prevSide1ActiveSide := side1ActiveSide;
prevmanualSelection := manualSelection};
**};
end Side2Thread.impl;
end Side2;
C.4 Package: Environment
package Environment
public
with SynchAADL;
with Base_Types;
system Environment
features
side1FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
manualSelection: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
end Environment;
system implementation Environment.impl
subcomponents
envProcess: process EnvironmentProcess.impl;
connections
C1: port envProcess.side1FullyAvail -> side1FullyAvail;
C2: port envProcess.side2FullyAvail -> side2FullyAvail;
C3: port envProcess.manualSelection -> manualSelection;
C4: port envProcess.side1Failed -> side1Failed;
C5: port envProcess.side2Failed -> side2Failed;
end Environment.impl;
process EnvironmentProcess
features
side1FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
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side2FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
manualSelection: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
end EnvironmentProcess;
process implementation EnvironmentProcess.impl
subcomponents
envThread: thread EnvironmentThread.impl;
connections
C1: port envThread.side1FullyAvail -> side1FullyAvail;
C2: port envThread.side2FullyAvail -> side2FullyAvail;
C3: port envThread.manualSelection -> manualSelection;
C4: port envThread.side1Failed -> side1Failed;
C5: port envThread.side2Failed -> side2Failed;
end EnvironmentProcess.impl;
thread EnvironmentThread
features
side1FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2FullyAvail: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
manualSelection: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side1Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
side2Failed: out data port Base_Types::Boolean;
end EnvironmentThread;
thread implementation EnvironmentThread.impl
properties
-- Uninitialized values will be chosen randomly
SynchAADL::InputConstraints => ("not (s1F and s2F)");
SynchAADL::IsEnvironment => true;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
annex behavior_specification {**
variables
s1FA: Base_Types::Boolean;
s2FA: Base_Types::Boolean;
mS: Base_Types::Boolean;
s1F: Base_Types::Boolean;
s2F: Base_Types::Boolean;
states
preInit : initial complete final state;
s0 : complete state;
transitions
preInit -[ on dispatch ]-> s0 {
s1FA := true;
s2FA := true;
mS := false;
s1F := false;
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s2F := false};
s0 -[ on dispatch ]-> s0 {
side1FullyAvail := s1FA;
side2FullyAvail := s2FA;
manualSelection := mS;
side1Failed := s1F;
side2Failed := s2F};
**};
end EnvironmentThread.impl;
end Environment;
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APPENDIX D
HIERARCHICAL CONTROL SYSTEM
In this chapter, we give an AADL code snippet of an example of the multi-rate PALS pattern.
We apply this pattern in the supervisory control synchronization of a hierarchical control system
discussed in Chapter 5.
(a) Top-level system component. (b) Replicated rudder control subsystem.
Figure D.1: Application of the multi-rate PALS pattern on the hierarchical control system.
The top-level AADL diagram of this example system is presented in Figure D.1a. This system
consists of a supervisory controller subsystem SCS, an aileron servo controller subsystem ACS, and
a rudder servo controller subsystem RCS. In Figure D.1b, we show the internal structure of the
system component RCS, which contains two rudder servo controllers RCS1 and RCS2, an actuator RA,
and a sensor RS. Similar to our discussion in Chapter 5, both rudder servo controllers receive the
setpoint commands, SpRD1 and SpRD2, from the supervisory controllers and the sampled data RSD
from the sensor. Both RCS1 and RCS2 exchange their heardbeat status Status for the redundancy
management. Output of the rudder servo controllers, RCD1 and RCD2, are passed to the supervisory
controller and the actuator. Only the active controller’s output is used to control the actuator.
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The architectural models of the pattern instance is shown in Figure D.2a, D.2b, and D.2c.
Here we add a multi-rate synchronizer, called Synch_Supervisory_Control. The multi-rate syn-
chronizer only affects the data flow of SpRD1 and SpRD2 that are used in the supervisory control
synchronization. The multi-rate synchronizer guarantees that the setpoint commands are processed
consistently at the servo controllers in every hyper-period interval. We then form a new thread
group with this multi-rate synchronizer and replace the original component in the process element
with the new thread group.
(a) A computation component RCT inside the process element of RCS1
(before the pattern is applied).
(b) A thread group, named RCT Group Supervisory Control, is created
with a multi-rate synchronizer and RCT.
(c) RCT is replaced with RCT Group Supervisory Control after the
application of the pattern.
Figure D.2: An application of the multi-rate PALS pattern in a hierarchical control system.
D.1 Input Model
In this section, we give the input AADL model of the multi-rate PALS pattern for supervi-
sory control synchronization. In this model, Rudder_Control_Threads.servo is the main in-
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put component. It has already been formed after the pattern instantiation of the group, “Rud-
der Control”. In this model, we apply the multi-rate PALS pattern for the connections that define
PALS_Connection_Id=>"Supervisory_Control" in the process component.
process Rudder_Control_Process
features
RSD: in event data port;
SpRD1: in event data port;
SpRD2: in event data port;
RCD: out event data port;
Status: out event data port;
Other_Status: in event data port;
end Rudder_Control_Process;
-- Input process implementation.
process implementation Rudder_Control_Process.old
subcomponents
RCT: thread group Rudder_Control_Threads.servo;
connections
C1: port SpRD1 -> RCT.SpRD2;
C2: port SpRD2 -> RCT.SpRD2;
C3: port RCT.Status -> Status;
C4: port RSD -> RCT.RSD ;
C5: port Other_Status -> RCT.Other_Status;
C6: port RCT.RCD -> RCD;
properties
-- PALS_Connection_Id is used to define the logically synchronous interactions.
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Supervisory_Control" applies to C1;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Supervisory_Control" applies to C2;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C3;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C4;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C5;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C6;
PALS_Properties::Computation => Multi_Rate_Base_Computation applies to RCT;
end Rudder_Control_Process.old;
thread group Rudder_Control_Threads
features
RSD: in event data port;
SpRD1: in event data port;
SpRD2: in event data port;
RCD: out event data port;
Status: out event data port;
Other_Status: in event data port;
end Rudder_Control_Threads;
-- Input computation component.
thread group implementation Rudder_Control_Threads.servo
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subcomponents
RC: thread Rudder_ServoControl_Thread.impl;
Synch_Servo: thread Rudder_Servo_SynchThread.impl;
connections
port RSD -> Synch_Servo.RSD_in;
port Synch_Servo.RSD_out -> RC.RSD;
port Other_Status -> Synch_Servo.Other_Status_in;
port Synch_Servo.Other_Status_out -> RC.Other_Status;
port RC.RCD -> RCD;
port RC.Status -> Status;
port SpRD1 -> RC.SpRD1;
port SpRD2 -> RC.SpRD2;
properties
PALS_Properties::PALS_Id => "Rudder_Servo_Control";
PALS_Properties::PALS_Period => 30 Ms;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Output_Time => 10 Ms .. 11 Ms;
Period => 30 Ms;
Deadline => 24 Ms;
Priority => 20;
end Rudder_Control_Threads.servo;
thread Rudder_ServoControl_Thread
features
RSD: in event data port;
SpRD1: in event data port;
SpRD2: in event data port;
RCD: out event data port;
Status: out event data port;
Other_Status: in event data port;
end Rudder_ServoControl_Thread;
thread implementation Rudder_ServoControl_Thread.impl
properties
PALS_Properties::PALS_Base_Component => true;
...
end Rudder_ServoControl_Thread.impl;
thread Rudder_Servo_SynchThread
features
RSD_in: in event data port;
RSD_out: out event data port;
Other_Status_in: in event data port;
Other_Status_out: out event data port;
end Rudder_Servo_SynchThread;
thread implementation Rudder_Servo_SynchThread.impl
properties
...
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end Rudder_Servo_SynchThread.impl;
D.2 Output Model
After the application of this pattern, we create a thread group Rudder_Control_Threads.supv
and add it as a subcomponent of the process implementation Rudder_Control_Process.new. This
thread group contains the input thread group and the instantiated multi-rate synchronizer. In
the output model, we also define the required timing, scheduling and PALS properties in these
instantiated components. In the following, we give the code snippet of the output model:
process implementation Rudder_Control_Process.new
subcomponents
RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control: thread group Rudder_Control_Threads.supv;
connections
C1: port SpRD1 -> RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.SpRD2;
C2: port SpRD2 -> RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.SpRD2;
C3: port RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.Status -> Status;
C4: port RSD -> RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.RSD ;
C5: port Other_Status -> RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.Other_Status;
C6: port RCT_Group_Supervisory_Control.RCD -> RCD;
properties
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Supervisory_Control" applies to C1;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Supervisory_Control" applies to C2;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C3;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C4;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C5;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Connection_Id => "Rudder_Control" applies to C6;
end Rudder_Control_Process.new;
thread group implementation Rudder_Control_Threads.supv
subcomponents
RCT: thread group Rudder_Control_Threads.servo;
Synch_Supervisory_Control: thread Rudder_Supervisor_SynchThread.impl;
connections
port RSD -> RCT.RSD;
port RCT.RCD -> RCD;
port RCT.Status -> Status;
port Other_Status -> RCT.Other_Status;
port SpRD1 -> Synch_Supervisory_Control.SpRD1_in;
port Synch_Supervisory_Control.SpRD1_out -> RCT.SpRD1;
port SpRD2 -> Synch_Supervisory_Control.SpRD2_in;
port Synch_Supervisory_Control.SpRD2_out -> RCT.SpRD2;
properties
-- Properties of this newly formed thread group.
138
PALS_Properties::PALS_Id => "Supervisory_Control";
PALS_Properties::PALS_Period => 120ms;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Output_Time => 8 Ms .. 12 Ms;
Period => 30 Ms;
Deadline => 24 Ms;
Priority => 20;
PALS_Properties::Computation => Multi_Rate_Base_Computation applies to RCT;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Synchronizer_Type => Multi_Rate_Synchronizer applies to Synch_Supervisory_Control;
end Rudder_Control_Threads.supv;
-- New multi-rate synchronizer.
thread Rudder_Supervisor_SynchThread
features
SpRD1_in: in event data port;
SpRD1_out: out event data port;
SpRD2_in: in event data port;
SpRD2_out: out event data port;
end Rudder_Supervisor_SynchThread;
thread implementation Rudder_Supervisor_SynchThread.impl
properties
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
PALS_Properties::PALS_Output_Time => 8 Ms .. 9 Ms;
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
Period => 120 Ms;
Deadline => 10 Ms;
Priority => 30;
end Rudder_Supervisor_SynchThread.impl;
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APPENDIX E
MULTICAST RELAY MODEL IN AADL
In this chapter, we give an AADL model of the multicast relay nodes of the fault-tolerant commu-
nication protocol of Section 6.3. As discussed in the protocol description, the source task transmits
a message to all relays in the system. The relay nodes then exchange the source message within
themselves and deliver to the destination tasks.
The first part of this model is to implement the multicast group of relay nodes. We can easily
implement the protocol in AADL by defining components for a given number of relay nodes and the
interconnections with the PALS tasks. Figure E.1 gives a graphical representation of the AADL
model with two relay nodes (Relay1, Relay2) and two PALS tasks (Task1, Task2). In the original
PALS model (Figure E.1a), these PALS tasks send and receive one data in every period. We form
an AADL system of type MulticastSystem surrounding the relays (Figure E.1b). Each relay node
implements an aperiodic thread to act on the incoming source message or the message from other
relays during each multicast operation unless it has failed.
However, a naive implementation for a given number of relays is not sufficient. We must design
the model to support its extensions. Especially, a designer must be able to add or remove any relay
node from the configuration with minimal changes to the AADL model. In AADLv1, making a
simple change like this one is not easy. One has to redefine the interfaces and connections of each
relay node and its surrounding hierarchical components.
Fortunately, we can now have a simpler design solution in AADLv2. For subcomponents of
identical type and similar connection patterns, AADLv2 now supports two features: array of com-
ponents and a property called Connection_Pattern that declares the connection pattern to/from
these components. For example, in this protocol, we define the relay nodes as an array of process
element in MulticastSystem. For a connection from a source PALS task to array of relay nodes,
we use the property value One_To_All for the Connection_Pattern property, which intuitively
gives that the multicast nature of the connection. Similarly, for the connections from the array of
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Figure E.1: Multicast relays in AADL.
relay nodes to a destination task, we set the value of Connection_Pattern to All_To_One. For
the connections between the relay nodes, we resort to a simpler model. Instead of defining event
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data ports for each application message, we define a pair of one input port and one output port
for each relay, given by fromOtherRelays and toOtherRelays, respectively. We assume that the
message communications between two relays are generic and happen through a single event data
port. Both input and output even data ports have the same data type and the size is equal to the
maximum of the size of all application messages. We also set the property of Connection_Pattern
for the connections between these relay nodes as All_To_All. This helps us model the fact that
each relay node communicates all relay nodes, especially when it receives a new message from either
the source PALS task or other relay nodes.
Figure E.2 gives the AADL code snippet with an example of array of relay nodes. We define
an abstract AADL component, called AbstractRelay, containing the ports: fromOtherRelays
and toOtherRelays. The thread and the process components of the relay node can extend this
abstract component. For example, we define a process component Relay, with ports for application
messages from two PALS tasks. We then use this process to form an array of relay nodes and
define the connections in a system implementation, called MulticastSystem.basic. Later on, we
integrate this system component with the PALS tasks to form the final implementation model such
as ExampleWithRelays.impl.
Note: In order to support the event-triggered dispatch, we use an event data port at the relay
nodes. On the other hand, the use of the event data port at the PALS task is optional. It depends
on the incoming data rate and the task period. For example, a single-rate PALS system assumes
a data port for the message communication. In such case, we model the connection end at the
PALS tasks with a data port, while the other connection end at the relay nodes still use an event
data port. AADLv2 supports different port categories at the connection ends. Such differentiation
only affects the queuing behavior at the connection ends. In this scenario at the single-rate PALS
system, the data port’s content at a receiving PALS task is overwritten by the incoming data from
the relay nodes. The PALS fault model assumes that the source and the relay nodes are fail-stop.
Since the proposed protocol guarantees consistency, an overwrite at an input port does not affect
the correctness of the application. The receiving PALS tasks process identical messages from a
non-faulty source task.
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abstract AbstractRelay
features
fromOtherRelays: in event data port; toOtherRelays: out event data port;
end AbstractRelay;
process Relay extends AbstractRelay
features
inData1: in event data port; inData2: in event data port;
outData1: out event data port; outData2: out event data port;
end Relay;
process implementation Relay.impl
subcomponents
task : thread RelayThread.impl;
connections
port inData1 -> task.inData1;
port inData2 -> task.inData2;
port task.outData1 -> outData1;
port task.outData2 -> outData2;
port task.toOtherRelays -> toOtherRelays;
port fromOtherRelays -> task.fromOtherRelays;
end Relay.impl;
system MulticastSystem
features
inData1: in event data port; inData2: in event data port;
outData1: out event data port; outData2: out event data port;
end MulticastSystem;
system implementation MulticastSystem.basic
subcomponents
allrelays : process Relay [10];
connections
inData1ToRelays: port inData1 -> allrelays.inData1
{ Connection_Pattern => ((One_To_All)); };
inData2ToRelays: port inData2 -> allrelays.inData2
{ Connection_Pattern => ((One_To_All)); };
relaysToOutData1: port allrelays.outData1 -> outData1
{ Connection_Pattern => ((All_To_One)); };
relaysToOutData2: port allrelays.outData2 -> outData2
{ Connection_Pattern => ((All_To_One)); };
CntoOtherRelays: port allrelays.toOtherRelays -> allRelays.fromOtherRelays
{ Connection_Pattern => ((All_To_All)); };
end MulticastSystem.basic;
system implementation ExampleWithRelays.impl
subcomponents
task1 : process Node::Task1.impl;
task2 : process Node::Task2.impl;
multicastRelays : system MulticastSystem.basic;
connections
task1ToRelays: port task1.outData1 -> multicastRelays.inData1;
task2ToRelays: port task2.outData2 -> multicastRelays.inData2;
relaysToTask1: port multicastRelays.outData2 -> task1.inData2;
relaysToTask2: port multicastRelays.outData1 -> task2.inData1;
end ExampleWithRelays.impl;
Figure E.2: AADL model with array of relay nodes.
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APPENDIX F
OVERVIEW OF CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION ALGORITHMS
In this chapter, we give an overview of the basic operations of the clock synchronization algorithms.
Generally, the nodes in a clock synchronization algorithm are categorized into two groups: clock
masters (reference clock servers) and clock slaves. The masters have access to high-precision refer-
ence clocks such as atomic clock, GPS. On the other hand, the slaves use regular clocks. Each node
executes a clock synchronizer process. The clock synchronizer periodically computes an estimate
of the clock offset θ based on the round-trip delay δ between a master and a slave. The slave then
adjusts its local clock by using these estimates.
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Figure F.1: Clock synchronization modes.
Basic operations. There are two common operational modes, in which the slaves compute
the clock offset and the round-trip delay: master-slave mode and broadcast mode. Figure F.2
illustrates these two approaches. The operational mode in a clock synchronizer depends on the
network architecture. If the network does not support broadcasts, then the master-slave mode is
applied.
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In the master-slave mode, a slave node periodically sends a message to a master node requesting
the master’s local clock time. Let the slave sends the request at its local clock time t1, and the
master receives the message at its local clock time t2. The master replies a message to the slave
with the time t2 in its packet. Let the reply message is sent at time t3, and the slave receives the
reply at time t4. Based on these 4 timestamps, the slave node computes an estimate of the clock
offset relative to the master node [61]:
δ = [(t4 − t1)− (t3 − t2)];
θ = [(t2 − t1) + (t3 − t4)]/2
In the broadcast mode, a master node initiates the message communications. The master broad-
casts a sync message at a regular interval to the slave nodes. Suppose that the master node
broadcasts the sync message at its local clock time t1, and a slave node receives this message at
its local clock time t2. In order to share the send time t1 with the slave nodes, the master node
usually broadcasts another (follow-up) message with the time t1 in the packet. In order to estimate
the network delay and the offset, the slave nodes infrequently transmits a delay-request message
to the master at time t5. The master receives the delay-request message at time t6. In a similar
approach as the master-slave mode, the master replies back to the slave with the time t6 in the
(delay-response) packet. Thus, when the slave receives this reply at time t7, it becomes aware of
4 relevant timestamps: t1, t2, t5, and t6. Based on these timestamps, the slave node computes the
clock offset and the round-trip time in the following way: [128].
δ = [(t6 − t1)− (t5 − t2)];
θ = −[(t2 − t1) + (t5 − t6)]/2
The performance of a clock synchronization algorithm depends on many factors. Primarily,
the uncertainty in the measurement of the network latency affects the performance. The clock
synchronizers often assume symmetric communication channels between the master and the slave
nodes. Thus, the asymmetric delay in the communication channels affect the estimation of the
one-way delay from the round-trip delay. Furthermore, the computations of the send and receive
timestamps are not always accurate, especially when they are done in the software. Inaccuracies
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in these computations also affect the performance.
Byzantine fault tolerance. The performance of the clock synchronizers also depends on the
quality and correctness of the clock of the master node. Existing research works consider different
fault models of the master clocks. One common form of fault-tolerance considered in the literature
is the Byzantine fault tolerance [129].
In this fault model, the master node can give an arbitrary (wrong) clock time to the slaves.
In order to handle the arbitrary clock failure, a slave node estimates its relative clock offset with
respect to N master nodes. It uses a “fault-tolerant average”, also called a convergence function, on
these estimates [63]. For example, a fault-tolerant average of N clock offsets is equal to the average
of (N − 2f) clock offsets, after discarding f highest and f lowest clock offsets. Here, N ≥ 2f + 1
where f is the maximum number of faulty master nodes.
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Figure F.2: Worst-case clock offset conditions for clocks c1 and c2 at global time t. The dashed
lines give the slope for worst-case clock drift rates.
Relating the clock offset and the clock skew. The performance of the clock synchronization
algorithms is generally defined by the maximum clock offset with respect to the global time. Let
the maximum clock offset is ∆, that is |c(t)− t| ≤ ∆ for all global time t.
In the PALS system, we assume that the clock skew is bounded. Let the maximum clock skew
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is . If c(t) = x, then the global time t happens in the global time interval [x− , x+ ].
We can see that there is a subtle difference in the definition of clock skew and clock offset. While
the clock offset gives the time difference between the local clock time and the current global time,
the clock skew gives the interval between the current global time t and the global time at which
the local clock time is equal to t.
We can however easily define the clock skew in terms of the clock offset. The relation between
these two parameters is based on the maximum clock drift rate. If the maximum clock drift rate is
ρ, then  = (1 + ρ)∆. The maximum clock drift rate is defined below:
1− ρ ≤ c(t1)− c(t2)
t1 − t2 ≤ 1 + ρ
To prove this relationship, consider a worst-case scenario in which any two clocks c1 and c2 have
the worst-case relative clock offset at the global time t. Suppose c1(t) and c2(t) are at the worst
condition and equal to t + ∆ and t − ∆, respectively. Figure F.2 illustrates this scenario at the
points x1 and x2, respectively.
Let the clocks c1 and c2 are equal to t at the global time t1 and t2, respectively. Thus, if the
maximum clock drift rate is ρ, then c1(t1) = t can happen at an earliest global time t−∆/(1−ρ) =
t−∆(1 + ρ) based on the smallest slope (1− ρ). Similarly, c2(t2) = t can happen at a latest global
time t+ ∆(1 + ρ). Thus, it easily follows that in the worst-case scenario,  = ∆(1 + ρ).
147
REFERENCES
[1] J. Potocti de Montalk, “Computer software in civil aircraft,” in Proceedings of DASC, 1991.
[2] R. N. Charette, “This car runs on code,” IEEE Spectrum, 2009.
[3] P. H. Feiler, J. Hansson, D. de Niz, and L. Wrage, “System architecture virtual integra-
tion: An industrial case study,” Technical Note, CMU/SEI-2009-TR-017, ESC-TR-2009-017,
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/09tr017.pdf , 2007.
[4] RTCA, “DO-178B - software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification,”
RTCA Inc., 1992.
[5] RTCA, “DO-178C - software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification,”
RTCA Inc., 2011.
[6] Y. Yeh, “Triple-triple redundant 777 primary flight computer,” in Proceedings of Aerospace
Applications Conference, 1996.
[7] J. Lala and L. Alger, “Hardware and software fault tolerance: A unified architectural ap-
proach,” in Fault-Tolerant Computing, 1988. FTCS-18, Digest of Papers., Eighteenth Inter-
national Symposium on, pp. 240–245, IEEE, 1988.
[8] W. Torres-Pomales et al., “Software fault tolerance: A tutorial,” NASA Technical Report,
NASA-2000-tm210616, 2000.
[9] M. Daughan, “Seawolf submarine ship control system: A case study of a fault-tolerant de-
sign,” Naval engineers journal, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 54–70, 1994.
[10] L. Sha and J. Meseguer, “Design of complex cyber physical systems with formalized archi-
tectural patterns,” Software-Intensive Systems and New Computing Paradigms, pp. 92–100,
2008.
[11] D. D. Cofer, “Complexity-reducing design patterns for cyber-physical systems,” AFRL Tech-
nical Report AFRL-RZ-WP-TR-2011-2098, 2011.
[12] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides, Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable
Object-Oriented Software. Addison-Wesley, 1995.
[13] D. Chapiro, “Globally-asynchronous locally-synchronous systems,” Ph. D. Thesis, vol. 1,
p. 50, 1984.
[14] J. Muttersbach, T. Villiger, and W. Fichtner, “Practical design of globally-asynchronous
locally-synchronous systems,” in Proceedings of ASYNC, IEEE, 2000.
148
[15] S. P. Miller, D. D. Cofer, L. Sha, J. Meseguer, and A. Al-Nayeem, “Implementing logical
synchrony in integrated modular avionics,” in Proceedings of DASC, 2009.
[16] NuSMV, “http://nusmv.fbk.eu.”
[17] S. P. Miller, M. W. Whalen, D. OBrien, M. P. Heimdahl, and A. Joshi, “A methodology for
the design and verification of globally asynchronous/locally synchronous architectures,” in
NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2005-213912, September 2005.
[18] B. Awerbuch, “Complexity of network synchronization,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 32,
pp. 804–823, Oct. 1985.
[19] S. Tripakis, C. Pinello, A. Benveniste, A. S. Vincent, P. Caspi, and M. D. Natale, “Imple-
menting synchronous models on loosely time triggered architectures,” IEEE Transactions on
Computers, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 1300–1314, 2008.
[20] G. Tel, E. Korach, and S. Zaks, “Synchronizing abd networks,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 66–69, 1994.
[21] L. Sha, A. Al-Nayeem, M. Sun, J. Meseguer, and P. C. O¨lveczky, “PALS: Physically Asyn-
chronous Logically Synchronous Systems,” UIUC Technical Report http://hdl.handle.
net/2142/11897.
[22] J. Meseguer and P. C. O¨lveczky, “Formalization and correctness of the PALS architectural
pattern for distributed real-time systems,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 451, pp. 1–37,
2012.
[23] A. Al-Nayeem, M. Sun, X. Qiu, L. Sha, S. P. Miller, and D. D. Cofer, “A formal architecture
pattern for real-time distributed systems,” in Proceedings of RTSS, 2009.
[24] Society of Automotive Engineers, “SAE standards: Architecture analysis & design language
(AADL),” AS5506A, 2009.
[25] K. Bae, P. O¨lveczky, A. Al-Nayeem, and J. Meseguer, “Synchronous AADL and its formal
analysis in real-time maude,” in Proceedings of ICFEM, 2011.
[26] A. Al-Nayeem, L. Sha, D. D. Cofer, and S. P. Miller, “Pattern-based composition and analysis
of virtually synchronized real-time distributed systems,” in Proceedings of ICCPS, 2012.
[27] C. Kim, A. Al-Nayeem, H. Yun, P.-L. Wu, and L. Sha, “PALS/PRISM software design de-
scription (SDD): Ver. 0.51,” UIUC Technical Report http://hdl.handle.net/2142/25987.
[28] P. C. O¨lveczky and J. Meseguer, “Semantics and pragmatics of real-time maude,” Higher-
order and symbolic computation, vol. 20, no. 1-2, pp. 161–196, 2007.
[29] Society of Automotive Engineers, “SAE architecture analysis and design language (AADL)
annex volume 2,” AS5506A/2, 2011.
[30] OSATE, “www.aadl.info.”
[31] J.-Y. Le Boudec and P. Thiran, Network calculus: a theory of deterministic queuing systems
for the internet, vol. 2050. Springer, 2001.
149
[32] M. Y. Nam, A tool for model-based engineering. PhD thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA, 2012.
[33] Society of Automotive Engineers, “SAE standards: Architecture analysis & design language
(AADL),” AS5506, 2004.
[34] F. Cristian, “Probabilistic Clock Synchronization,” Distributed Computing, vol. 3, no. 3,
pp. 146–158, 1989.
[35] J. Lundelius and N. Lynch, “A New Fault-Tolerant Algorithm for Clock Synchronization,”
1984.
[36] Y. Yeh, “Triple-triple redundant 777 primary flight computer,” in Aerospace Applications
Conference, 1996. Proceedings., 1996 IEEE, vol. 1, pp. 293–307, 1996.
[37] P. Ramanathan, K. G. Shin, and R. W. Butler, “Fault-tolerant clock synchronization in
distributed systems,” Computer, vol. 23, no. 10, pp. 33–42, 1990.
[38] G. Gaderer, P. Loschmidt, and T. Sauter, “Improving fault tolerance in high-precision clock
synchronization,” Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 206–215,
2010.
[39] “IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Version 2 Specification,” 2008.
[40] Aeronautical Radio Inc., “664P7 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7, Avionics Full Duplex
Switched Ethernet (AFDX) Network,” 2005.
[41] K. G. Larsen, P. Pettersson, and W. Yi, “Uppaal in a nutshell,” International Journal on
Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT), vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 134–152, 1997.
[42] V. Hadzilacos and S. Toueg, “A modular approach to fault-tolerant broadcasts and related
problems,” 1994.
[43] T. D. Chandra and S. Toueg, “Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems,”
Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 225–267, 1996.
[44] P. M. Melliar-Smith, L. E. Moser, and V. Agrawala, “Broadcast protocols for distributed
systems,” Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 17–25,
1990.
[45] M. F. Kaashoek, A. S. Tanenbaum, and S. F. Hummel, “An efficient reliable broadcast
protocol,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 5–19, 1989.
[46] A. Schiper, K. Birman, and P. Stephenson, “Lightweight causal and atomic group multicast,”
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 272–314, 1991.
[47] J.-M. Chang and N. F. Maxemchuk, “Reliable broadcast protocols,” ACM Transactions on
Computer Systems (TOCS), vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 251–273, 1984.
[48] K. Obraczka, “Multicast transport protocols: a survey and taxonomy,” Communications
Magazine, IEEE, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 94–102, 1998.
[49] K. P. Birman and T. A. Joseph, “Reliable communication in the presence of failures,” ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 47–76, 1987.
150
[50] L. E. Moser, P. M. Melliar-Smith, D. A. Agarwal, R. K. Budhia, and C. A. Lingley-
Papadopoulos, “Totem: A fault-tolerant multicast group communication system,” Commu-
nications of the ACM, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 54–63, 1996.
[51] ISIS 2, “http://isis2.codeplex.com.”
[52] F. Cristian, H. Aghili, R. Strong, and D. Dolev, “Atomic broadcast: From simple message
diffusion to byzantine agreement,” Information and Computation, vol. 118, no. 1, p. 158,
1995.
[53] H. Kopetz and G. Grunsteidl, “TTP-a time-triggered protocol for fault-tolerant real-time
systems,” in Proceedings of Fault-Tolerant Computing, FTCS-23, 1993.
[54] T. Abdelzaher, A. Shaikh, S. Johnson, F. Jahanian, and K. Shin, “RTCAST: Lightweight
Multicast for Real-Time Process Groups,” in Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Real-Time Tech-
nology and Applications Symposium, 1996.
[55] F. Cristian, “Synchronous atomic broadcast for redundant broadcast channels,” Real-Time
Systems, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 195–212, 1990.
[56] S. E. Deering and D. R. Cheriton, “Multicast routing in datagram internetworks and extended
lans,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 85–110, 1990.
[57] IEEE Standard 1588-2008, “http://ieee1588.nist.gov/.”
[58] Network Time Protocol (NTP), “www.ntp.org.”
[59] B. Simons, J. L. Welch, and N. Lynch, “An Overview of Clock Synchronization,” pp. 84–96,
1990.
[60] H. Kopetz and W. Ochsenreiter, “Clock synchronization in distributed real-time systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 100, no. 8, pp. 933–940, 1987.
[61] D. Mills, “Internet time synchronization: the network time protocol,” IEEE Transactions on
Communications, vol. 39, no. 10, pp. 1482–1493, 1991.
[62] Precision Time Protocol daemon, “http://ptpd.sourceforge.net.”
[63] F. Schneider, “Understanding protocols for byzantine clock synchronization,” 1987.
[64] Quanser, “http://www.quanser.com.”
[65] R. Hanmer, Patterns for Fault Tolerant Software. Wiley Publishing, 2007.
[66] B. P. Douglass, Real-time Design Patterns Robust Scalable Architecture for Real-time Sys-
tems. Addison-Wesley, 2006.
[67] D. Schmidt, M. Stal, H. Rohnert, F. Buschmann, and J. Wiley, Pattern-oriented Software
Architecture: Patterns for Concurrent and Networked Objects, Volume 2. Wiley, 2000.
[68] R. Allen and D. Garlan, “A formal basis for architectural connection,” ACM Transactions
on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM), vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 213–249, 1997.
151
[69] J. Dietrich and C. Elgar, “A formal description of design patterns using owl,” in Software
Engineering Conference, 2005. Proceedings. 2005 Australian, pp. 243–250, IEEE, 2005.
[70] P. S. Alencar, D. D. Cowan, and C. J. P. d. Lucena, “A formal approach to architectural
design patterns,” in FME’96: Industrial Benefit and Advances in Formal Methods, pp. 576–
594, Springer, 1996.
[71] S. K. Wahba, J. O. Hallstrom, and N. Soundarajan, “Initiating a design pattern catalog for
embedded network systems,” in Proceedings of EMSOFT, 2010.
[72] T. Taibi and D. C. L. Ngo, “Formal specification of design patterns - a balanced approach,”
Journal of Object Technology, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 127–140, 2003.
[73] P. Dissaux, J. Legrand, A. Plantec, M. Kerboeuf, and F. Singhoff, “AADL design-patterns
and tools for modelling and performance analysis of real-time systems,” in Proceedings of
Embedded Real-time Software and Systems Conference (ERTS), 2010.
[74] D. d. Niz and P. H. Feiler, “Verification of replication architectures in AADL,” in Proceedings
of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems
(ICECCS), 2009.
[75] Simulink, “www.mathworks.com/products/simulink/.”
[76] SCADE, “www.esterel-technologies.com/products/scade-suite/.”
[77] N. Halbwachs, P. Caspi, P. Raymond, and D. Pilaud, “The synchronous data flow program-
ming language LUSTRE,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 79, no. 9, pp. 1305–1320, 1991.
[78] N. Halbwachs and L. Mandel, “Simulation and verification of asynchronous systems by means
of a synchronous model,” in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Application
of Concurrency to System Design, 2006.
[79] E. Jahier, N. Halbwachs, P. Raymond, X. Nicollin, and D. Lesens, “Virtual execution of
AADL models via a translation into synchronous programs,” in Proceedings of EMSOFT,
2007.
[80] SysML, “www.sysml.org.”
[81] MARTE, “www.omgmarte.org.”
[82] K. Birman and T. Joseph, “Exploiting Virtual Synchrony in Distributed Systems,” ACM
SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 123–138, 1987.
[83] K. P. Birman, “Replication and fault-tolerance in the isis system,” ACM SIGOPS Operating
Systems Review, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 79–86, 1985.
[84] R. van Renesse, K. P. Birman, and S. Maffeis, “Horus: a flexible group communication
system,” Commun. ACM, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 76–83, 1996.
[85] K. Guo, W. Vogels, and R. van Renesse, “Structured virtual synchrony: Exploring the bounds
of virtual synchronous group communication,” in Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on ACM
SIGOPS European Workshop, 1996.
152
[86] J. Pereira, L. Rodrigues, and R. Oliveira, “Reducing the cost of group communication with
semantic view synchrony,” in Proceedings of DSN, pp. 293–302, 2002.
[87] T. H. Harrison, D. L. Levine, and D. C. Schmidt, “The design and performance of a real-time
corba event service,” in Proceedings of OOPSLA, 1997.
[88] T. Abdelzaher, S. Dawson, W.-C. Feng, F. Jahanian, S. Johnson, A. Mehra, T. Mitton,
A. Shaikh, K. Shin, Z. Wang, H. Zou, M. Bjorkland, and P. Marron, “ARMADA Middleware
and Communication Services,” Real-Time Systems, vol. 16, no. 2/3, pp. 127–153, 1999.
[89] L. Lamport, “Paxos made simple,” ACM SIGACT News, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 18–25, 2001.
[90] M. Burrows, “The chubby lock service for loosely-coupled distributed systems,” in Proceedings
of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation, pp. 335–350, USENIX
Association, 2006.
[91] J. Gray and L. Lamport, “Consensus on transaction commit,” ACM Transactions on
Database Systems (TODS), vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 133–160, 2006.
[92] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. S. Paterson, “Impossibility of distributed consensus with
one faulty process,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 374–382, 1985.
[93] D. K. Gifford, “Weighted voting for replicated data,” in Proceedings of the seventh ACM
symposium on Operating systems principles, pp. 150–162, ACM, 1979.
[94] A. Benveniste, A. Bouillard, and P. Caspi, “A unifying view of loosely time-triggered archi-
tectures,” in Proceedings of EMSOFT, 2010.
[95] C.-T. Chou, I. Cidon, I. Gopal, and S. Zaks, “Synchronizing asynchronous bounded delay
networks,” Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 38, pp. 144 –147, February 1990.
[96] E. Korach, G. Tel, and S. Zaks, Optimal synchronization of ABD networks. Springer, 1988.
[97] G. Tel, E. Korach, and S. Zaks, “Synchronizing abd networks,” Networking, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 66–69, 1994.
[98] J. Rushby, “Systematic formal verification for fault-tolerant time-triggered algorithms,” IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 25, pp. 651–660, September 1999.
[99] H. Kopetz, “The time-triggered architecture,” in Proceedings of ISORC, 1998.
[100] W. Steiner, “TTEthernet specification,” TTTech Computertechnik AG, Nov, 2008.
[101] H. Kopetz, “Fault containment and error detection in the time-triggered architecture,” in
Autonomous Decentralized Systems, 2003. ISADS 2003. The Sixth International Symposium
on, pp. 139–146, 2003.
[102] H. Pfeifer, D. Schwier, and F. W. Von Henke, “Formal verification for time-triggered clock
synchronization,” in Dependable Computing for Critical Applications 7, 1999, pp. 207–226,
IEEE, 1999.
[103] W. Steiner and B. Dutertre, “Automated formal verification of the ttethernet synchronization
quality,” in NASA Formal Methods, pp. 375–390, Springer, 2011.
153
[104] H. Kopetz, “Sparse time versus dense time in distributed real-time systems,” in Distributed
Computing Systems, 1992., Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on, pp. 460–467,
IEEE, 1992.
[105] H. Kopetz, Real-time systems: design principles for distributed embedded applications.
Springer Science+ Business Media, 2011.
[106] W. and J. Rushby, “TTA and PALS: Formally verified design patterns for distributed cyber-
physical systems,” in Proceedings of DASC, 2011.
[107] “Real-Time CORBA with TAO.” http://www.cs.wustl.edu/ schmidt/TAO.html, 2009.
[108] P. T. Eugster, P. A. Felber, R. Guerraoui, and A.-M. Kermarrec, “The many faces of pub-
lish/subscribe,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 114–131, 2003.
[109] F. Cristian, “Understanding fault-tolerant distributed systems,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 56–78, 1991.
[110] R. E. Kuehn, “Computer redundancy: design, performance, and future,” Reliability, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 3–11, 1969.
[111] L. Sha, “Using simplicity to control complexity,” IEEE Software, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 20–28,
2001.
[112] K. G. Shin and Y.-H. Lee, “Measurement and application of fault latency,” Computers, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 370–375, 1986.
[113] D. T. Stott, B. Floering, D. Burke, Z. Kalbarczpk, and R. K. Iyer, “Nftape: a framework for
assessing dependability in distributed systems with lightweight fault injectors,” in Computer
Performance and Dependability Symposium, 2000. IPDS 2000. Proceedings. IEEE Interna-
tional, pp. 91–100, IEEE, 2000.
[114] S. Dawson, F. Jahanian, T. Mitton, and T.-L. Tung, “Testing of fault-tolerant and real-
time distributed systems via protocol fault injection,” in Fault Tolerant Computing, 1996.,
Proceedings of Annual Symposium on, pp. 404–414, IEEE, 1996.
[115] M. Hendriks, “Model checking the time to reach agreement,” in Formal Modeling and Analysis
of Timed Systems, pp. 98–111, Springer, 2005.
[116] L. Lamport, “Real-time model checking is really simple,” in CHARME, pp. 162–175, 2005.
[117] K. M. Chandy, S. Mitra, and C. Pilotto, “Convergence verification: From shared memory to
partially synchronous systems,” in Formal Modeling and Analysis of Timed Systems, pp. 218–
232, Springer, 2008.
[118] C. Killian, J. W. Anderson, R. Jhala, and A. Vahdat, “Life, death, and the critical transition:
Finding liveness bugs in systems code,” in Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on
Networked systems design & implementation, pp. 18–18, USENIX Association, 2007.
[119] J. Yang, T. Chen, M. Wu, Z. Xu, X. Liu, H. Lin, M. Yang, F. Long, L. Zhang, and L. Zhou,
“Modist: Transparent model checking of unmodified distributed systems,” in NSDI, pp. 213–
228, 2009.
154
[120] K. Sen and G. Agha, “Automated systematic testing of open distributed programs,” in Fun-
damental Approaches to Software Engineering, pp. 339–356, Springer, 2006.
[121] S. Lauterburg, M. Dotta, D. Marinov, and G. A. Agha, “A framework for state-space explo-
ration of java-based actor programs,” in ASE, pp. 468–479, 2009.
[122] K. Bae, J. Meseguer, and P. O¨lveczky, “Formal patterns for multi-rate distributed real-time
systems,” in Proceedings of FACS, 2012.
[123] Rockwell Collins META Tools, “https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/aadl/index.php/RC_META.”
[124] CBMC: Bounded Model Checker for ANSI-C and C++ programs, “http://www.cprover.
org/cbmc.”
[125] A. Pnueli, In transition from global to modular temporal reasoning about programs. Springer-
Verlag, 1985.
[126] C. S. Pasareanu, M. B. Dwyer, and M. Huth, “Assume-guarantee model checking of software:
A comparative case study,” in In Theoretical and Practical Aspects of SPIN Model Checking,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1999.
[127] P. H. Feiler and D. P. Gluch, Model-Based Engineering with AADL: An Introduction to the
SAE Architecture Analysis & Design Language. Addison-Wesley Professional, 1st ed., 2012.
[128] D. Mills, “IEEE 1588 precision time protocol (PTP), http://www.eecis.udel.edu/˜mills/
ptp.html.”
[129] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, “The byzantine generals problem,” ACM Transactions
on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 382–401, 1982.
155
